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ABSTRACT 
“WHAT GOD GAVE TO US”: DIGITAL HABITUS AND THE SHIFTING SOCIAL 
IMAGINARY OF AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM 
Corrina Laughlin 
Dr. John L. Jackson Jr. 
“What God Gave to Us”: Digital habits and the shifting social imaginary of American 
evangelicalism examines how “digital habitus” (following Bourdieu, 1977; Sterne, 2000) 
has shaped the social imaginary (Taylor, 2004) of the American evangelical subculture. 
Using mixed qualitative methods including real-world ethnographic participant observa-
tion, interviews, and digital ethnography, the author presents four case studies that spring 
from what the author conceives of as a “digital unconscious” (following from Walter 
Benjamin’s (2010) notion of the “optical unconscious”) of evangelicalism. This study be-
gins by situating evangelical digital habitus in the context of the long history of media 
use in American evangelicalism, a history that has often seen this subculture using media 
technologies means to prove their fitness in the modern world. In my first case study I 
analyze how contemporary evangelical worship spaces have become infused with tech-
nology and technological products. I take Life.Church in Edmond, Oklahoma, which 
calls itself a “startup church” as the central example of how churches are adapting their 
services and spaces to meet the needs of a suburban populace increasingly defined by 
digital habitus. My second case study explores the world of faith tech. My interviews ex-
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plore how these religious entrepreneurs negotiate their place in the hierarchical culture of 
technology production centered in Silicon Valley. I also discuss how many evangelicals 
see their work as having “redemptive” potential for both the tech industry and American 
culture. In my third case study I analyze the motivations of a network of Christian mis-
sionaries who are dedicated to incorporating new media technology into missions work. I 
argue that these evangelicals are wary of corporate culture and instead identify with the 
early visionaries of the internet especially with the Free and Open Source Software 
movement. Their experiments with technology have run into problems in indigenous con-
texts and these issues have revealed the problems inherent in the Western nature of tech-
nology production. Lastly, this study turns to users and takes a network of female evan-
gelicals on Twitter as examples of a new connective feminism in evangelical culture 
brought about by the affordances of digital media.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
“Christians should be at the head of innovation and not the tail. We shouldn’t wait for 
Google or for Apple to come out with Christian innovation it should be the Christians 
trying to innovate for what is needed in the Kingdom.” (Jeyanti Yorke).  
“The day that the iPhone came out I was in Las Vegas at the Consumer Electronics Show 
in the Nokia tent. Heard the announcement... and I hit publish on a page that said how to 
get your Bible onto an iPhone.” (Antoine Wright).  
 It is a hot, sunny day in Southern California and as I walk through the landscaped 
campus of a large evangelical megachurch I see young children in water wings swimming 
in the outdoor baptismal pools. I am talking with a pastor at this church and our conversa-
tion has turned from the interview he just gave me to idle chat. He tells me about a friend 
of his who was involved in a Silicon Valley startup that is doing pretty well. The pastor 
seems a bit envious, but he thinks trying something like that himself would just be too 
risky, plus he does not have the skills he would need to succeed in the tech industry. 
Nonetheless, he wants to start getting his kids into classes for coding so they will have 
opportunities he has not had. His kids are three years old and eighteen months.  
 Lawrence Lessig (1999) has asserted that “code is law” and code is undeniably 
powerful in a twenty-first century American culture where digital products, and what this 
project conceives of as “digital habitus” has become ubiquitous. Thus the sense that this 
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pastor wants his children to code connects to his desire for his children to have power and 
influence in American culture. As this study will show, this idea is at the heart of the 
American evangelical embrace of new media technologies. In what follows, I track those 
evangelicals who fear that they are losing younger adherents and who posit that involve-
ment in new media technologies is the way to remain “relevant” in American culture. Im-
plicit in the young pastor’s hopes for his children is the sense that new media technolo-
gies are the future and if Christians want to be a part of that future, they have to prepare 
themselves for it by learning how to code. 
 Beyond the need to stay relevant in the public sphere, many American evangeli-
cals also believe that the goals and prophecies central to Christianity eschatology can 
only be met when Christians use all of the tools of the modern world at their disposal. For 
example, at Echo, an evangelical tech and media conference I attended in 2013, a social 
media consultant, Tim Schraeder, gave a presentation in which he told the audience,  
 We’ve never been more equipped and more resourced to get the message of the   
 gospel out there…I really do believe that we could be part of that generation or   
 part of raising up the next generation that could see Christ return. And we have an 
 amazing opportunity but we’re going to be held accountable for how we    
 stewarded what God gave to us. (Schraeder, 2013 July 25).  
In the cosmic play of Christian history, evangelicals see the contemporary moment as the 
final or penultimate act before the return of the Christ, or the Rapture. Given this, the 
Christians living on Earth during this time believe that they have a responsibility to do 
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everything in their power to fulfill what they call “the Great Commission,” the biblical 
imperative to bring the gospel, or the message of the Bible, to all people.  As Schraeder 1
suggests, individual believers will be judged by God based on how effectively they used 
God-given tools, like consumer media technologies, in their lifetimes. 
 These twin imperatives, cultural and theological, that animate how evangelicals 
use technology have consequences for the shape and contour of evangelical culture. New 
media technologies have transformed the primary spaces in which evangelical worship 
takes place. It is now commonplace for evangelical churches to have an app or to employ 
text-based giving. Similarly, it has become normal to imagine integrating technology into 
missions work. Prominent evangelicals argue over Twitter, and they argue about Twitter. 
And the technological products that evangelicals have developed and put into use have 
been successful, wide-reaching, and influential. For example, the Bible App, created by 
Life.Church, has been downloaded on over 300 million devices and translated into virtu-
ally every language. To create this app, Life.Church, based in Edmond, Oklahoma, hired 
developers and computer engineers from Silicon Valley and tech hubs across the country 
and assembled a group of programmers they called their “digerati team”—a feat that the 
New York Times estimates cost the church over twenty million dollars (O’Leary, 2013) 
and made it into a new hybrid institution, a “start-up church.” Successful forays into the 
technology industry like this, have allowed this subset of evangelicals an influential voice 
in mainstream evangelical publications, for example, The Christian Post named 
 A short glossary of commonly-used evangelical terms is included in Appendix A. 1
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Life.Church “the most innovative church” in 2007 (Kwon). These evangelicals have also 
circulated a Christian-based understanding of the religious affordances of technology 
both through the influence of figures like Bobby Gruenewald, the leader of Life-
Church.tv’s “digerati team” who was voted one of the most innovative people in business 
in 2011 by Fast Company, a magazine about Silicon Valley culture.  
 American evangelicalism has evolved over its history as I track in Chapter Two of 
this project. Those who consider themselves evangelicals are Christian Protestants and 
though there is much denominational, cultural, and doctrinal diversity among evangeli-
cals, they can typically be characterized by the affective, emotional relationship that they 
display in worship and activism, an understanding of Biblical literalism, and an emphasis 
on being “born again” or conversion as a central theological tenet.  As Heidi Campbell’s 2
(2010) research has shown, American evangelicals have been early adopters of new me-
dia technologies relative to other religious traditions. At every iteration in the develop-
ment of digital culture, from message boards to killer apps, evangelical Christians have 
been producing technologies and creating networks alongside and sometimes within the 
technology industry. Some of these have been passion projects, others have been for-prof-
it businesses, some have been driven by the need to proselytize, or spread the “Good 
News.” Others have been driven by the need to keep up with American cultural norms. 
Yet in the narrative of the growth of internet culture, in journalism and popular media, 
these projects and the people who have created them are typically considered with wry 
  This short definition of evangelicalism is adapted from David Bebbington’s (1989) definition which is 2
also used by the National Association of Evangelicals. 
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curiosity, if they are considered at all. But, if we accept that software is culturally coded, 
that technological products originate out of specific social milieus that carry with them 
assumptions, biases, and value-propositions, then understanding the beliefs and motiva-
tions of religious technology producers and users adds to our understanding of digital cul-
ture. To this end, this study takes seriously the endeavors that American evangelical 
Christians have made in digital culture and asks what the evangelical embrace of dis-
courses and practices endemic to Silicon Valley culture has meant for evangelical culture 
and for digital culture.  
 In light of this my study asks a series of related questions: What is revealed about 
each of these cultures in the negotiations between them? What new publics take shape as 
evangelicals shape technology? What is the meaning of technology to these Christians 
and how do they understand their role in an evolving technological culture and in a pre-
sumed technological future? What is the relationship to capitalism inherent in the em-
brace of technology that these evangelicals perform? In what ways does the evangelical 
embrace of technology discourses also mean that they replicate Silicon Valley and digital 
culture’s failures, especially in regard to race and gender?  
 My study employs a qualitative approach that combines real-world and virtual 
ethnography and interviews and focuses on four areas in which evangelicals are engaged 
with digital culture. First, I look at how evangelical churches are transforming themselves 
into tech-saturated spaces, and I visit and analyze an influential “startup church” that bor-
rows strategies from Silicon Valley tech companies. Then, I explore those business peo-
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ple who create faith-based apps in Silicon Valley and around the country and who strug-
gle to negotiate their place in Silicon Valley’s hierarchical culture. Third, I speak with 
those working to tinker with technology to make it suitable for various missionary 
projects around the globe, and whose efforts are reshaping the boundaries of the mission-
ary project and the evangelical understanding of indigenous people. And finally, I turn 
from considering technology producers to considering users and I explore how female 
bloggers garnering charismatic authority through their performance of authentic Christian 
womanhood on the internet are creating what the magazine Christianity Today has called 
a “crisis” in evangelical culture by upending patriarchal authority structures. Throughout 
these case studies, I argue that there is a widespread digital habitus in evangelical culture 
that is creating new norms and ideas and that the digio-cultural assemblage of people, 
businesses, and organizations that is emerging, which I characterize as a “digital uncon-
scious,” is changing the evangelical social imaginary, the way that evangelicals under-
stand themselves and their place in American culture.  
Definitions: Technology, evangelicalism 
 This study is focused on how evangelicals use and conceive of digital media tech-
nologies and as such I use the terms “technology,” “digital media,” and “new media” in-
terchangeably and in a way that I believe is emic to the community under study. When 
my interlocutors spoke about “technology” they were referring to consumer technologies, 
and especially those mass media technologies that have been successful in the consumer 
marketplace. Things like the iPhone, social media platforms, and virtual reality (VR) 
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hardware were included in the suite of technological products that concerned the people I 
spoke with whereas things like the washing machine, or military innovations were not. 
When they referenced the history of technology they nearly always referenced the print-
ing press, understood to be the reason that the Bible was able to be read in vernacular 
languages. So even in looking backward, their focus was always on media technologies, 
technologies that can be used to disseminate messages.  
 I also use the terms “evangelical” and “Christian” interchangeably again, in a way 
that I believe is emic to those who consider themselves evangelicals. The people that I 
spoke with, the organizations that I visited, and the churches that I attended were part of 
what is known as the evangelical tradition and identify themselves as such when asked, 
however they typically call themselves “Christians” rather than “evangelicals.” This is in 
large part due to the fact that the term “evangelical” is one that is under constant negotia-
tion in evangelical culture especially because it is used to define a swath of people that is 
typically read as politically conservative. In 2018, prominent Christian writer Tim Keller 
published what became a controversial essay about the shifting meanings of the term 
“evangelical” in the New Yorker magazine. In it, he writes of the problem of being asso-
ciated with figures like disgraced Alabama politician Roy Moore and others who seem to 
stand for evangelicals in the public sphere. Keller asserts that the term “evangelical” has 
become loaded, even toxic in some circles and because of this even as evangelicalism 
continues to be popular. He predicts that “The movement may abandon, or at least de-
mote, the prominence of the name, yet be more committed to its theology and historic 
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impulses than ever” (Keller, 2017). In my fieldwork I found a similar ambivalence for the 
term “evangelical.” At least three evangelicals I interviewed told me––though I had not 
asked–– that they believed in global warming. About the same number brought up how 
they believe in equal rights for LGBTQ people, again unprompted. These Christians un-
derstood themselves to be part of a subculture that is often identified by its objection to 
secularism, modernity, and science and they wanted to make sure that I knew that they 
thought differently than their peers about these issues. All of this is background to ex-
plaining the historical weight of the term “evangelicalism,” a trajectory that I dive deeper 
into in Chapter Two of this project.  
 Academic works on evangelicalism have often made the move of expressly focus-
ing on white evangelicals. Chief among the justifications for this move is the idea that 
white evangelicalism has been a distinct cultural and political force in the United States 
with a history that is markedly different from what is known as “the black church.” For 
Jonathan Walton (2009), however, this is a bias in the literature that is no longer relevant, 
especially in relation to the study of media use in evangelicalism (p. 20). I take Walton’s 
critique seriously and I did not set out to study only white Christians. I attended services 
where popular black pastors preached, yet I found that the people that shared a zeal for 
technology were overwhelmingly white evangelicals. My study unpacks the reasons why 
there are a dearth of black voices in the movement that I trace, and I argue that in accept-
ing the discourses of Silicon Valley digital culture, evangelicals have also accepted the 
biases of this culture, specifically the historic erasure of racial and gender difference in 
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technology production. Both evangelicalism and tech purport to be color blind spaces that 
will accept anyone. Yet, as scholars have shown, this is not the case.  
For example, Alice Marwick’s (2013) ethnography of Silicon Valley argues that 
Silicon Valley culture has internalized the myth that it is a meritocratic industry and this 
cultural understanding has excluded women and people of color because it is assumed 
that if they do not already have a seat at the table, they must not have earned one, and 
may not deserve one. And Sarah Wachter-Boettcher (2017) makes a similar point more 
bluntly writing, “Scratch the surface at all kinds of companies––from Silicon Valley’s 
‘unicorns’ (startups with valuations of more than a billion dollars) to tech firms in cities 
around the world–– and you’ll find a culture that routinely excludes anyones who’s not 
young, white, and male” (16). Similarly, evangelicalism has a fraught, contested history 
of racial exclusion and separation. Though prominent evangelicals like Rick Warren and 
Russell Moore have urged evangelicals to attempt to heal the racial schisms that have de-
fined the movement in the past, there is little evidence that evangelicalism is becoming 
more integrated (see Bracey & Moore, 2017). Women, too, face systemic challenges to 
leadership roles of all types, and this is a history that I dive into in more depth in Chapter 
Six of this project. It is perhaps because of their own history that evangelicals do not see 
the faults in the technology industry that are clearly there. And it may be because of this 
history that white evangelicals in particular are willing to accept the premises of the tech 
industry more than those evangelicals of color. 
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Religion and digital culture 
 Wade Clark Roof (1999) has asserted that religion in the United States is orga-
nized like “a spiritual marketplace.” Because the First Amendment has not allowed for a 
single religion to be established in the state, religious entities have instead appealed to the 
populace, and as many scholars have noted, there has been no more successful populist 
religion in America than evangelicalism (see Balmer and Winner, 2002). That American 
evangelicalism is a populist religion means that it has historically been invested in under-
standing, keeping up with, and often mimicking popular culture. At the same time, it is 
counter cultural. Evangelicals talk about the imperative to be “in but not of the world” 
and by this they mean that they must understand and participate in worldly things so as to 
be able to connect to the “unchurched,” but as individuals and organizations, they must 
not embrace what they see as the sinful nature of secular culture. Related somewhat or-
thogonally to what George Marsden calls the “establishment-outsider paradox” (2006, p. 
7) in fundamentalism, then, is an understanding of evangelicalism as reflective of popular 
culture. This aspect of evangelicalism has been explored by scholars working at the inter-
section of media studies and religious studies who have rightly pointed out that evangeli-
cals have historically been early adopters of media technologies and in many cases have 
advanced and helped to define media forms.  This study follows in that tradition by ex3 -
ploring the evangelical understanding and embrace of new media technologies. 
 See especially Hangen (2002) on evangelicals radio shows and their audiences, Hendershot (2007) on the 3
material culture of evangelicalism, and Hoover (1988), Schultze (1991), and Walton (2009) on televange-
lism as a cultural form. 
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 Evangelicals are a counterculture, but they can be understood in terms of publics, 
that is, collectives that cohere through shared participation in media forms such as maga-
zines, television shows, and radio programs. I argue that since the early days of the fun-
damentalist movement, American evangelicals have formed counterpublics (following 
Michael Warner 2002) as well as a counter-cultural spaces and by this I mean that they 
have often expressed their activism vis a vis American culture as well as their understand-
ing of themselves in and through media forms. I provide a more detailed analysis of the 
historical development of evangelical counterpublics in Chapter Two of this project, and I 
believe these social formations are central to the way that evangelicals have approached 
and used new media technologies. 
 As it is concerned with media use, my study follows from and contributes to liter-
ature on media and religion, and on the social shaping of technology. Daniel Stout (2002) 
has argued that religious groups redefine themselves in and through their media practices, 
a process that is especially significant as they approach and use new media. And Birgit 
Meyer concurs, noting in her study of religious mediation, “media by and large only be-
come an issue when they are new and the possibility of using them is considered” (2009, 
p. 12). Relatedly, these groups also define how large swaths of the public respond to me-
dia and mediated change. Heidi Campbell (2010) has observed that the rhetoric of reli-
gious leaders shapes the way that people adopt and use technologies, a process that she 
calls the “religious social shaping of technology,” following MacKenzie and Wajcman’s 
(1999) notion of the” social-shaping of technology.” There has been some work that de-
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tails how evangelicals use digital media, especially the practice of online churches (see 
Hutchings, 2013; Laughlin, 2011), and there has been some analysis on how Christian 
symbolism is used to characterize technological products, for example the labeling of the 
iPhone as the “Jesus phone” (Campbell & La Pastina, 2010) and my work follows from 
these studies but also diverges in that I focus on the imaginary of technology in evangeli-
calism and how digital habitus and a related circulating discourse, that I reveal through 
interviews, textual analysis, and ethnographic experiences, is changing the shape and 
forms of a long-established American subculture.  
On the other side of the coin, works like Fred Turner’s From Counterculture to 
Cyberculture (2006), Thomas Streeter’s The Net Effect (2011), Stephanie Ricker 
Schulte’s Cached (2013) and others have focused on the cultural discourses that influ-
enced the creation of internet, the tech industry, and new media technologies. And recent 
studies have focused on how discursive communities have formed due to the affordances 
of the internet, for example, Jessa Lingel has explored the “communities of alterity” that 
have developed around body modification and punk counter-cultural networks (2017a), 
and Zeynep Tufekci (2017) has looked at how activist networks have cohered with rela-
tively degrees of success by employing digital media. My study takes a similar approach 
to these explorations of digital culture but focuses on a specific religious subset of tech-
nology producers and users. 
Digital habitus and the digital unconscious 
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 This study charts how the widespread adoption and integration of digital tech-
nologies is shaping evangelical culture and evangelical publics. To begin to think through 
this I want to follow Johnathan Sterne’s urging that scholars of technology should employ 
Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus” in understanding technologies as both embodied 
and social (Sterne, 2003). Habitus encompasses all of the socially and culturally condi-
tioned practices that define a lifeworld, from the way a person unconsciously picks up a 
fork to the frequency with with she checks the Twitter app on her iPhone. As Bourdieu 
explains, “the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective prac-
tices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by that 
history” (1977, p. 84). Habitus is the way that a culture or society replicates through indi-
vidual and collective practices, but it is not fixed or externally imposed, and may change 
over time. Technologies too are socially and historically shaped. They emerge from cul-
tures, and live in social systems and as such they both guide habitus and are habitus; as 
Sterne puts it, “understood socially, technologies are little crystallized parts of 
habitus” (2003, p. 376) by which he means that they are “practical reason” made mani-
fest. As digital, mobile media becomes more ubiquitous, what might be termed “digital 
habitus” has infused American culture. Jose van Dijk notes that “In barely ten years, algo-
rithms have come to punctuate everyday social acts.” (2013, 416). And as algorithms 
have been folded into the social world, the habitus of Americans has shifted, and a new 
set of digital practices have come to occupy space in the social world. All of the daily in-
teractions and micro-interactions that are facilitated by digital media might be character-
!14
ized as digital habitus. Furthermore, this habitus is often guided by digital platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram which encourage repetitive social behavior such as 
scrolling, liking, posting, engaging.  
Marshall McLuhan (1964) conceived of media technologies as extensions of 
the human nervous system, and this now seems prescient in an era when it is common to 
liken a smartphone to an appendage. Smartphones, wearables, laptops, internet-connected 
cars, and televisions all provide people with mobile access to others, and to a repository 
of images, inputs, discourses and all of this becomes part of what it means to move 
through the world. Raymond Williams understanding of “mobile privatization” (1975), 
the idea that in scattered living rooms in various places, people engaged with a global 
culture (typically centrally controlled by large media conglomerates) through the medium 
of television, has evolved to be more mobile, more privatized, and more individualized. 
People perform various versions of themselves based on the platforms that they frequent 
and switch between and in this way they hail others and form social bonds.  And though 4
McLuhan’s prediction that the world would be united through electronic technology in a 
“global village” has not borne out, what I term digital habitus has shaped new communi-
ties, publics, and imaginaries.   
A focus on the imaginary particular fits a study of the interplay between tech-
nology and religion. Consumer technology in the neoliberal context is invested in the 
  The performative nature of social media platforms has been a robust site of study in the field of Commu4 -
nication. Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012) has framed this in regard to “self-branding.” Alice Marwick (2013) 
has looked at the ways that social media platforms encourage and dictate particular performances of self 
and status. And Marwick and boyd have studied how Twitter users perform themselves in and through that 
platform. 
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imaginary as it is preoccupied by future-casting; by an understanding of “innovation” as a 
way to create products that tap into a consumer Zeitgeist. Religion is also a category that 
traffics in imaginaries as it propagates a specific lens through which to view human histo-
ry. In thinking of imaginaries, I want to focus on Charles Taylor’s (2004) definition of the 
“social imaginary.” Taylor explains that the social imaginary encompasses “the ways 
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (p. 23). Thus, the social 
imaginary is the way that a culture or a public sees and represents their world, and, in 
turn it defines normative expectations. Talal Asad (2003) argues that religious groups 
have different social imaginaries than what might be considered the secular public as 
posited by Habermas (1962/1989), that is a public governed by the norms of deliberation 
and reasoned debate as in the 17th and 18th Century coffee houses in England and salons 
in France that Habermas takes as his central examples. Religious voices, viewpoints and 
imaginaries present a problem for the vitality of the public sphere, understood in a nor-
mative, Habermasian sense, because as Asad notes, “overlapping patterns of territory, au-
thority, and time collide with the idea of the imagined national community” (Asad, 2003, 
p. 179). As Benedict Anderson’s (1983/2006) work on “imagined communities” has ar-
gued, publics that took shape around nationally syndicated newspapers helped to define a 
new understanding of the nation and of the significance of nationality and these “imag-
ined communities,” “made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think 
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about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profound new ways” (p. 36). For 
Anderson, the imagined community of the nation in some ways replaced previous under-
standings of collective belonging including religious community, but in the contemporary 
moment it is more precise to say that many modes of belonging and many social imagi-
naries may exist together and reinforce each other or in some ways butt against one an-
other. On the whole, the evangelical social imaginary differs in important ways from the 
social imaginary of the larger public sphere, though it is also more in concert with a secu-
lar imaginary than other religious traditions may be, for example, as Asad emphasizes, 
the Muslim social imaginary in the context of a purportedly secular European society.  
Through the case studies in this project, I argue that digital habitus is reshaping 
the social imaginary of evangelicalism by building a “digital unconscious.” I reference 
the “unconscious,” not to bring up a Freudian or Lacanian analysis, but to build on Walter 
Benjamin’s understanding of the “optical unconscious,” a social unconscious that is on 
display in and through media technologies. For Benjamin, the contrast between how au-
racular art like painting is experienced by a viewer in the here and now, versus how film 
is experienced is significant. Benjamin emphasizes the fact that film is a temporal medi-
um that relies on the cut, on montage, and on juxtaposition. In concert with the technolo-
gy of the camera, a cinematographer can see beyond what is possible to apprehend by 
human senses. Benjamin makes the case that film is thus able to penetrate reality, rather 
than to simply represent it. These mechanistic affordances of film create for the medium 
the ability to glimpse a collective “optical unconscious” (see Benjamin, 2010, p. 37). 
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Like the optical unconscious, than, what I term the “digital unconscious” relies on tech-
nological affordances, such as software, and hardware. In the case of the digital, algo-
rithmic technologies that guide users to see and engage with certain content, also define 
publics by setting the terms and boundaries of the discourse. And with digital media, un-
like with film, individuals, through their digital habitus, also leave traces–– comments, 
likes, cookies–– that taken together chart paths through a discursive and visual realm, 
even when those paths are not consciously taken by users, who may not even realize that 
they left a mark, or that their paths intersect and diverge with others. Thus, though film 
may also be considered a collaborative medium, as it is generally the creation of a group 
of people, cinematographers, directors, editors, etc., the medium does not have the same 
potential to incorporate feedback from viewers or users as the digital does. And this cre-
ates a digital unconscious that resembles Benjamin’s optical unconscious but also di-
verges from it in that it is collectively created by a socio-technical assemblage of people, 
algorithms, and devices through digital habitus.  
Central to Benjamin’s notion of the optical unconscious is its visuality. What 
was created by the medium of film was a visual display of a collective unconscious. This 
is significant given the fact that Benjamin imagines film, as a mass medium, to have 
emancipatory political potential, though this potential, he asserts, will not be realized un-
til the medium is no longer controlled by capitalist modes of production. The digital un-
conscious too, can be seen, and also experienced through a user’s movement through 
platforms, images, and discourses, in other words it is the manifestation of a person and 
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collective’s digital habitus. Though the offline world remains an anchor, the digital un-
conscious, as a collective display of information and digital flows, lives in the digital 
realm and provides the unconscious register for a dispersed assemblage of people. None-
theless, as I will argue through the case studies in this project, this digital unconscious 
shapes cultural discourses and social imaginaries and becomes conscious in various 
forms.  
In the case studies that follow, the idea of a digital unconscious is meant to de-
fine the discourses, practices, and predilections of an assemblage of evangelicals who are 
defined in and through their relationship with digital media, a relationship, I will argue 
through my case studies below, that has stakes for the social imaginary of evangelicalism. 
Though I think the heuristic of the digital unconscious works particularly well for a com-
plicated assemblage of people like evangelicals, it is not a theory that stops at religious 
communities. Indeed much of American life is now spent on devices and the notion of a 
digital unconscious speaks to how many publics in the digital era are shaped. In Chapter 
Two of this study I expand on my understanding of digital habitus and the digital uncon-
scious particular to what might be considered the counterpublic or counterculture of 
evangelicalism––a stance that has developed throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
century in the United States.  
Investigating evangelicalism’s digital unconscious 
 The idea of an evangelical digital unconscious provides the entry point for my 
methodological approach. My evidence comes from the digital unconscious that has 
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formed in evangelical culture which I have gleaned using various digital and real-world 
methods. Though the digital unconscious is a phenomenon that cannot exist without the 
internet, and is a socio-technical assemblage, I did not chose to embark on a “virtual 
ethnography” of it. Christine Hine (2000) writes that, “Online ethnographies despatialize 
notions of community, and focus on cultural process rather than physical place” (2000, p. 
57). Instead of focusing on places, Hine asserts that ethnographers of the internet should 
focus on connections between and among people and users. While this approach holds 
some appeal for an investigation into what I am calling a digital unconscious, I also found 
in my research that there is much in the physical, social world that responds to this un-
conscious mode. By combining in-person and digital modes, I follow Daniel Miller and 
Don Slater’s approach to qualitatively investigating digital publics, which values the 
physical spaces in which online discourses and practices take shape as well as their virtu-
al, and technological instantiations. As they put it “the Internet is not a monolithic or 
placeless ‘cyberspace’; rather, it is numerous new technologies, used by diverse people, 
in diverse real-world locations” (Miller & Slater, 2001, p. 1). Though I engaged in a 
“hashtag ethnography” of Twitter users as one of my case studies, visited online church-
es, and generally tried to traffic in the digital unconscious of evangelical culture, I also 
performed real-world fieldwork, travel, and interviews.  
In my conception of the multiple virtual, real, and mediated sites that make up 
the digital unconscious of evangelicalism, I have also followed an approach similar to the 
multi-site ethnography outlined by George Marcus (1996). Marcus urged ethnographers 
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to design their studies based on an understanding of the various flows of cultural contexts 
that might make up a culture. For example, an anthropologist might “Follow the people” 
in designing a multi-site project, or “Follow the discourse.” In investigating online coun-
tercultural communities, Jessa Lingel (2017b) has employed a comparative approach she 
calls “networked field studies,” which draws from Marcus’s understanding of multi-site 
ethnography but employs case studies. She writes that this approach is especially useful 
in considering socio-technical communities because it is, “invested in looking across 
communities to consider convergences and divergences in relationships to an uses of 
digital technologies among groups of people” (Lingel, 2017b, p. 2). Though all of my 
case studies come from a single countercultural source, that of the American evangelical 
subculture, they focus on four different aspects of this culture and use the divergences 
among these groups as a means to investigate the differences and commonalities among 
them.  
I conducted 36 interviews with people associated with this movement in evan-
gelicalism, including those running faith-based startups, those in the missionary field, and 
those working in churches. I identified my interviewees through a combination of “snow-
ball sampling” and by following evangelical magazines like Christianity Today, evangeli-
cal blogs, and following Christians on social media platforms–– in other words, trying to 
traffic in the flow of the digital unconscious shared by this community. One of my inter-
viewees described his own entree into the world of digital Christians as “just building re-
lationships with individuals who are in this world. That’s how I got started, I got into the 
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ministry and then I started just going to conferences getting connected, building relation-
ships and now five years later I feel like I know a lot of people in the world” (Pulos, 
2017). Put simply, this also the approach that I took to identifying interviewees. I began 
this study in 2010 and over the course of 8 years I spoke and connected with evangelicals 
working on various facets of technology and media, who in turn referred me to other 
people or referred me to Twitter accounts, smartphone applications, podcasts, and 
churches. The decade during which I conducted my study saw the first billion dollar app 
sale and the ballooning of the app market. It saw the growth of VR content and technolo-
gy. And at every turn, evangelicals were watching and thinking through the possibilities 
for missions, for community growth, for faith. Through cultural shifts in thinking about 
technology, through subtle and not so subtle changes in how people used technology in 
their everyday life, evangelicals shifted too. My study has tracked the people most in-
vested in this; the people who have thought and continue to think about how technology 
might change the practice and expression of faith for the better. 
In addition to interviews, I employed short stints of participant observation that 
provided me with experience from within the techno-social systems that comprise this 
unconscious digital community. These included four months of real-world-ethnographic 
fieldwork at a Los-Angeles-based tech startup, and immersion and participant observa-
tion in and through Twitter networks. I also attended two conferences, one in Dallas, 
Texas and one online. Though my study primarily deals with producers of technology, I 
consider users in the final substantive chapter of this study. In this chapter I take the ap-
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proach laid out by Bonila and Rosa (2015) of “hashtag ethnography” as a means to inves-
tigate an emerging feminist public whose use of social media has been dubbed a “crisis” 
by the evangelical magazine Christianity Today. In their analysis of the hashtag #Fergu-
son and other activist campaigns that have gone viral on Twitter, Bonila and Rosa theo-
rize that the hashtag function affords the medium a type of placeness and because of this 
a hashtag can be understood as an ethnographic fieldsite. Despite the shortcomings that a 
hashtag fieldsite has, they authors write, “we must approach them as what they are: entry 
points into larger and more complex worlds. Hashtags offer a window to peep through, 
but it is only by stepping through that window and ‘following’ (in both Twitter and non-
Twitter terms) individual users that we can begin to place tweets within a broader con-
text” (2015). “Hashtag ethnography,” then is a way to enter and participate in a media-
tized social world, and furthermore, this is a world that has consequences beyond the vir-
tual frame as contemporary social movements are multi-modal and the mediated context 
of them cannot be ignored as it is inextricable from what is going on “on the ground.” By 
employing multiple ethnographic and qualitative modes my study attempts to traffic in 
and analyze the contours of the digital unconscious while also keeping in mind the real 
world spaces that cannot be severed from their digital presences.  
 I should note that I am relatively sure that some of my informants have read my 
degree of “nativeness” in evangelical culture differently than others. As John L. Jackson 
Jr. notes in Thin Description (2013), ethnography no longer has a “backstage,” a place an 
ethnographer can retreat to and keep hidden from his subjects. Thus, no longer can a re-
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searcher assume himself to be the observer, he is also observed by his informants. This 
may be particularly true of researcher trying to understand digital contexts and immersing 
themselves in digital worlds. I had the experience of introducing myself to an interviewee 
only to have him allude to details of my life that I had not disclosed to him, but had dis-
closed on social media. This experience and others made me realize that I was being 
watched, and certainly being judged on my nativeness.  
 In my first year of high school I became a Christian, or “was saved,” though this 
experience, guided by a friend’s mother, was not entirely consensual on my part. I had 
become friends with a group of girls who all went to the same evangelical church. I went 
to church with them, and began to frequent the church’s youth group. We sometimes went 
to other churches to see Christian bands play and for the most part, for me, this was a way 
to meet boys. These girls remained my friends throughout high school and beyond –– one 
of them was the Maid of Honor at my wedding. As an undergraduate I majored in Reli-
gious Studies and continued to explore my spirituality, though I had stopped going to 
church on a regular basis several years before. When I embarked on this project, many 
memories from my church days came back to me. Because of this history I understood 
when people slipped shorthand versions of Bible verses into their language and I felt rela-
tively fluent with evangelical jargon (in this study I have included a glossary of evangeli-
cal phrases in this that can be found in Appendix A). But beyond that, throughout this 
project, I had genuine experiences in churches that I have considered personally impor-
tant to my spiritual life: I have openly cried as I watched adults get baptized at a church 
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service in Nashville; I have had deep conversations about faith and life with Christians 
and pastors, that I have taken seriously; I have rethought many of the beliefs that I had 
about religion and spirituality. This project opened me up to a world that I had only 
known as a child and made me consider my faith and spiritual life in a new way–– though 
of course that was not my intent when I began this investigation.  
I tried to be as honest as possible when people asked whether I was religious, or 
Christian. And I always took John Jackson approach of employing “ethnographic sinceri-
ty” (2010), which he has defined as both a way of being in the world and a way of doing 
ethnography that treats “other subjects/ informants more robustly as fully embodied and 
affective interlocutors” (p. S285). Affect is part of the experience of fieldwork, and we 
should embrace it, Jackson argues, not just as observers, but as humans interacting with 
other humans. Ethnographic sincerity recognizes and honors the fact that “Informants 
embody an equally affective subjecthood during the ethnographic encounter” (Jackson, 
2010, p. S281), and as such becomes a crucial way of practicing ethical research in an 
age when informants and ethnographers are increasingly in contact with one another in 
various aspects of professional, personal and political life.  
Chapter outlines 
 My second chapter outlines the academic historiography of American evangelical-
ism focusing on evangelicalism as a counterpublic and a counterculture in American so-
ciety and tracks how this history has led to the widespread digital habitus that this study 
takes as its focus. From the early days of radio through today, evangelicals have been ear-
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ly adopters of media technologies and have attempted to create a parallel culture that is 
the result of the twin and sometimes conflicting evangelical drives to retreat from and 
engage with popular culture. In their many entrees into media they have continually re-
vised what evangelicalism looks like and how it speaks in the public sphere. I argue that 
as these historic impulses and imperatives have been ported on to the internet where new 
publics and new imaginaries have taken shape.  
 In Chapter Three I explore the how digital habitus has changed the church world 
and the physical instantiations of evangelical worship spaces over the past decade. I trace 
the move toward multi-site, online, and virtual churches, and discuss the issues that 
prominent evangelical voices have faced in attempting to implement these visions. I end 
with a visit to a “startup church” in Oklahoma called Life.Church and explore how the 
American social imaginary of technology has transformed evangelical spaces in material 
and rhetorical ways and, in turn, how these transformations have successfully hailed a 
suburban, middle-class, white population who see teched-up churches as proof that their 
faith has a viable place in an increasingly technological American culture.  
 Chapter Four travels to Silicon Valley and beyond identifying faith-based star-
tups–– that is, for-profit tech businesses with Christian missions. In this chapter I speak 
with those CEOs and founders of faith-based startups to discover their motivations, their 
business practices, and their vision of the technology industry. Many believe that by cre-
ating products that engage digital habitus they might have a role in “redeeming” and spir-
itualizing American culture, but they also express the negotiations that they have to en-
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gage in in order to fit in to tech culture. I argue that though they set themselves apart from 
it, these Christian business people have in many ways internalized the lessons of Silicon 
Valley culture, and in some ways have replicated the shortcomings of that culture as well, 
especially in regard to race and gender.  
 Chapter Five takes as its central case study a network of missions-focused non-
profit organizations that call themselves “The Mobile Ministry Forum.” These evangeli-
cals see the potential for missionary work changing especially through the ubiquity of 
mobile phones. From the practice of “SD card evangelism,” to new, cloaked Bible apps, 
this scene hopes to create technology in service of fulfilling “The Great Commission” 
and hastening the return of Christ. In so doing, they struggle with thousands of years of 
Western-dominated World Christianity–– a history that they try to overcome using digital 
solutions, and, I argue, that they often replicate in part because they have internalized 
many of the biases of the Western-based technology industry.  
 In Chapter Six I turn from technology producers to users and I turn from a male-
dominated landscape to a female one. This chapter focuses on how the technological af-
fordances of social media have transformed authoritative structures in evangelicalism and 
caused a “crisis” that is shaking the foundations of the church by putting into play the po-
tential role of women as preachers and leaders. I employ Bonila and Rosa’s (2015) 
method of “hashtag ethnography” to investigate an emerging evangelical feminist public 
who have used social media to create a space for female voices in a male-dominated 
evangelical culture. 
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 My study concludes with a discussion of how the many related moves to make 
American evangelical Christianity a more modern, more technologically-savvy religion 
have been challenged by some Christians who argue that the opposite is what is really 
needed to revive evangelicalism. The chief critic in this realm has been Rod Dreher, the 
New York Times best-selling author of The Benedict Option (2017).  
Conclusion 
 Evangelicalism as an American populist religion is an especially receptive cultural 
form that has been molded by dominant cultural discourses since the beginning of the 
American republic. This study argues that the widespread digital habitus in American cul-
ture is shaping the social imaginary and the actually-existing practices and forms of 
evangelical culture. Because of their long history as early adopters of media technologies, 
evangelicals are particularly primed to accept and integrate new media into their lives and 
communities. The two cultures at play here, evangelicalism and tech, both have a hold on 
the American imaginary and I conceive of the particular assemblage of people that I study 
as trafficking in a digital unconscious that is influencing and shaping the evangelical so-
cial imaginary. Finally, I hope that in thinking of American evangelicalism as reflective of 
popular culture, we may also imagine pieces of the American social imaginary are re-
fracted in the evangelical social imaginary and can reveal predilections in American cul-
ture more broadly conceived.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLVING EVANGELICAL ASSEMBLAGE 
The shifting evangelical relationship to modernity, media, and technology 
 In the lobby of a Baptist church outside of Nashville, Tennessee, where it is ap-
parently a minor scandal when the pastor does not to wear a tie on a Sunday, Darrel Gia-
rdier, the church’s Digital Strategy Director tells me his fears about the long-term viabili-
ty of evangelicalism. Church leaders just are not keeping up, he worries. The church is 
getting grayer, and the people in charge are not paying enough attention to what captures 
the attention of younger generations. “I’m going to tell you that God’s word is relevant 
for your life,” he begins, explaining how young people experience church. “I’m going to 
tell you what He has pertains to what’s going on right now—but everything I surround 
you with in that room you walk into is not relevant to your life. At home you experience 
five screens while you’re watching TV. We’re not doing that at church” (Girardier, 2015). 
For Girardier and others the problem with church and with evangelicalism as a whole is 
that it is not attracting a younger generation attuned to media technologies and the enter-
tainment value and social engagement they offer.  
Giradier has worked in Christian institutions most of his adult life and though 
he voices his concern more forcefully than others, most of the people I spoke with for this 
study expressed some version of this same sentiment: the church is not keeping up and if 
it continues to be oblivious to the technological changes happening in the world around 
it, it will disappear. For many evangelicals the way forward is understanding and embrac-
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ing changes in the technological landscape. Their message, as they see it, is timeless, and 
if the right tools are employed to express that message, the church will thrive. If not, it 
will not. For many, this means churches and parachurch institutions must embrace tech-
nology, and even learn from the workings of those tech companies that clearly have a 
hold on the popular imagination. As our conversation continues, Girardier explains that 
the problem is not just that church is not entertaining people, it is that church no longer 
understands how people think and operate in the contemporary world. He believes 
churches should think about their parishioners more like companies like Google and 
Facebook this about their customers. He tells me, “People have a deep desire to be known 
and if people are giving over these massive amounts of data on Facebook and on other 
platforms, churches should coalesce that data ... We have to think in such a way that we 
really individualize stuff for people” (Girardier, 2015). For Girardier, the path forward 
should be moving the church into the digital present by understanding the digital habitus 
of young people conditioned by new media companies, and integrating this into church 
services. His concern, however, is that the church as a whole is not up to the task. 
Though most of the evangelicals I spoke with agree with Girardier’s assess-
ment of the church as an institution that is a step behind culture, relative to other religious 
traditions, evangelicals have often been on the cutting edge of media and technological 
change. Throughout the twentieth century evangelicals have promoted evangelical partic-
ipation in and adoption of technology for the same reason that Girardier voices–– to re-
main relevant. As Bethany Moreton explains about the “high-tech redneck, the rustic with 
!30
a Bible in one hand and a Blackberry in the other,” the fact that these groups use the tools 
of modernity to their advantage is “only paradoxical from the perspective of a stage theo-
ry of history” (2009, p. 7), meaning that it is only difficult to understand if we place 
evangelicals on the losing side of a constructed dichotomy of modernity, which, Susan 
Harding (1991) argues that the press and the academy has done since the Scopes trial, 
when the modern notion of fundamentalism as modernity’s “repugnant other” was in-
vented. Since then, evangelicals have been characterized in the press as parochial and as 
righteous keepers of tradition. Yet by some polling estimates, forty percent of Americans 
identify as evangelicals (see Smidt, 2013). And although evangelicals are often portrayed 
in the media as fundamentalist Christians who harbor a strong, politically conservative 
bent, there are many disparate strands of evangelical Christianity—from Michele Bach-
mann in the Midwest to rave-party-throwing millennial evangelicals in the Hamptons 
(see Kisner, 2013). As Mark Noll notes, evangelicalism is “diverse, flexible, adaptable, 
and multiform” (2001, p. 14). In fact one characteristic of evangelicalism in America 
might be that it does not have a solid ground on which it pitches its wide tent. Some 
scholars have even argued that because of its diversity of forms evangelicalism qua evan-
gelicalism does not exist. D. G. Hart, for example, calls it, “the wax nose of twentieth-
century Protestantism. Behind this proboscis, which has been nipped and tucked by savvy 
religious leaders, academics, and pollsters, is a face void of any discernible 
features” (2004, p. 17). For Hart and others, there is no distinct theological, religious, or 
social rubric that defines evangelicalism.  
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 Evangelicalism is a complex assemblage of organizations, messages, people, 
ideas, traditions. This chapter traces the academic historiography of evangelicalism as a 
means to explore the shifting habitus of evangelicals and their related understandings of 
modernity, media, and technology. It should be noted that the history my interview sub-
jects (all self-identified evangelicals) drew from was a much different one. I never, for 
example, heard an evangelical reference the Scopes trial, though you would be hard-
pressed to find a book about evangelicalism that did not reference it. Instead, evangeli-
cals spoke about churches in the Bible, specifically the churches described in the Book of 
Acts, as their ideals. This emic understanding is important, and I hope to unpack it in the 
chapters to follow, but before we get there I want to sketch the historical stakes of the 
discourses and practices that this study charts, taking special care to understand how 
shifts in evangelical habitus have created counterpublics, audiences, and countercultures 
and how evangelicals have positioned themselves, and been positioned by their relation-
ship to American culture, society, politics, and especially evolving media industries. 
Evangelicals have continually used the most modern technological tools at their disposal 
to transmit their message, understanding that American culture will not be receptive to 
them unless they are perceived as modern and relevant. This chapter charts how evangel-
icalism became the robust counterpublic and counterculture that it is in American culture 
today and points to how it is redefining itself, once again, in the face of media change. In 
light of this complex and variegated history, I argue that widespread digital habitus has 
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created a digital unconscious that is changing the shape of American evangelicalism in 
the twenty-first century.  
Beginnings, schisms and the birth of a counterpublic 
 The United States has never had an established religion, but in the early years of 
the republic, Protestantism came close to being one. Early English colonists migrated to 
North America because of religious persecution and these Puritans established Christian 
churches and became dominant voices in early American politics and culture. American 
Protestantism distinguished itself from its European roots during the First Great Awaken-
ing beginning in the 1730s, a movement that is characterized by its massive outdoor re-
vivals. Hankins (2008) explains that these revivals were significant, defining events in 
American history and were controversial because they featured preaching by women and 
uneducated, unordained orators (11). This style upended authoritative structures of Eu-
ropean Protestantism and proved to be incredibly popular in the early days of the Ameri-
can Republic. Similarly, The Second Great Awakening, beginning in Cane Ridge, Ken-
tucky in 1801, saw mass, outdoor movements that both reflected and promoted American 
Protestantism’s populism. Marsden (2006) notes that the style and themes of these awak-
enings have an outsized influence in American religion and in American culture because 
the United States at the time had few older institutions (11).  
 American evangelicals spring from these roots, especially from the tradition of 
revivalism, but they have often engaged in theological battling with their more liberal 
Protestant counterparts. This schism goes back to the nineteenth century when an influen-
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tial cadre of preachers developed two Biblical exegeses that became theological lightning 
rods: the theories of premillennialism and dispensationalism (or, when taken together, 
premillennial dispensationalism). Premillennialists believe that Christ will return to rap-
ture his followers before the millennium prophesied in the Bible, the thousand-year reign 
of peace on Earth, and thus signs of the world falling into sinfulness and evil can be in-
terpreted as signs of Jesus’ imminent return. Premillennialists often agree with the theo-
logical rubric of dispensationalism, which states that God has divided the history of the 
world into ages or dispensations––the last of which was the millennium–– and each age 
has its own cosmic purpose and logic. More liberal Protestants in the nineteenth century 
instead sided with a postmillennialist interpretation of Biblical prophecy that believed 
that Christ would return after the millennium. 
 Because postmillenialists, or “modernists” as they became known believed that 
peace on Earth was possible before Jesus’ return, they often attempted to influence social 
and political policy in order to make America into the New Israel, the Biblical model of a 
Godly nation. Christians established temperance societies, they implemented policies that 
would help the poor, and they involved themselves in causes that saw the betterment of 
American society as the goal. Premillenialists, however, did not believe that human in-
volvement in political affairs could bring about peace, and instead felt their first and 
foremost mission should be spreading their message and bringing as many people to Je-
sus as possible before His return. This shift in Christian involvement in American social 
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and political affairs is referred to by historians as “The Great Reversal,” because in effect 
Christian political involvement became relegated to the back burner  of Christian culture.  
Popular premillennialists, like Dwight Moody of the Moody Bible Institute set 
the stage for a new for a new generation of Protestants who became known as “funda-
mentalists.” This term was inaugurated by a series of pamphlets entitled The Fundamen-
tals published between 1910 and 1915, financed by Lyman Stewart, President of Union 
Oil in Los Angeles. It was these pamphlets, according to Lienesch (2007), that created an 
identity for a burgeoning movement that before had been a scattered network of itinerant 
and localized preachers, Bible Colleges, and organizations. They also gave the movement 
a name: fundamentalism. The Fundamentals articulates a premillennial vision of the 
world that relies on a strictly literalist interpretation of the Bible in contradistinction to 
theological modernists of the time, whose Biblical interpretations tended to be more flex-
ible. 
Fundamentalism not only became a movement, through The Fundamentals, it 
became a counterpublic. Theories of the public date back at least to Gabriel Tarde (1901/ 
1969) who, writing at the turn of the twentieth century––less than a decade before The 
Fundamentals-- defined publics with recourse to print noting that “the invention of print-
ing has caused a very different type of public to appear, one which never ceases to grow 
and whose indefinite extension is one of the most clearly marked traits of our period” (p. 
277). For Tarde, publics were fundamentally different entities than their correlate in the 
street, the crowd (a category studied by Le Bon just previous to Tarde’s writing (1895), 
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because they were mediated and thus allowed for connections across geographical dis-
tances. These connections also altered the sociality and psychology of the people engaged 
in them in new, and different ways than the crowd had. This point was also central to 
Benedict Anderson’s work on the rise of the imaginary of the nation state. For Anderson, 
print, especially in the forms of the newspaper and the novel, allowed dispersed people to 
see themselves as temporally connected to spatially distant others who nonetheless occu-
pied the same “homogenous empty time” (a phrase that Anderson borrows from Walter 
Benjamin) and these new conceptions of space and time became the basis for the modern 
imagination of the nation (1989/2006). In both theories, publics are powerful modern as-
semblages because they allow for relations among strangers, that is people who have 
never met face-to-face, to take place. The Fundamentals allowed Christians all over the 
United States to understand themselves as part of a religious, social, and political move-
ment. Moreover, this public cohered through reading and thus fundamentalist identity 
was not only determined by church membership, but also by this habitus. And it was 
through this that fundamentalism became a counterpublic.  
Michael Warner explains that counterpublics are those publics that go against 
the grain of what we might think of as the larger social imaginary (following Taylor, 
2002) of a public (Warner, 2002, p. 56). In other words, counterpublics imagine the world 
differently than the normative public. Important for Warner is the fact that counterpublics 
are not only activist in the traditional political sense, but in the social sense; they want to 
change the way that social life works (2002, p. 122). Where, for Habermas and many of 
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his critics, the influence of the public sphere was to be felt in the realm of politics, for 
Warner and others, the influence of multiple publics might be political without being di-
rected toward politics writ large, especially because alternative, or minority positions 
might not be considered or voiced in the larger public sphere. It is useful to think about 
Chantal Moufe’s distinction between “politics” and “the political” here. While politics 
refers to the normative, institutional order of society, the category of “the political” in-
stead indexes the complicated social push and pull of diverse subjectivities inherent in 
any society (Moufe, 1999, p. 754). Thus, what might be seen as purely a social considera-
tion, may also be a political one, even if it does not directly connect to debates going on 
in Congress, for example.  
The first aim of the fundamentalist counterpublic was to reign in the relativism 
and secularism they believed defined theological modernism. Fundamentalists encour-
aged a retreat from politics, and from the social concerns that preoccupied the mod-
ernists. Yet, appearing when they did, at the turn of the century when Americans were 
struggling with the waves of immigration that were making American society more plu-
ralistic, The Fundamentals still seeks to define a cultural space that is ultimately political. 
From the outset fundamentalism was a primarily white movement, and a belief in Anglo-
Saxon superiority and the Anglo-Saxon missionary imperative animates The Fundamen-
tals. In Lyman Stewart’s personal correspondence, he makes it clear that spreading “An-
glo-Saxon” ideals went along with spreading Christianity. He writes glowingly, for ex-
ample, in a letter dated February 28, 1910 about all of the “Anglo-Saxon Protestant min-
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isters, missionaries and theological students in the world,” many of whom were engaged 
in “foreign missions,” a passion of Stewart’s that led him to establish the Hunan Bible 
Institute in China and the Bible Institute of Los Angeles (now Biola University) whose 
mission was training students to evangelize around the world. 
As the United States debated whether to enter World War I, fundamentalists––
continuing in the tradition of staying out of politics–– tended to want to avoid war, even 
to the point of advocating pacifism (see Marsden, 2006, p. 143). And as the war contin-
ued, it revivified the debate over evolution which had began in the late nineteenth centu-
ry. Many fundamentalists saw German barbarism as an outgrowth of the theory of evolu-
tion and were concerned that these ideologies could take over in the United States were 
evolution to become a widespread belief. Though the schism between fundamentalism 
and modernism had been primarily a theological issue, with evolution, fundamentalists 
were able to cast themselves as protecting American culture and society as well as Christ-
ian religion (Marsden, 2006, p. 170). Evolution became a rallying cry of the fundamental-
ist movement in the 1920s. As Marsden describes it, “the more clearly they realized that 
there was a mass audience for the message of the social danger of evolution, the more 
central this social message became” (2006, p. 170). And thus the fundamentalist counter-
public found its entree into the public sphere with resistance to the theory of evolution. 
Fundamentalist groups implemented a wave of laws aimed at preventing sec-
ondary schools and institutions of higher education from teaching evolution. But in 1925, 
the American Civil Liberties Union paid John Scopes, a young public school teacher in 
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Dayton, Tennessee to teach evolution in his classroom and violate one of these laws, Ten-
nessee’s Butler Act. Clarence Darrow, fresh off of his famous defense of Leopold and 
Loeb, two teenagers who in a supposed Nietzsche-induced frenzy murdered a young boy 
to prove that they were “supermen,” travelled to Tennessee to defend Scopes. Christian 
socialist and famous politician Williams Jennings Bryan, who had railed against the dan-
gers of teaching the theory of evolution, took up the cause of fundamentalism and the 
case for the prosecution.  
With the Scopes trial fundamentalists had a place to give their movement a 
public hearing and to cement their image as the guardians of a Bible-based American in-
tellectual culture. The trial played out in the media and in churches around the country 
where preachers dramatized the contest between Bryan and Darrow as the battle between 
good and evil (see Lienesch, 2007, p. 151). And though the prosecution prevailed and 
fundamentalists had captured the attention of the broader American public, their beliefs 
were roundly dismissed in the media as parochial and backward. No journalist more 
forcefully condemned them than the famous H.L. Menken of The Baltimore Sun. In his 
writings on the trial his cosmopolitan disdain for fundamentalism comes through clearly 
and at times viciously. He writes of fundamentalists: 
Every step in human progress, from the first feeble stirrings in the abyss of 
time, has been opposed by the great majority of men. Every valuable thing that 
has been added to the store of man's possessions has been derided by them 
when it was new, and destroyed by them when they had the power. They have 
!39
fought every new truth ever heard of, and they have killed every truth-seeker 
who got into their hands. (Menken, 1925) 
Menken’s characterization of fundamentalists as backwards stuck, and became the com-
monly understood connotation of fundamentalism. Interestingly, as Marsden notes, after 
Scopes, as the fundamentalist movement became identified with parochialism in the me-
dia, it also came to be more accepted in Southern, rural denominations (2006, p. 195). 
Thus there was a reshuffling of fundamentalist regional and doctrinal affiliation. Perhaps 
most significantly, the case and its echoes in the court of public opinion proved that a 
fundamentalist vision of the world had fallen out of vogue. And fundamentalists, under-
standing that they had lost ground began to build institutions set apart from American cul-
ture such as Bible colleges and parachurch institutions, and they also began to accept that 
their counterpublic voice would not be the dominant one in American politics, that is, un-
less, they could find a new way to gain entry into the public sphere.  
Inventing a new evangelicalism on the airwaves 
The fundamentalists’ situation worsened as the Great Depression deepened and 
the donors that had kept separatist fundamentalist institutions alive dried up. During this 
time, it was modern media technologies that sustained them and ultimately helped lead to 
the re-emergence of new fundamentalist counterpublic. For fundamentalists, secularism 
and modernism were the foes, but contra Menken’s caricature, technology itself was not. 
Perhaps most central to creating a new public face for fundamentalism was radio. One of 
the earliest evangelistic voices on the airwaves, and the first woman to broadcast an on-
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air sermon was Aimee Semple McPherson, the Los Angeles-based Charismatic who had 
been known for her high-production-value revivals.  For evangelicals like McPherson 5
who had travelled the country in her “Gospel Wagon” before radio, the new medium was 
a natural extension of circuit riding. Preachers who would otherwise be traveling from 
town to town could reach more ears through broadcast. Mcpherson continued in the tradi-
tion of other media-savvy Pentecostals, most notably black Pentecostals who produced 
religious race records in the 1920s (see Walton, 2009, pp. 33-45).  
Tona Hangen (2002) argues that radio helped fundamentalist Protestantism gain 
a new national identity and furthermore, through their participation on the airwaves, 
Christians could claim that they too had a place in contemporary American culture and 
they could combat the image that had been created for them in the press in the previous 
decades. Though firebrand preachers like the anti-communist crusader Carl McIntyre 
gained national popularity, many Christians self-consciously defined themselves against 
the rabid fundamentalism McIntyre embodied and began to call themselves “neo-evan-
gelicals.” Neo-evangelicals had learned from the lessons of the Scopes Trial, chief among 
them to avoid using the term “fundamentalist.”  As Hart notes “After World War II until 
the 1970s, evangelicals constantly looked over their shoulders to see who was going to 
accuse them of fundamentalism” (2004, p. 83). Much like the later moniker “compas-
sionate conservative,” “neo-evangelical” denoted a kinder, gentler Christianity. These 
evangelicals still believed in the tenets of fundamentalism, especially in the inerrancy of 
  See Blumhofer (1993) on McPherson and the Foursquare Gospel Church. 5
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the Bible, but they softened their tone and attempted to become more inclusive. They 
wanted to shift their image from the stone-faced guardians of literalism and tradition to 
that of a cadre of friendly folks spreading the Good News. In 1942 this new brand of 
evangelicalism gained a public face, with the founding of the National Association of 
Evangelicals (NAE). And at this time, the counterpublic inaugurated by The Fundamen-
tals morphed into an evangelical counterpublic defined primarily by new voices transmit-
ted through radio waves. 
Charles Fuller’s Old Fashioned Radio Hour especially embodies the ethic of 
the neo-evangelical. Hangen notes that though Fuller was a fundamentalist and a premil-
lennialist, he toned down these themes in his broadcast and even claimed to be an apoliti-
cal figure. Hangen’s research shows that The Old Fashioned Radio Hour attracted a fer-
vent national audience who communicated back to Fuller and his wife through letters 
(2002, p. 88). The feeling of connection that these listeners had with the Fullers is an ex-
ample of an early parasocial relationship (Horton and Wohl, 1956), and it is also evidence 
that the medium helped Fuller and other evangelicals inaugurate a new counterpublic that 
could connect Christians around the country through the habitus inaugurated by the new 
medium of radio.  
Around the same time, evangelicals were establishing publishing houses in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan like Zondervan, which began publishing in 1931, that would 
distribute evangelical texts to a wide audience. Like fundamentalists, neo-evangelicals 
shunned what they perceived as encroaching secularism, but through media like radio and 
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publishing they could package their dissent in a more appealing, more positive sheath, 
and new evangelical organizations, especially Bible Colleges like the Fuller Theological 
Seminary which opened its doors in 1947, added to the edifice of respectability that 
evangelicals were constructing for themselves. 
Also in the 1940s, Billy Graham, a young preacher from North Carolina who 
cut his teeth at the parachurch organization Youth for Christ, began to gain national noto-
riety. Staunch fundamentalists criticized what they perceived as Graham's openness, but 
the image that Graham embodied of the wholesome, clean-cut, all-American Christian 
appealed to Cold War Americans en masse. Graham would exert an influence on national 
politics and evangelical culture until the early years of the twenty-first century and one of 
his strengths was that he understood that media was a crucial tool both for evangelism 
and for strengthening evangelical identity. In the mid-twentieth century Graham set up a 
network of Christian media outlets. With his father in law he founded the evangelical 
magazine Christianity Today in 1956. In his autobiography Graham remembers that he 
wanted the magazine to be a “counterbalance” to the liberal Protestant views provided by 
The Christian Century. He also wanted to base the magazine in Washington D.C. in order 
to “give it a measure of authority” (Graham, 1999, p. 286). His vision was that it would 
have a positive tone–– a shrewd way to avoid seemingly like a fire-and-brimstone fun-
damentalist. In the same spirit, he threw his name behind myriad media ventures, includ-
ing his film production house Billy Graham Films (later World Wide Pictures), and the 
popular radio program The Hour of Decision. Graham was not alone in his embrace of 
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media and business as a means to legitimize evangelicalism. Oral Roberts employed the 
same tactics to legitimize the parallel movement of Pentecostalism in the 1940s and 50s 
as well.  
Graham was also a political figure. He was a close friend and confidant to all of 
the presidents from Harry Truman through George W. Bush. In his autobiography he de-
scribes golfing with Dwight D. Eisenhower and then-Vice President Richard Nixon. He 
recounts days on the ranch with Lyndon B. Johnson. He even speaks positively of Bill 
and Hillary Clinton, popular punching bags of the Christian Right. As he travelled the 
world as an evangelist, he brought with him his anti-Communist political agenda and he 
was central in solidifying anti-communist rhetoric and enshrining capitalist individualism 
as central ideologies in the evangelical social imaginary. As early as 1949, Billy Graham 
connected the dots for evangelicals between anti-communism and evangelical theology, 
which helped to push evangelicals to the political right (see Dochuk, 2011 and Kruse, 
2015). As FDR’s New Deal programs went into effect in the 1940s, many fundamental-
ists and evangelicals feared Communism and by extension Atheism would follow as they 
believed it had in the USSR. Because of their shared fear of Communism, evangelicals 
developed ties to a coalition of business leaders led by the National Association of Manu-
facturers and with these networks in place, Billy Graham and others self-consciously in-
tertwined business goals and Christian goals in America as Kruse (2015) charts, and cen-
tral to the creation of this new identity for conservative American Protestants was the 
evangelical media apparatus that circulated this discourse.  
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The anti-communist tone that was struck American evangelicalism in the mid-
twentieth century is striking in comparison to the socialist evangelicalism that was 
sweeping the globe in other places. Roger Lancaster (1988) for example found that Chris-
tian evangelical belief structured class consciousness in Nicaragua. Liberation theology, 
which took hold in many South American countries in the middle of the Twentieth Centu-
ry is starkly different from the pro-business evangelicalism promoted by Billy Graham 
and others in the United States. Evangelical anti-communist political engagement in the 
1950s prefigured evangelicalism’s politicization and concomitant reemergence into the 
public sphere in the 1960s. In 1962 The Supreme Court of the United States banned 
school prayer, prompting Christian activists to respond by supporting a prayer amend-
ment that would enshrine public prayer as a constitutional right. Though the amendment 
gained some political momentum, it ultimately failed to materialize as it was perceived as 
too right wing for many politicians to support as Kruse (2015) notes in his study of the 
issue (p. 203-237). It was also during this time that evangelicals became Republican en-
masse, as they began to identify with Southern conservatism. This shift played out synec-
dochally when Strom Thurmond switched his party affiliation from Democrat to Republi-
can in 1964 (Dochuk, 2011, p. 253). 1960s Southern California was the epicenter of the 
growing political activism in evangelical culture. Christian activists based in Los Angeles 
and Orange County supported Barry Goldwater in the 1964 Presidential election and 
though Goldwater’s campaign failed, their political zeal for conservative issues set the 
!45
stage for the “Creative Conservatism” promoted by Ronald Reagan first in California in 
the late 60s and later on the national stage (see Dochuk, 2011).  
Though it could claim some diversity, evangelicalism remained a primarily 
white movement. And as the Civil Rights movement gained national attention, white fun-
damentalists and evangelicals mostly remained silent. Martin Luther King Jr. noted in 
1953 that “it is appalling that the most segregated hour of Christian America is eleven 
o'clock on Sunday morning,” referring to the racially segregated nature of church going 
in the United States. That white Christian communities were segregated from black ones, 
typically by design, made the Civil Rights movement a difficult pill to swallow for many 
white Christians. Collins (2012) notes that though Billy Graham began integrating his 
audiences in the 1950s, Christianity Today conspicuously ignored Civil Rights and re-
fused to cover it in their magazine (p. 82). Billy Graham was particularly nervous about 
the movement’s methods as he believed that the civil disobedience tactics employed by 
Martin Luther King and others could be disruptive to the American way of life (see 
Collins, 2012, p. 83). Graham’s attitude is perhaps indicative of the larger body of white 
evangelicals for which he was a figurehead. And though what became known as “the 
black church” played a central role in the Civil Rights movement, a role that has contin-
ued to be a defining factor in black Christianity to this day, as a whole, white evangelicals 
overwhelmingly did not support efforts toward racial equality and racial reconciliation. In 
fact, as Dochuk (2011) asserts, racial fears often provided the impetus behind evangelical 
political involvement, especially in California where evangelicals threw their support be-
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hind municipal measures that would allow for continued housing discrimination (see 
Dochuk, 2011, p. 170-172). As thus whiteness remained central to the evangelical coun-
terpublic identity as it had been in the early days of fundamentalism.  
Evangelicalism also began to change theologically and culturally in the 1960s 
in response to the growing Neo-Pentecostal movement which can be traced to a revival in 
Van Nuys, California in 1967. Like earlier Pentecostals who had popularized speaking in 
tongues or glossolalia and other gifts at the turn of the century, at Neo-Pentecostal and 
Charismatic churches the power of the Holy Spirit was on display. A new experiential, 
emotional dimension of popular evangelicalism opened up in these churches, and this 
connected to the political mobilization happening in evangelical culture as Neo-Pente-
costals “were political advocates who believed that personal and social morality were in-
extricably linked–– that the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on one’s personal life com-
pelled the individual to hasten its outpouring in every realm of society” (Dochuk, 2011, p. 
283). Also in California, “Jesus People,” derisively called “Jesus freaks” by some, 
charismatics who dressed like hippies, played rock music, and spread the word of Jesus’ 
love, gained visibility (see Balmer, 1989 p, 12-30; Luhrman, 2012, p. 15-24).  Tanya 
Luhrman argues that their brand of free-form Bible study, belief in spiritual gifts, and 
love of music was highly influential for the future of evangelical culture. She writes, 
“One of the greatest paradoxes of a movement many people think of as right-wing threat 
is that it was fueled by the most countercultural left-wing movement our country has ever 
seen” (Luhrman, 2012, p. 16). The style and culture of evangelicalism changed in the 
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1960s partially in response to the changing cultural climate, and because of these changes 
it remained a popular form of American spiritual expression and continued to grow in 
prominence.  
 Newsweek famously declared 1976 the “Year of the Evangelical.” Jimmy Carter, a 
devout evangelical, had won the presidency and in so doing had brought evangelical cul-
ture center stage. At the same time, evangelical political involvement grew in other are-
nas and what later became known as the Culture Wars began. Former Southern beauty 
queen Anita Bryant brought her anti-gay agenda onto the public stage while evangelicals 
in California mobilized in support of Proposition 6, which would have made it illegal for 
homosexual people to work in public schools. Proposition 6 failed–– even Ronald Rea-
gan came out against it–– but fundamentalists and evangelicals remained energized by 
the possibility of standing up for “traditional values” against what they saw as hegemonic 
secularism. In the same vein, evangelicals saw feminist issues as threatening to their life-
style. As Randall Balmer writes “No issue has caused evangelicals more consternation in 
the second half of the twentieth century than feminism” (1999, p. 71). In the 1970s evan-
gelicals organized and protested against feminist causes. Ultimately, the political coali-
tions formed during this period would defeat the Equal Rights Amendment which would 
have guaranteed equal protection and equal pay for women in the workforce. It should be 
noted that not all evangelicals embraced the right-wing political ideologies gaining steam 
at this time. Jim Wallis, for example, founded Sojourners in 1975, a faith-based publica-
tion with a strong liberal, social justice bent that still remains one of the strongest voices 
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in the evangelical left. Yet it was the Christian Right that gained the most ground on the 
American political stage. And it was their tactics, especially their savvy use of media 
technologies that gave the counterpublic of evangelicalism a powerful voice in American 
culture and politics.  
The Christian right and the public voice of evangelicalism 
Jerry Falwell was the most prominent proponent of the Christian Right in the 
late 1970s and 80s. Falwell was a Southern fundamentalist who believed, as Martin Mar-
ty and Scott Appleby put it, “Satan, who had inspired the philosophy of secular human-
ism that was eroding the Judeo-Christian foundations of American schools, courts, and 
Congress was threatening to ensure that there would be no future generations of Ameri-
can Christians to educate” (1992, p. 39). To combat this, Falwell established political 
lobbying organization the Moral Majority. The Moral Majority had some successes in 
politics and it also staged and threatened boycotts of media it felt were promoting secular 
agendas–– soap operas that included a gay character, for example. Falwell’s organization 
also represents a shift in evangelical political engagement summed up by Hart (2002):  
Evangelicals involved in politics during the depression and World War II were 
generally interested in national and international politics and economics. They 
identified collectivism, both at home (the New Deal) and abroad (Communism 
and Socialism), as the chief enemy to American liberty. As evangelicals who 
saw most problems through a spiritual lens, they accounted for communism’s 
errors by looking to the Soviet Union’s atheism. For the religious right of the 
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later years, however, the most pressing issues facing the United States were not 
necessarily economic or political but personal. This explains why evangelicals 
shifted from American to family values. (p. 160) 
Evangelicals in the late 70s and early 80s began to come together around a few deeply-
felt issues that centered on the preservation of the traditional family structure. Along with 
gay rights, the debate around the legality of abortion united and energized evangelicals 
and also allowed them to develop ties to Catholic organizations, breaking their long tradi-
tion of anti-papist sentiment (see Dochuk, 2011, p. 346).  
While evangelicalism was entering politics and public consciousness and lay-
ing the groundwork for the cultural issues that the religious right would mobilize around, 
evangelical media outlets were thriving. As Joe Turow (1997) has demonstrated it was in 
the 1970s that advertisers began to envision the United States as an aggregation of spe-
cialized niche markets. And Sarah Banet-Weiser has noted in the same vein, that the 
communities that had become visible in the 1960s through Civil Rights and other move-
ments, in the 1970s and 80s became market segments that advertisers could target (2012, 
p. 32). And thus, white evangelicals became another market segment to be catered to. 
While Christian cultural products had been sold since the nineteenth century (see Mc-
Dannell, 1995), in the 1970s Christian businesses began to target evangelicals in the 
United States as a consumer market (Hendershot, 2004). The 1970s saw an explosion of 
religious radio stations (see Schultze, 1990), and evangelical publishing hit its apex and 
morphed from boutique to big business (see Ferre, 1990). As Heather Hendershot’s book 
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on Christian material and media culture argues, this shift from seeing Christians as poor 
and rural––the image that had been painted in the public sphere since Scopes–– to seeing 
them as middle-class consumers validated Christian respectability discourses. Hendershot 
writes, “To purchase Christian products is to declare one’s respectability in a country in 
which people are most often addressed by mass culture not as citizens but as 
consumers” (2004, p. 30 emphasis in the original).  
No one was more successful at mining this market than Christian psychologist 
James Dobson who founded Focus on the Family in 1977, an organization devoted to 
promoting “family values.” Focus on the Family, while often characterized as a political 
organization, has become a multi-million dollar business by selling Christian-themed 
media products to an evangelical audience. Their success has proven that catering to an 
evangelical audience who seeks an alternative media culture is a savvy business decision 
and it also shows that evangelicals are responsive to religious products minted on the lat-
est technological platforms. Thus, a new understanding of an evangelical audience al-
lowed Christians to identify as evangelicals not only on the local scale through church 
involvement, but on a larger scale through the habitus engendered by consumerism and 
media engagement. In so doing, evangelicals were connecting themselves with like-
minded others in a countercultural movement.  
The target consumer for the media that emerged in the 1970s was a white, mid-
dle-class suburbanite, not unlike “Saddleback Sam,” the fictional figure Baptist preacher 
Rick Warren conjured around the same time using survey data about Lake Forest, Cali-
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fornia (see Warren, 1995). For Warren, the goal was to create a composite of the neigh-
borhood he wanted to build his church for. Warren saw a market-based approach to 
church building and church growth as a way for evangelicals to connect to the American 
middle-class and his strategies proved to be extremely effective and birthed the 
megachurch movement. Megachurches like Saddleback and Willow Creek Church in Illi-
nois tried to present an informal and fun energy, Rick Warren could often be seen preach-
ing in a Hawaiian shirt, parishioners sang along with a rock band rather than a choir, and 
worship took place in an auditorium, rather than a steepled church. These churches 
popped up all over the country starting in the 80s and 90s and as Kilde notes, they at-
tempted to attract a middle-class, suburban, primarily white cultural aesthetic “by identi-
fying with other contemporary places of peace, places where people spend their leisure 
hours (hopefully) untroubled by the cares of the world: the shopping mall, the sports are-
na, the movie theatre” (2002, p. 219). In the 1980s and 90s church leaders began to self-
consciously discuss the marketing and branding of their messages and the megachurch 
movement swept the suburbs. And though scholars and evangelical pastors have noted 
that by appealing to a market-based understanding of culture, the religious message that 
evangelical churches preach becomes somewhat watered down (see Hoover, 2000), the 
megachurch movement proved that evangelicals can and will deftly adapt to cultural 
trends and changes, in order to stay a relevant force in American culture. This market-
based approach to church building also had the effect of further deepening racial divi-
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sions in evangelical culture because it used demographic data to attract a specific type of 
person, almost always coded as white and suburban. 
 Perhaps not coincidentally, as evangelical culture gained ground in populous sub-
urbs, in 1980 all of the major candidates for President, Democratic incumbent Jimmy 
Carter, Republican Ronald Reagan, and Independent John Anderson claimed to be evan-
gelical. As such this election marks the solidification of what is now called the religious 
right. Though many see this as a reactionary stance against the rapid socio-political 
changes in the 1960s (Hart, 2002, p. 146), other scholars see it as a natural extension of 
the political organization evangelicals had been doing since the 1940s (see Dochuk, 
2011). In any case evangelicals in the 1980s rallied around a small number of core issues 
and became active in promoting those issues to the national consciousness. They opposed 
feminism, including the Equal Pay Amendment; they characterized medical abortion as 
murder and the “Pro-life” movement came into being; they opposed homosexuality and 
collectively, their passionate embrace of this set of issues became known as the Culture 
Wars.  
 The 1980s also saw the apex of televangelism. As Stewart Hoover’s study of the 
audience of the 700 club showed, as with radio, when evangelicals watched prominent 
television preachers they saw their movement transcending “the local and particular, in-
troducing their worldview into the public stage where it can receive the respect and hear-
ing it deserves” (Hoover, 1990, p. 240). Erica Robles-Anderson (2012) writes of the logic 
of televangelist congregations in reference to Robert Schuller’s Crystal Cathedral noting 
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that these churches “take up the material conditions associated with the project of mod-
ernization, and thus secularization, in order to create a hyper-visible model of congrega-
tion. In so doing, they reassert the legibility of a Christian cosmology within contempo-
rary technological conditions” (579). In the same way that popular radio evangelists 
helped fundamentalism become a mainstream movement, that preachers from various 
faith traditions within evangelicalism had a place on television validated their relevance 
in American culture. And like the megachurch, televangelism appealed to a suburban 
middle class. As Robles Anderson puts it, broadcasting church at the Crystal Cathedral 
was “exercise in experiencing the mediating logics of a suburbanizing spatial order from 
a sacred point of view” (583). Because in the suburbs what Raymond Williams calls 
“mobile privatization” (1974) dominated, the idea that in scattered living rooms in vari-
ous places, people engaged with community practices that used to be rooted in real space 
through the medium of television, evangelicals adapted their forms and messages to fit an 
American lifestyle increasingly mediated through screens. And for many believers, the 
way that television preachers used the technology of television served to confirm that 
evangelicals had a place in an American culture increasingly defined by televisual visibil-
ity. This was especially true for black televangelism which, Jonathan Walton (2009) as-
serts, functions as a liminal space in which “ the unjust realities of race, class, and gender 
are suspended long enough for viewers to imagine themselves living and thriving in such 
a world” (198). Though Walton concedes the potential for personal empowerment in the 
popular narratives of black televangelism, he critiques the cultural myths that popular 
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black televangelists traffic in and reify, especially the ideologies of “economic advance-
ment, the minimizing of race, and Victorian ideals of the family” (Walton, 2009, p. 171). 
Marla Frederick has asserted that black televangelism, through its notions of racial uplift 
through wealth represents a break with the black church of the Civil Rights movement 
and the beginning of a mediated, visual form of black Christianity that has become a 
shaping force throughout the African diaspora. Frederick particularly focuses on the fig-
ure of the “religious dandy.” She writes, of this figure that he is “attempting to undo cen-
turies-long assumptions about the role of black religion and the low social status of the 
black worshipper...instead of equating poverty with godliness, religious dandies reinter-
preted religious language and expectation by asserting that prosperity is associated with 
godliness” (Frederick, 2015, p. 38). “Religious dandies” became popular in the black tel-
evangelical context and helped to popularize what is known as the “prosperity 
gospel” (See also Bowler, 2013). The figure of the religious dandy also serves to eluci-
date how the visual mode of televangelism hailed different audiences and cultural con-
texts. Again, the habitus of American evangelicalism shifted such that television-watch-
ing became part of the identity of many evangelicals and became folded into evangelical 
culture, though it remained segregated in much the same way that churches were––black 
televangelists primarily hailed a black audience and white televangelists, a white one.  
 Despite the fact that evangelicals remained popular on television, the form was 
beset by scandals, like that of Jim Bakker, prominent television preacher who was im-
prisoned for fraud, that damaged the form’s credibility and the credibility of evangelicals 
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in the public sphere. Along with this, the dominance of evangelicals in politics began to 
wane in the later years of the 80s and in the 90s. In 1989, Pat Robertson, a Pentecostal 
televangelist, ran for president and many see the failure of his candidacy as a turning 
point in the history of evangelical involvement in politics. The Moral Majority stopped 
operating in 1989 and in its place, The Christian Coalition was established, helmed by 
Robertson and conservative academic Ralph Reed. Reed, like Billy Graham before him, 
attempted to be the exemplar of a clean-cut, all-American, white, middle-class and his 
self-conscious posturing to this effect showed that evangelicals were still fighting against 
their image as anti-modern parochials even as they entered into the 1990s.   
By this time, their relative successes and failures in the public sphere had tem-
pered the political zeal of the religious right and revealed what Marsden (2006) calls “the 
establishment-outsider paradox” (p. 7) in fundamentalism, the suspicion held by many 
evangelicals that they are a persecuted minority, a suspicion that exists alongside the 
knowledge that they are in fact the majority religious voice in the United States. None-
theless, as evangelical political stances increasingly became folded into the platform of 
the Republican party and the Culture Wars continued, the idea of evangelicals under fire 
became prevalent. Writing at the end of the 90s, Randall Balmer noticed “To hear Robert-
son tell it–– or Dobson or LaHaye or Sheldon or Wildmon–– Christian conservatives are 
a persecuted minority perpetually under siege at the hands of Communists, Hollywood, 
liberals, homosexuals, feminists, and Hillary Rodham Clinton” (Balmer, 1999, p. 109). 
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Evangelicals were fighting a perpetual war against secular culture in the public sphere, 
and even when they won battles, they felt as though there were losing that war.  
Because of this, evangelicals began to open up new cultural spaces for them-
selves in which they could be assured that their values would be respected. The 1990s 
saw a boom in Contemporary Christian Music (CCM), a genre that tweaked popular mu-
sical styles and added Christian messages as a way to remain relevant to a young Christ-
ian audience as Heather Hendershot’s (2004) study tracks. A network of religious media 
producers cropped up and tailored films and television shows to Christian audiences. 
These programs often co-opted the themes and forms of secular culture, but had religious 
messages (Hendershot, 2004). While, as Hoover’s (2006) research into media audiences 
revealed, Christians still participated in the “common culture” of television, they could 
increasingly retreat into a parallel evangelical culture at the same time. This countercul-
ture developed idioms and symbols specific to it, and those semiotics have been used by 
Republican politicians (some evangelical themselves, some not) to hail evangelicals in 
politics and mobilize their voting power. Frances Turek (2014) explores how George W. 
Bush, himself an evangelical, was especially adroit at this. And Anthea Butler has pointed 
out that Sarah Palin, Vice Presidential candidate in the 2008 Presidential election, embod-
ied a new kind of “renewalist” persona who spoke in “coded language” that hailed the 
religious base of the Republican party and especially those from Pentecostal faith tradi-
tions. Palin was also central to solidifying the theme of “persecution” as central to evan-
gelical identity, especially vis a vis the media (see Butler, 2012). As evangelicalism en-
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tered the 21st century, this semiotic register voiced by popular politicians and pundits 
helped to define how the evangelicals would engage with culture and politics.  
But those that spoke from this counterpublic in the public sphere no longer 
spoke in a unified voice as they had during the heyday of the religious right. Frances 
Fitzgerald (2017) writes about Rick Warren as an example of what she calls the “new 
evangelicals,” a movement that grew out of the disappointment and disillusionment 
evangelicals felt as they were increasingly identified as “The Republican party at prayer” 
during George W. Bush’s tenure. She notes that, “In the two years after Bush’s reelection, 
half a dozen prominent evangelicals published books denouncing the Christian right for 
what they saw as its confusion of religion and politics, its equation of morality with sexu-
al morality, its aggressive intolerance, and its unholy quest for power” (Fitzgerald, 2017, 
p. 539).  Evangelicals, realizing that in some sense they had lost the Culture Wars began 
to change the conversation. These new evangelicals tried to re-energize the evangelical 
counterpublic by focusing on issues like poverty alleviation, climate change, and racial 
reconciliation. Russell Moore, for example, as the head of the Southern Baptist Conven-
tion made racial reconciliation a central part of his platform.  
Continuing their historical engagement with technology, as the internet and so-
cial media became drivers of American cultural engagement in the early aughts, evangel-
icals were there. As Heidi Campbell (2010) notes in her study of how religious organiza-
tions approach new media, for evangelicals “the goal of evangelism that can be realized 
through this technology seems in many respects to outweigh the criticism and cautions 
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raised” (Campbell, 2010, p. 39). The historic institutions that defined and redefined evan-
gelicalism throughout the twentieth century have moved, sometimes unevenly, into the 
digital age. Counterpublic spaces that express American evangelical identity have popped 
up all over the internet and social media platforms and the countercultural register of 
evangelicalism, too, has been ported into the digital realm. As a tradition that has enthusi-
astically embraced mass media technologies in the past, this is no surprise, and indeed is 
consistent with the history of evangelical engagement in the public sphere. As evangeli-
cals have moved online they have also created new forms, such as the online church, 
which Tim Hutchings has ethnographically explored (2007; 2011; 2013). Relatedly, 
Robert Glenn Howard has pinpointed what he calls a new movement of evangelicals 
based on “vernacular Christian fundamentalism” that has come into being through digital 
sociality (2011). Prominent evangelicals have written books about the possibilities for 
social media (see Sweet, 2012; Wilson, 2008; Stephenson, 2011; Murrell, 2011; Rice, 
2009), and alternative versions of church like Second Life Churches (see Estes, 2009) 
and the overwhelming consensus has been that though technology can be dangerous and 
corrupting, evangelicals must use it and shape it to their ends. And, as they have through-
out their history, their forays into digital culture also show their willingness to shift along 
with the larger cultural tide and their impulse to use the most modern technological 
means to remain relevant and contemporary. In this way, the widespread digital habitus 
that has emerged in evangelical culture was prefigured by evangelical engagement with 
radio and television. And as with radio and television evangelicals who deftly use the 
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medium of the internet prove to their fellows that their voice is still valid in the contem-
porary technological world. They also shape new publics through their use of these new 
media, and as my study will show, in so doing they shape the social imaginary of Ameri-
can evangelicalism.  
Another scorched Earth moment 
In 2016 white evangelicals overwhelming supported Donald Trump for presi-
dent and many in the press decried what seemed like a clear hypocrisy: evangelicals who 
had touted the importance of family values for decades supported thrice-married casino 
mogul Donald Trump. Evangelical scholars saw this election as revealing of evangelical-
ism’s worst instincts, and as especially indicative of their exclusionary past. Randall 
Balmer has gone as far as to assert that white evangelicals’ support from Donald Trump 
in the 2016 presidential election is a natural extension of their history of racial segrega-
tion and exclusion. And Sarah Posner concurs, writing, “By openly embracing the racism 
of the alt-right, Trump effectively played to the religious right’s own roots in white su-
premacy” (2017). Evangelical support for Trump can be seen as the natural extension of 
the religious right’s decades-long project of culture battling, and it has again positioned 
evangelicals in the public sphere as reactionary and parochial.  
 Since the Scopes trial, evangelicals have created counterpublic spaces by estab-
lishing media outlets to influence the shifting winds of modernity and they have remained 
arguably the most prominent religious voice in American politics. Yet the feeling that 
evangelicals are losing influence in American culture persists in evangelical circles. One 
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evangelical I spoke to went as far as to say that evangelicalism had reached a “scorched 
Earth moment” in terms of how it is perceived in the public sphere because of the Culture 
Wars and evangelical support of Donald Trump. For evangelicals, like Darrel Giardier, 
embracing technology to capture a younger demographic is key to the rebranding that 
needs to happen to keep evangelicalism alive as is letting go of the Culture Wars. Gi-
rardier told me, “Pastors right now are obsessed with the following question: gay mar-
riage— should we or should we not be okay with it? And I want to look at them and go 
‘Dude, that’s over. You lost that battle.’ The question you’re going to ask in the next 15 
years is: ‘What does it mean to be human?’” (2015). For Girardier, if evangelicals con-
tinue to dig their heels in on “family values” discourses they will no longer be speaking 
to the American people, they will lose their foothold. And he fears this is already happen-
ing. The church is getting grayer was a sentiment that I encountered throughout my 
fieldwork. For those that I studied, the potential remedy was technological. If evangeli-
cals could harness the power of the smartphone, perhaps they could reenergize the evan-
gelical counterpublic and thus remain in the conversation and even shift it.  
As in the 1920s with radio, the 1970s with publishing, the 1980s with televi-
sion, and the 1990s with music, evangelicals today want to use technology as a means to 
prove that their message still has a viable place in the modern world. As Darrel Girardier 
implies, they also want to provide a touchstone for a rapidly changing technological cul-
ture but they can only do this by using the technology of that culture for their own ends. 
Thus the path forward, for many, and indeed for the people represented in this study, is 
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embracing digital habitus in all aspects of Christian culture and exploring and exploiting 
it for Christian ends. The rest of this study deals with the many ways that evangelicals 
animated by this imperative negotiate their place in digital culture and in new media in-
dustries and how their embrace of technology is changing the contours of this subculture.  
I begin with the church, the central institution of evangelicalism. I look at 
churches that have internalized the same logic as Darrel Girardier and have looked to 
software companies and to Silicon Valley for inspiration as to how to run their institution. 
In so doing, they have promoted digital habitus among their parishioners, making the 
smartphone a necessary accessory to twenty-first century worship in mainstream evangel-
ical churches.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CHURCH 
From the cathedral to the startup church 
!  
 
 Vintage video games are set up in a large, loft-like room with exposed beams and 
industrial-style fans, and bearded men wearing stylish t-shirts and jeans cradle iPads as 
they wait for their turn at the nearest console. This building and its inhabitants look like 
they could be in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, the epicenter of hipsterdom, but they are stand-
ing in the lobby of Watermark Community Church, an evangelical megachurch in Dallas, 
Texas. This is the scene at Echo , a yearly conference that promises to be the meeting 6
place for “artists, geeks and storytellers who serve the church” (EchoHub, 2018).  
  The Echo Conference ran from 2007 through 2013. 6
Figure 3.1: A still from the 8-bit-style animation used at the Echo Conference in 2013
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The theme of the 2013 conference I attended was “8-bit”, an early form of 
computer animation, so named because it only allowed for 8 bits per pixel. This anima-
tion was developed in the late 1980s and used in video games. The conference organizers 
used 8-bit in all of their promotional materials and even created Nintendo-style 8-bit an-
imations that were accompanied by bass-heavy electronic music to introduce each of their 
main speakers [see figure 3.1]. The organizers at Echo chose this theme because, as one 
explained in his introductory remarks, his generation of Christians came of age spiritually 
at the same time as video games were coming of age technologically. Thus a generation 
of millennial evangelicals share a collective memory rife with coexisting Christian and 
technological narratives, and this was externalized in Echo’s promotional materials and in 
the stylings at the conference. The 8-bit imagery that pervaded the event signified the 
personal engagement with media that members of this group overwhelmingly had in 
common. The attendees at Echo were mostly church professionals, some even bore the 
title “pastor,” but their authority was performed far differently than those senior pastors 
who are often seminary-trained professionals. Instead, it was performed in and through 
their deep familiarity with media technologies and their effortless ability to interface with 
them, in other words through their digital habitus. At this conference, those who identi-
fied as “church creatives,” or “church geeks” (both of these terms were used at the con-
ference but are also used in broader circles) hailed each other and reinforced their social 
bonds. Many people who had followed each other on Twitter for years shook hands for 
the first time at Echo. As the conference organizers posted on their website, “Echo has 
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created a tribe… and one that we love. We love connecting with hundreds of like-minded 
creative types in the Church. Echo has become an annual reunion of sorts for us and 
many others. We deeply cherish this reunion and the friends we get to see” (Echo Hub, 
2018).  
In her ethnography of hackers, Gabriella Coleman has theorized the conference 
as a social ritual that can “reconfigure the relationship between time, space, and persons, 
allow for a series of personal transformations; and perhaps most significantly, reinforce 
group solidarity” (2012, p. 47). Though church conferences are different than hacker con-
ferences in that they do not include the element of making as a central activity, they have 
this ritualistic aspect that is heightened, I found, by the ritualistic activity common to 
evangelical gatherings, for example, prayer––which at Echo often occurred before or af-
ter a conference presentation.  
 So what is this group whose solidarity is on display at the Echo conference? Who 
are these church creatives and church geeks? The people who came together at Echo, are 
the vanguards of a new generation of evangelical church professionals that hope to push 
the church into the digital era. Though churches remain centers of community and local 
worship, with the megachurch and multi-site movements many churches today resemble 
corporations, which, as I explore below, is the result of a strategy that began in the popu-
lar church growth movement of the late 1970s and 80s. At every point in the history of 
evangelical churches since this time, leaders have taken cues from corporate paragons 
and in the contemporary moment, they have looked to technology companies in order to 
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shape their organizational and outreach strategies. They have also integrated the products 
that this industry creates into their liturgy and spaces, thereby encouraging digital habitus 
in the central spaces that define evangelicalism. This chapter charts evangelical church 
forms from the megachurch movement, to the multi-site church, to the online church first 
through experiential vignettes using attendance at three different types of Life.Church 
services, and then through theoretical analysis. I then take a trip to Edmond, Oklahoma, 
where Life.Church has its central offices. I argue that Life.Church , which likes to call 7
itself a “start-up church,” represents the apotheosis of a large, dispersed network of 
churches that have attempted to integrate technology and digital habitus into the spaces of 
their churches and the strategies that define their outreach. As such, they have created 
spaces in which digital habitus is encouraged and where the digital unconscious of evan-
gelicalism becomes conscious.   
This chapter is based on a variety of qualitative sources. I conducted semi-for-
mal interviews with church leaders: communications directors, pastors, and others; at-
tended two church conferences, one in Dallas in the summer of 2013 and one virtual con-
ference in the summer of 2017; I analyzed 26 books  written by evangelicals on how 8
churches should approach the digital era; I attended evangelical church services in Los 
Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, New Jersey, and Nashville and spent three days 
at the church that provides the central data for this chapter, Life.Church in Edmond, Ok-
 Life.Church was formerly called LifeChurch.tv. They changed their name in 2015. 7
  Books are cited when quoted and a complete list of these titles is located in Appendix B.  8
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lahoma. At two Life.Church locations in Edmond and at their central offices I conducted 
roughly 30 informal interviews with parishioners, volunteers, and staff members.  In my 9
analysis I argue that the hybridized discourse growing from the megachurch movement 
that saw the twinning of business speak with Christian strategies and now takes cues from 
the world of high technology has fundamentally changed the central institutions that de-
fine evangelicalism today.  
One Church, Many Locations 
 
“Is this it?” Asks the Lyft driver. Even though I am expecting a relatively non-
descript building, I am not sure I am in the right place until I see the two large satellite 
 Pseudonyms are used for the names of all informal interviews from Life.Church.9
Figure 3.2: Photograph taken by the author at Life.Church’s flagship location in Edmond, Oklahoma. 
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dishes out front [see figure 3.2]. “This is it” I tell her. This Life.Church’s flagship loca-
tion in Edmond, Oklahoma where Craig Groeschel preaches in person every weekend. 
His sermons go out to twenty-six connected campuses, to “networked 
churches” (“churches” housed in people’s homes, in community centers, or in other loca-
tions), and to a large online church audience. Life.Church estimates that about 70,000 
people watch some version of Groeschel’s weekly sermon each weekend. On the front 
page of their website they claim that they are “One Church, Multiple Locations” and ex-
plain, “A church isn't a building—it's the people. We meet in locations around the United 
States and globally at Life.Church Online. No matter where you join us, you'll find 
friendly people who are excited to get to know you!” (Life.Church, 2018).  
Throughout my interviews for this project, in on and offline spaces, in church-
es, conferences, chat rooms, listening to podcasts, participating in the mediated discourse 
that springs from the digital unconscious of evangelicalism, one name always recurred as 
the paragon of what a church in the digital age should strive to be: Life.Church. This 
church is a touchstone for those people who might understand themselves as belonging to 
a movement of digitally-minded evangelicals, and for good reason. Life.Church calls it-
self a “startup church.” And that moniker has been reinforced by their very successful 
app, the YouVersion Bible App. In 2012, The New York Times reported that YouVersion 
was the result of a multi-million dollar investment that the church made in technology. In 
2013 alone, Life.Church reportedly spent 20 million dollars on the app (see O’Leary, 
2013). Life.Church parishioners tell me that they believe that their church is in the center 
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of a revival. One says “God could turn the tap off at any time,” but as for now, they tell 
me, they are growing, they are reaching people, and they are doing it by staying on the 
forefront of technological innovation.  
Below I sketch my experience of attending Life.Church and watching Craig 
Groeschel preach in person, attending a multi-site Life.Church location, and attending 
church online. Evangelical church spaces have evolved throughout the last forty years, 
from the megachurch movement, to the multi-site, the online church, and Life.Church’s 
strategy encompasses all of these iterations. The scenes below are only meant to give a 
sense of Life.Church’s brand and they are not ethnographically embedded pieces as I did 
not engage in a long-term participant observation at each location. Still, I hope to use my 
experience to vivify the theoretical assertions made in my discussion of the evolution of 
evangelical church spaces below.  
Flagship 
Outside the auditorium in Life.Church’s flagship location are high-top tables 
and black leather couches for people who came early for the church service to sit and 
gather. Coffee, tea, and cookies are on offer. The church, as all Life.Church locations, has 
an industrial aesthetic with polished concrete floors and exposed ductwork. Simply-de-
signed text posters on the wall quote Life.Church’s central tenets, like “Our mission is to 
lead people to become fully devoted followers of Christ” but other than the references to 
Jesus in these quotes, the church has very little religious imagery. There is not a steeple 
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outside, instead there is the red Life.Church trademark sign. Volunteers for the church 
wear red branded t-shirts with the Life.Church logo on them, and jeans, and they smile 
and greet people as they walk in. Inside and out it looks more Costco than cathedral. On 
the day that I attended, the church was decorated for Christmas and several small sets had 
been constructed with Christmas scenes. The church offered a professional photographer 
at each of these so that attendees could take Christmas photos with their families. The 
crowd at this location was mostly white, and judging by the cars in the parking lot, and 
the self-presentation of the people including their various technological accoutrements 
such as iPhones and Apple watches seemed to indicate that they were middle to upper 
middle class suburbanites, the majority of which were families and older people.  
About fifteen minutes before the service was set to begin I entered the auditori-
um which is set up like a theater with padding on the wall to maximize sound, Two 
broadcast-quality cameras loom above the parishioners who sit on folding chairs. Before 
the service began “trailers” played on the three movie-sized screens at the front of the 
room. On this day, there were two videos that were roughly four minutes in length. The 
first was a behind-the-scenes look at a new song being produced by the church and the 
second was an interview with a Christian singer who uses the YouVersion Bible app and 
who called it “life-changing.” Both short videos had high production values; they could 
have played on any television network.  
The service began with the band playing two praise songs, as is typical of a 
contemporary evangelical liturgy. Parishioners rose to their feet and were encouraged to 
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sing along (the lyrics played across the screens along with the songs) and clap, dance, or 
raise their arms. Then the campus pastor came on to the stage, urged the congregation to 
tithe, and introduced another video. This video showed a tribe in Zambia who were able 
to read the Book of Acts in their native language for the first time through the YouVersion 
Bible App. He emotionally said that “Bible poverty” might be eliminated in our lifetime 
because of the work going on right here at Life.Church. He told the audience, “The 
prophecy is happening.” And then he introduced senior pastor, Craig Groeschel.  
Groeschel is a highly charismatic preacher who uses his droning voice well, 
making it rapid and loud when he is trying to emphasize a point in the manner of a hip 
hop artist. He darts back and forth across the stage, adroitly and seamlessly looking into 
the audience, then the camera, then back to the audience. He tells personal stories about 
working out, about his wife and children, about a sleepless night tossing and turning in 
bed. He tells a story about hearing of a friend's’ tragic death during Thanksgiving dinner 
and going outside to weep and pray. Throughout his sermon Groeschel was careful to in-
clude all of the Life.Church locations. He said things like, “Somebody in Wichita say it 
with me,” when asking the congregation to repeat a biblical phrase. In introducing the 
concluding prayer he said, “All of my churches would you pray aloud.” In these ways he 
hailed the congregants in the crowd in Edmond as part of a larger, dispersed network of 
people all worshipping together. Near the end of his sermon music began to swell behind 
him. The service ended with another praise song. I cried and laughed along with 
Groeschel and with parishioners in the audience during his sermon and I left the auditori-
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um feeling like I had just had a particularly emotional conversation with a friend, who 
despite everything remained optimistic, upbeat, and secure in his religious faithfulness.  
Though some people brought their own physical Bible, most, like me, used the 
Life.Church YouVersion Bible App during the service and there were no physical Bibles 
available in the makeshift folding-chair “pews.” On the YouVersion App you can search 
sermon plans, and I found the plan for the day I was visiting, and I followed along and 
took notes on my iPhone. The app in some ways gamifies the experience of church going 
by offering “badges” to users when they perform certain functions on the app. For exam-
ple, I earned a “YouVersion Badge” when I subscribed to a reading plan on the app. The 
App also integrates with iOS functionalities. Because I have installed YouVersion on my 
iPhone, when I send a text message my phone offers a widget that would allow me to 
send Bible verses from the app through text. And in this way, Life.Church’s app is folding 
into the digital habitus of its users.  
Multi-site 
The following morning I saw the same sermon preached at another location, 
Life.Church’s second campus, also in Edmond, Oklahoma. This time my Lyft driver 
knew all about Life.Church. He told me that he was not one to cry easily, but that he cried 
every time he went to service at Life.Church because of the music and the preaching and 
the Holy Spirit present in the congregation. He asked if I had heard of the YouVersion 
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Bible App and he told me that millions of people had downloaded it. Life.Church is just 
so “relevant,” he explained. 
This location, like the first Life.Church location, had the branded sign out front 
and though this one had a large cross outside, the inside was similarly devoid of tradi-
tional religious imagery. At this service, Groeschel’s sermon was book-ended by appear-
ances from the “campus pastor,” in this case a woman named Erin Crain. Walking into 
the auditorium was the same. The turnout was the same. In-person singers and a band 
played just as they had the day before. The videos played on the three screens were the 
same. And again, I cried and laughed along with Groeschel and the congregation.  
Figure 3.3: Craig Groeschel preaching in person at Life.Church’s flagship location in Edmond, Oklahoma. 
Photo by the author. 
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 Outside of the auditorium before and after the service parishioners greeted each 
other as they had at the first location. I saw a list of “small groups” offered by this loca-
tion that people could sign up to be involved in. I spoke with a volunteer who told me 
that it was great to be able to travel and go to a Life.Church in another location. He had 
recently taken his family to another networked Life.Church location in Kansas City and 
they had seen their pastor, Groeschel preach there. He told me when you walk into the 
Kansas City Life.Church location it looks just like the location in Edmond that he attends. 
“Like In and Out?” I say referring to the way that chain locations of corporate stores tend 
to look the same. “Exactly,” he responded. 
Figure 3.4: Craig Groeschel preaching as seen from the audience in a networked congregation where 




Life.Church’s church online opens with a short “Welcome” video that shows 
quick crosscut images of people logging on, Groeschel energetically preaching, a band 
playing on a stage and the phrase “Our goal is to lead people to be fully committed fol-
lowers of Christ.” Then the live feed starts. The service online begins with music, in the 
same way it does in Life.Church’s physical locations, though the experience is different 
because the shots of the band are seen through multiple cameras in the manner of a music 
video, rather than from a vantage point of an audience member in the auditorium. I do not 
stand up from the music like I would if I was in an auditorium though I bob my head a 
Figure 3.5: Screenshot of Craig Groeschel preaching as seen through the Life.Church online interface. Chat 
screen to the left was omitted to protect the privacy of those involved. 
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bit, and tap my feet. I notice that I have not thought about how I am dressed, as I would 
have before attending a church service. I sit at my desk, watching the feed, as I would 
with any other online video. I resist the urge to toggle to another tab, and check Twitter, 
an urge that is consistent with my online behavior. There is an empty heart shape at the 
side of the screen that when clicked on it launches a colored heart animation across the 
screen. This is a similar functionality to Facebook which allows “likes” to stream across 
live videos. I see other people’s hearts go by when I assume that they want to indicate 
that they agree with or like something going on on screen. And this serves as a reminder 
that there are other people watching along with me from various locations.  
There is a chat screen next to the live feed and there are people on it labelled 
“hosts” who greet users by their usernames as they come into the chat. In many of my 
experiences of church online I have found that trolling is a persistent problem for church 
online. Sometimes comments by trolls when they are particularly inappropriate or threat-
ening are deleted from the chat screen immediately. But often, the hosts will try to engage 
with the troll, ask the troll what is wrong and whether they would like the hosts to pray 
from them. Others in the chat are regulars who greet the hosts cordially. The hosts chat 
back and forth with the regulars, with the trolls, and with each other throughout the ser-
vice, and occasionally someone says something like “Okay, I’m going to go full screen 
now, see you later!” People in chat “sing along” by typing the words to the song they are 
listening to. People sometimes post emojis to indicate how they are feeling. The chat 
screen can be toggled to another in a long list of languages at which point it will immedi-
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ately auto-translate. This constant chatter is markedly different from the experience of 
attending a church in person.  
Yet this is hardly a “virtual world,” as Tom Boellstorff’s (2008) definition 
would have it. Boellstorff explains that to be a “virtual world,” an online platform must 
meet three requirements. First, it must be a place with a sense of placeness. In Second 
Life, residents buy “land,” and understand themselves in relation to a spatial reality creat-
ed by the world. Second, for a site to be a virtual world, it has to have people in it. Thus, 
it has to be a site of sociality. Third, and perhaps most obviously, it has to be online. 
These three requirements paint a specific picture of virtual worlds as online “places” in 
which a social world is performed and there is some evidence that proponents of online 
church hope that attending a church online feels like entering a place, and indeed a social 
world. However, there is no sense of placeness in Life.Church’s online church, or any 
online church I have attended. Instead the sociality of Life.Church’s platform resembles 
that of Twitter, Facebook, or other online, text-based spaces. As in those spaces there is a 
different type of sociality at play. People say things to others that they would never say in 
a face-to-face environment. Trolls are the clearest example of this. Trolls in a physical 
church space would be either reprimanded by the people around them, or in the case of 
disruptive behavior, would be ejected from the service. Similarly parishioners do not tend 
to speak to each other throughout a church service if they do not know each other. Clear-
ly, there are different social rules governing the online church space as opposed to the 
physical space.  
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After the music, the online pastor, Alan George, comes on screen. He tells a 
story about an African refugee coming to the United States that illustrates that church on-
line through Life.Church is a “global community.” He encourages online church mem-
bers to invite people to the church. Then he introduces Craig Groeschel.  
Groeschel’s preaching is still engaging, but it is more difficult to pay attention 
to him. Because church online is located on my personal computer, a tool that I am used 
to controlling and adapting to my own preferences, toggling back and forth, multi-task-
ing, etc. I do not feel the social pressure to be paying close attention that I would feel in a 
church auditorium surrounded by fellow parishioners. In the chat, during the service one 
person mentions that he believes that he is a curse. The online church parishioners in chat 
try to encourage him and convince him that this is not so. This is a common experience in 
church online that is less present in a physical church where people do not talk to each 
other during services and where people generally act in according to established social 
norms.  
Many Locations 
Attempts are made to make the services across three different formal structures 
feel consistent. Each iteration has a campus pastor and throughout the service pastors 
emphasize that Life.Church is one large, global family, rather than a single building or 
experience. Life.Church is a brand that makes its parishioners feel comfortable because 
each location has a sameness to it. That the multi-site model borrows from the strategies 
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of chain stores is appealing to middle class parishioners who see this as a way that the 
church is remaining “relevant” in American culture. Several parishioners praised the effi-
ciency of this model and excitedly agreed that the church was borrowing strategy from 
the corporate world. Like the Lyft driver that brought me to Life.Church and told me that 
they were “so relevant,” the fact that Life.Church borrows business models from the cor-
porate world and, as I show below, also from the world of tech, in their growth strategy 
appeals to its congregants who see this fact as evidence that Life.Church is particularly 
suited to growth in the contemporary consumer marketplace. In their attempt to equate all 
modes of church service such that to watch Groeschel in person, on a large screen, or on a 
laptop screen all invoke the same feelings of community and worship, they also encour-
age digital habitus. Technology is used as a way to excite congregants and make them 
feel as though they are actionably involved in the fulfillment of a biblical prophecy. And 
the “life-changing” technology that is most central to the experience of Life.Church is 
their YouVersion Bible App, which they constantly promote. For many, the app is another 
piece of evidence that Life.Church is a contemporary, practically-focused church.  
Life.Church is “one church with many locations,” and as I hope to show below, 
this model is the result of decades of evolution in evangelicalism and this evolution has 
been sparked by following business models from the corporate world, and increasingly, 
by using technologies and practices imported from these worlds, rethought and remixed 
Christian purposes.  
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The Multi-media Megachurch  
Though the earliest evangelical churches in the United States emulated the style 
of European cathedrals, as Kilde (2002) explores in her study of evangelical architecture, 
as American evangelicalism’s populist leanings began to dominate, evangelicals experi-
mented with different forms of church, including housing church services in theaters. 
This willingness to adapt formal structures to the preferences of parishioners and poten-
tial parishioners reached an apex with the megachurch movement, which began in the late 
1970s. Megachurches have been defined as those churches that house 2,000 or more 
parishioners per weekend (typically churches offer several services between Saturday and 
Sunday). Many megachurches house many more people; and as the movement has grown 
and matured, megachurches have become even larger, some accommodating tens of thou-
sands of people per weekend. In their “Megachurch Report” (2015) the Hartford Institute 
reports that in 2015 the median megachurch had 1,200 seats in its auditorium. 
Megachurches also typically host many “small groups” in which smaller groups of 
parishioners come together to do Bible study, or otherwise create communities that are 
meant to act as a weight to the largeness of church worship.  
As megachurches began to spring up in the suburbs in the 1970s, “church 
growth consults” proliferated and myriad books were and continue to be written on the 
subject. The Christian publisher Zondervan has a “Church growth section” on its website 
that contains over one hundred titles. The church growth strategy relies on a focus on 
“seekers”; seeker-focused churches want to grow their church by converting previously 
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unaffiliated or otherwise affiliated people. As sociologists of religion have asserted, after 
the 1950s American religious affiliation changed. No longer was it assumed that one 
would follow the religious traditions of their family or community, instead, the popular 
focus shifted to individual notions of spiritual progress and reward. Wade Clark Roof 
(1999) has called this phenomenon America’s “spiritual marketplace,”  a field in which 10
religious producers use various strategies to attract spiritual “seekers.” 
 Rick Warren’s classic church growth manual The Purpose Driven Church 
(1995), which has sold over a million copies, maps out how churches can attract these 
seekers. Warren’s strategy relies on catering to specific demographic and cultural norms 
which he gleans, as a business would, using survey research and census data. Blending 
into the community is of paramount importance to Warren’s strategy and he relates the 
experience of another pastor noting,  
When my friend Larry DeWitt was called to pastor a church in southern Cali-
fornia, he found a small clapboard church building in a high-tech suburban 
area. Larry recognized that the age and style of the building were a barrier to 
reaching that community.  He told the church leaders he’d accept the pastorate 
if they’d move out of the building and start holding services in a Hungry Tiger 
restaurant. The members agreed. (Warren, 1995, p.  269). 
  There is an extensive body of scholarly literature on the American spiritual marketplace. See especially 10
Ellingson (2007) on the megachurch and the spiritual marketplace and Banet-Weiser (2012) whose work 
looks at how Christian preachers have mobilized an understanding of branding and marketing to attract 
spiritual seekers. 
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The traditional style of the central steepled church did not appeal to those suburbanites 
who saw it as as anachronistic. Instead they cast the more familiar environs of a corporate 
chain restaurant as a more appropriate setting for a church. For Warren, this story illus-
trates the fact that to grow, a church must tap into the style and culture of a community. In 
Warren’s words, “To penetrate any culture you must be willing to make small conces-
sions in matters of style in order to gain a hearing” (1995, p. 196). These concessions can 
even influence how and if churches display crosses, the central symbol of Christian the-
ology and worship. Stewart Hoover (2000) points out that Willow Creek Community 
Church (one of the first and most iconic megachurches) does not display a cross. Instead 
church leaders think of the cross as a “prop” and only bring it out for ceremonial occa-
sions like weddings and baptisms. Hoover concludes that the lack of a cross at Willow 
Creek means that megachurch culture is a  “new, voluble, embodied, and effervescent 
kind of religiosity articulated to cultural-symbolic practices which it can never fully es-
cape” (2000, p. 156). In other words, as times change, evangelicals are involved in a dis-
cursive relationship to contemporary culture that forces them to restructure their style, 
aesthetics, and forms. To this end, the megachurch: 
locates itself on a separate plane of respite outside of the stresses of everyday 
life by identifying with other contemporary places of peace, places where peo-
ple spend their leisure hours (hopefully) untroubled by the cares of the world: 
the shopping mall, the sports arena, the movie theatre.  The church home is no 
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longer relevant, but the mall provides the feeling of worry-free comfort for 
which the megachurch strives. (Kilde, 2002, p. 219) 
Old church buildings carry the baggage of an what many view as an oppressive religious 
past, while malls, theaters and restaurants speak the consumer-driven present of the 
American suburbs.  
 By emulating malls, theaters, and chain restaurants, in order to appeal to a specific 
demographic subset of white, suburban consumers on the American spiritual marketplace, 
megachurches could be termed what Marc Auge (1991) has called “non-places.” For 
Auge, the central community church in Europe epitomized anthropological place—it is 
the ultimate marker of a local culture. Auge writes about the French context, explaining 
that, 
The smallest French towns, even villages, always boast a 'town centre' contain-
ing monuments that symbolize religious authority (church or cathedral) and 
civil authority (town hall, sous-prefecture or, in big towns, the prefecture). The 
church (Catholic in most parts of France) overlooks a square or open space 
through which many or most cross-town routes pass. The town hall is nearby; 
even where this defines a space of its own, the place de la Mmie is seldom 
more than a stone's throw from the place de l'Eglise. Also in the town centre, 
and always close to the town hall and the church, a monument to the dead has 
been erected. (Auge, 1995: 65) 
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Auge conjures the image of a towering religious symbol presiding over provincial life. 
Twinned with civic authority, this church provides a connection with a cosmic order, one 
that would be clearly read by the citizens who passed it daily. The notion of anthropolog-
ical place relies on a belief that there are places that embody a culture that is bounded. He 
writes that it represents a fantasy “of a closed world, founded once and for all long ago; 
on which, strictly speaking, does not have to be understood” (Auge, 1995, p. 44). He goes 
on to explain that placeness, when thought of in this manner is holistic and social. An en-
tire, bounded, cultural world can be grasped through the experience of any part of it and 
thus every sign is pregnant with cultural meaning. Auge contrasts this understanding of 
anthropological place with what he calls “non-place.” He defines non-place with regard 
to place noting simply, “If a place can be defined as relational, historical and concerned 
with identity, then a space which cannot be defined as relational, or historical, or con-
cerned with identity will be a non-place” (Auge, 1995, p. 78). Rather than reinforcing a 
collective, shared history, non-places are those spaces in which individuals create a mean-
ing from their experiences that is more self-reflexive than reflective of a collective com-
munity or history. One experiences the non-place “Assailed by the images flooding from 
commercial, transport or retail institutions, the passenger in non-places has the simulta-
neous experiences of a perpetual present and an encounter with the self” (Auge, 1991, p. 
105). By fashioning megachurches in the manner of non-places like retail institutions, 
than, evangelical culture catered to the American proclivity for an individualized, self-
reflexive form of worship and an American habitus shaped by non-places. 
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Megachurches also encourage a reflexive encounter with the self with their 
embrace of media technologies, especially by using movie screens and high-tech audio 
equipment. In her study of megachurches, Kilde explains that “the newest megachurch 
auditoriums not only include stage areas designed to accommodate large screens––Grace 
Church, for instance, has two huge screens on either side of the stage––but also eliminate 
all natural light from the room to optimize video clarity” (2006, p. 243). Screens are the 
focal point of the worship space in evangelical megachurches and as such have more 
prominence than crosses or traditional religious imagery. In sometimes stadium-sized 
megachurches, screens are a necessity. But the fact that “the role of congregants in wor-
ship ritual consists primarily of watching screens,” (Kilde, 2006, p. 244) is also an exten-
sion of the seeker-focused strategy that realizes that, as Rick Warren asserts, “Television 
has permanently shortened the attention span of Americans” (1995, p. 255). Because 
television has become the primary mode by which suburbanites interact with culture, 
evangelical churches understand the power that screens hold for them and they employ 
screens as a means to attract these spiritual consumers. The experience of the church, 
both in personal worship (singing along with the worship band on stage, repeating 
prayers after the pastor), and community worship (the understanding of a collective expe-
rience), is mediated through large screens at the front of the auditorium. Schultze (1991) 
however, voices a common criticism of megachurches when he notes that they contain 
"mere collections of individual believers who happen to be in the same place for wor-
ship" (p. 210).   
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Screens are to the megachurch what rose windows were to the Gothic church. 
They provide a visual narrative that serves to guide and augment the worship experience. 
But unlike rose windows, digital technologies allow for continuously changing content 
and producing this content becomes one of the main concerns of megachurches. The 
website for Northland: A Church Distributed showcases a documentary called “What is 
Worship?” that explains how they prepare for weekly services. This documentary reveals 
that Northland focuses just as much on the technological setup than on the substance of 
the message. One church leader explains that “We let a voice-over and scripture and the 
music and the lights and the video kind of tell the story” (Northland, 2011). Telling the 
story does not only mean crafting a sermon, it means producing an entertaining and tech-
nologically advanced service that can keep the attention of parishioners who have been 
trained by mass-media environments. The crew follows Northland’s “Lighting/Staging 
director” and shows him renting a fog machine. Throughout the documentary church 
leaders have discussions that focus on “creating an environment” for the audience. In the 
Middle Ages, the Catholic Church created an environment for their church goers, making 
worship into a ritualistic event that was meant to transport the individual into the realm of 
the sacred, or spiritual. Conversely, in the megachurch, church leaders instead borrow on 
the familiar paradigms of the secular entertainment industry ostensibly to achieve the 
same end. In the Northland documentary, as the camera focuses on the church auditori-
um, it seems as though it could be the set of a high-budget, Broadway blockbuster. The 
stage is decorated to look like the Garden of Eden with a giant screen providing the ever-
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changing backdrop. Throughout the service this screen will display the words to worship 
songs, the text of Biblical verses and it will play video to introduce segments. 
Megachurches understand that they are preaching to an audience that expects entertain-
ment, expects production values, and expects screens, and this is where “church cre-
atives” come in. To be successful, megachurches need people who can produce media. 
Churches hire MFAs, they employ people who have worked for production houses and 
studios. Not unlike the days of the rose windows, evangelical megachurches have to hire 
artists who have a familiarity with the entertainment industry and a knack for storytelling. 
These multi-media-saturated megachurches have become the most recognizable 
institutions of evangelicalism, and as centers of community worship they are what Birgit 
Meyer calls “aesthetic formations.” Meyer defines aesthetic formations with reference to 
Anderson’s (1991) concept of “imagined communities,” which explains how print media 
gave rise to a collective understanding of the nation-state, and Meyer begins with this in 
order to keep the concept of mediation at the center of her theory. In place of “imagined,” 
Meyer posits the term “aesthetic,” which she uses in the Aristotelian sense, referring to 
embodied, lived experience. For Meyer, the idea of imagination is too limited to encom-
pass religious experience, which not only exists in minds, but is also performed through 
bodies. Meyer also substitutes “formation” for community to move away from the spatial 
bindedness that community implies toward a more fluid and flexible structural image. Put 
simply, aesthetic formations are the structures that mediated groups of religious believers 
take. 
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Meyer adds a layer of complexity to her theory when she introduces the con-
cept of sensational forms. Sensational forms are the specific communicative practices that 
structure social relations within aesthetic formations. Meyer defines “sensational forms” 
as “both religious content (beliefs, doctrines, sets of symbols) and norms. Including all 
the media that act as intermediaries in religious mediation practices, the notion of sensa-
tional form is meant to explore how exactly mediations bind and bond believers with 
each other, and with the transcendental” (Meyer, 2009, p. 13). Sensational forms make 
manifest the often invisible aesthetic formations behind them. Meyer explains that, “in 
order to achieve this and be experienced as real, imaginations are required to become 
tangible outside the realm of the mind, by creating a social environment that materializes 
through the structuring of space, architecture, ritual performance and by inducing bodily 
sensations” (Meyer, 2009, p. 5). In evangelical megachurches, screens have become the 
central sensational form by which believers mediated their experiences and their relation-
ships with the church community around them, people whose eyes are also fixed on 
screens. These sensational forms have transformed the non-places of evangelicalism into 
complex visual spaces in which an ever-changing visual liturgy whose tropes are bor-
rowed from popular entertainment addresses parishioners. That mediation has become a 
central experience in megachurches has been the impetus behind a change in how evan-
gelical churches are structured. It also provides the logistic means by which megachurch-
es become multi-site churches.  
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The Multi-site Church  
The seeker-church strategy relies on continual change and flexibility as a means 
to attract new initiates, but as megachurches grow, logistical problems can limit growth. 
Books on church growth note that parking becomes an oft-lamented issue and seating be-
comes another. One way that evangelical churches have escaped this problem is through 
establishing satellite churches in other locations; megachurches become “multi-site” 
churches. Research from the Hartford institute found that 62 percent of megachurches in 
2015 were multi-site churches. In contrast, in 2010 only 46 percent of megachurches 
were multi-site. As this data indicates, multi-site churches are a growing trend.  
Some multi-site churches hold concurrent worship services in which video 
from one site (proponents advise against using terminology such as “main site”) is simul-
cast into another or many other sites. Other churches transfer their brand of worship to 
various locations through non-simultaneous video teaching. And still other multi-site 
churches develop teaching programs to train new pastors in their style of preaching and 
revamp old sites with their style in order to attract new followers in new locations. One 
proponent of this model explains that “The multi-site movement is a strategic response to 
the question of how to maintain momentum and growth while not being limited to the 
monolithic structure of a megachurch” (Surratt et al, 2006, p. 7). Multi-site churches ex-
tend the reach of a successful church’s style or brand. And because many churches rely 
on the charisma of a lead pastor – Bill Hybels of Willow Creek, Rick Warren of Saddle-
back and Craig Groeletsch of Life.Church all embody this charismatic preacher archetype 
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and all run multi-site churches—multi-site churches allow a megachurch to extend the 
reach of a charismatic leader’s particular brand of preaching. Some multi-site churches 
have locations in many states, others even boast satellite campuses in other countries. On 
pastor notes “multi-site summarizes today’s approach to church in which geography is no 
longer the defining factor” (Surratt et al, 2006, p. 27 emphasis in the original). By going 
multi-site and overcoming the restrictions of a single building, churches rely on media, 
technology, and a cadre of “church geeks” to facilitate these increasingly important sen-
sational forms.  
  Joel C. Hunter is the leader of the Florida church: Northland: A Church Dis-
tributed.  In 2007 he wrote a manual outlining how and why his church adopted the mul-
ti-site model.  In it, he expresses a commonly voiced frustration with the narrowness of 
the local church. Hunter casts the building of the church as a binding space, one that con-
fines bodies and by extension, the minds of the parishioners. He explains that “we will 
miss so much if we limit our exuberance to what happens within the walls we’ve 
built” (Hunter, 2007, p. 47). He says that the traditional model runs the risk of being “en-
closed and self-limiting” (Hunter, 2007, p. 23). To solve these problems, Hunter estab-
lished multiple satellite locations all connected together to enable concurrent worship 
services. Hunter was able to justify this move by framing his understanding of a “net-
worked model” of church as similar to the trinitarian nature of the Christian God who is, 
in Christian theology, simultaneously three beings: The father, the son, and the Holy Spir-
it. 
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Hunter explains the earliest iteration of this model: 
The worship services began with T1 phone line hook-ups for video and audio 
capabilities.  Then, because of the geographical proximity we laid fiber-optic 
cable between the two worship sites, enabling us to worship interactively in 
real time. We have responsive readings duets, and other types of worship lead-
ership exchanges between the two sites. There is truly a feeling of togetherness. 
On occasion, I start my sermon at one location, only to finish it at another. 
(Hunter, 2007, p. 41) 
Interactive technology allowed Hunter’s megachurch flexibility. No longer were the spa-
tial realities of the church building a concern. As megachurches become multi-site and 
new technologies open up new frontiers, evangelicals see themselves as defeating the 
limiting category of space. For many this is cause for celebration. Consider one evangeli-
cal response: “The possibilities are limitless, especially with contemporary 
technology” (McManus, 2006, p. 8). At the root of the enthusiasm underlying the multi-
site model is the idea that church is a scalable project. The church can expand in geo-
graphical reach without losing its essential purpose as a place of congregation, communi-
ty and worship. Anna Tsing (2012) discusses scalability as a central ideology of contem-
porary capitalism, and as in the megachurch, evangelicals have looked to corporate ideals 
for guidance on how to scale churches in the manner of chain restaurants. One how-to 
manual on multi-site churches mentions the Holiday Inn, Krispy Kreme donuts and a 
chain restaurant from the South called “Sticky Fingers,” as models churches might emu-
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late (see Surratt et al, 2006). And at both of the conferences I attended for this study there 
were several presentations devoted to creating and maintaining a church “brand” that 
drew on influences from the corporate world.  
The issue of scalability is also related to the time-space distanciation that also 
underlies the multi-site church project. Anthony Giddens has defined time-space distanci-
ation as “the conditions under which time and space are organized so as to connect pres-
ence and absence” (1990, p. 14). Globalization is predicated on the modern ability to 
connect distant spaces in real time just as the multi-site church model does. Giddens 
writes, 
The separating of time and space and their formation into standardised, "emp-
ty" dimensions cut through the connections between social activity and its 
"embedding" in the particularities of contexts of presence. Disembedded insti-
tutions greatly extend the scope of time-space distanciation and, to have this 
effect, depend upon coordination across time and space. This phenomenon 
serves to open up manifold possibilities of change by breaking free from the 
restraints of local habits and practices. 
(Giddens, 1990, p. 20). 
This phenomenon requires that social relations be “disembedded” from their local con-
texts which he explains, “by disembedding I mean the "lifting out" of social relations 
from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-
space” (Giddens, 1990, p. 21). And this is why the process of disembedding is fundamen-
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tally related to trust for Giddens: when people no longer trust our own senses to reveal 
truths of the social world, they place that trust in other systems such as brands. Where 
once a local church goer would have trust in his pastor and his congregation which were 
both rooted in his local community, he now places that trust in the greater institution, the 
church brand. This is not a difficult transition for most Americans who spend much of 
their life living in what Sarah Banet-Weiser calls a “brand culture” (2012). But for Gid-
dens, there are stakes to this process, especially the loss of “ontological security.” Gid-
dens states that “the locality in pre-modern contexts is the focus of, and contributes to, 
ontological security in ways that are substantially dissolved in circumstances of moderni-
ty” (1990, p. 103). The church was the center of ontological security in the pre-modern 
world, just as it was the embodiment of anthropological place, but as the church becomes 
a scaled project, multi-site churches disembed church from the social structures of the 
local context. Though many church leaders express exuberance for this model, it also 
severs the church from its earlier definition as a safeguard of ontological security. Instead 
the church becomes another abstract institution, like the supermarket, or the mall. It 
moves further into abstraction, into the realm of the non-place.  
As a megachurches move beyond their buildings, they take a step into further 
spatial abstraction and in doing so abstract the social relations of a community that were 
once the defining factor of the idea of a local church. Media technologies allow for multi-
site churches, but they also change the notions of time and space that are central to 
church worship. The multi-site model relies even more heavily on screens and on video 
!93
production. While churches can potentially reach more people by deploying charismatic 
preachers through video, those people may never meet the pastor or preacher who in-
spired them to come to their faith. One multi-site pastor expresses the anxiety this can 
breed when he explains that “it is also a challenge to feel like a pastor in a church that 
you never see and that only sees you on video” (MacDonald as quoted in McConnell, 
2009, p. 22).   
Church is no longer a singular building nor is it even the sprawling campus of 
the megachurch, it is instead a network in a city or a state, or a network mapped onto the 
globe, it comes down to earth at certain points, in certain spatial realities, auditoriums, 
schools, even prisons. Church online takes a further step into spatial abstraction, letting 
go of the category of space virtually completely. 
The Online Church 
 Doug Estes’ book Sim Church: Being the church in the virtual world begins with 
a description of church as a spatial instantiation: “Each one has a building with a front 
door that you open; each one has people who shake your hand; each one has pastors, min-
isters, elders, or leaders who proclaim God’s Word to you; each one is real, tangible, 
physically present.  There are differences, but there are more similarities” (2009: 17). 
Both the megachurch and the multi-site church fit this description. But now,  
A change is occurring in the Christian church the likes of which has not hap-
pened for centuries.  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the church is 
beginning to be different not in style, venue, feel, or volume but in the world in 
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which it exists.  A new gathering of believers is emerging, a church not in the 
real world of bricks and mortar but in the virtual world of IP addresses and 
shared experiences. (Estes, 2009: 18) 
Estes book charts his experience as a pastor of a church in the then-popular online game 
Second Life. For Estes, Christians have an unprecedented tool at their disposal that can 
allow them to completely rethink the way church is done. He explains that in a way this 
model is much like the model of church in the Book of Acts, before Christian worship 
was formalized and this is a common theme that came up in my interviews, the sense that 
the internet both allows for something that has never been tried before, and the sense that 
it represents a more biblical and ancient model of Christianity than contemporary forms 
of worship. Many people based this exegesis on an understanding of the Apostle Paul and 
his approach to creating and shepherding young Christian church communities through 
letters or epistles.  
As Tim Hutchings (2017) documents, online churches have existed in various 
forms since the 1980s. Experiments with online worship have come from many denomi-
nations and countries, including the United States, Germany, and South Korea, but it was 
Life.Church (then LifeChurch.tv) that first debuted the “Internet campus” model of on-
line church in 2006 and this has come to be the predominant form of evangelical online 
worship.  As Hutching writes of Life.Church’s online church, “Church online relies on 11
  For a succinct history of the many forms that online churches have taken see Hutchings (2017), Chapter 11
One “A brief history of cyberchurch,” pages 10-23. And for a history of Life.Church’s Online Church and 
the various changes it has undergone it its history see Chapter Eight “Church online at LifeChurch.tv.”
!95
centralized production of high-quality video resources, including the message of a popu-
lar preacher and new music from skilled performers” (2017, p. 200). In his ethnography 
of various forms of online churches, he notes that the Life.Church model has proven es-
pecially effective at attracting and keeping parishioners (253). And this model has been 
used by churches all over the country. Indeed in 2015 thirty percent of megachurches 
hosted an online campus (Thumma & Bird, 2015). 
 Proponents of church online see it as a natural extension of the digital habitus in 
American culture. If suburbanites––the target of megachurches––are increasingly living 
their lives online, than churches should be online too. Just as twenty years ago church 
leaders saw that television had captured the attention of their target demographic, they 
see the smartphone as doing the same today. Then, their answer was to integrate screens 
and high-production value media products into their church services, today, the answer 
has been to put church online. 
 I first discovered church online in 2009 and when I began talking to online church 
pastors around this time, most of whom were in their early twenties, I was confronted 
with boundless enthusiasm for the potential of this new way of doing church. In the early 
days of internet campuses many people believed that the online church could be a way to 
create communities of Christians all around the world, and shared the excitement evident 
in the quote from Doug Estes above. But by 2013, much of that enthusiasm had been 
tempered by the realities of church online. At the Echo conference an online church pas-
tor explained that her church had bought iPads for all of their bedridden or older parish-
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ioners and they had attempted to provide training on how to attend church online. Still, 
however, they had seen very little result. In another session I heard a different pastor be-
moan the fact that millennial evangelicals, the presumed demographic of church online, 
were not taking to it in the numbers her church had hoped they would. In 2017, I caught 
up with another online church pastor, who had been one of the most enthusiastic propo-
nents of church online in the early days. By 2017 his initial zeal had dissipated. Though 
he still believed that church online was an important aspect of contemporary church cul-
ture he no longer thought it was the primary tool through which Christian churches might 
evangelize the globe. Church online in some ways, then, was a fad, but it continues and 
has become an expected part of evangelical worship. 
 The church online that has been integrated in evangelical megachurches is differ-
ent than the model Doug Estes hoped to see, the model of the virtual world church. In-
stead it is a platform that mimics other social media and streaming platforms endemic to 
the web. Online church campuses have become a way for churches to add another site to 
a multi-site megachurch, and again, they rely on screens as the central sensational form. 
This screen, an individual's’ laptop screen for example, or an iPhone, can be the entry into 
a church community. But this screen is even more individualized, even more personalized 
than the screens that dwarf parishioners in the mega- and multi-site churches. The an-
thropological place of the church has been disembedded completely in this version of 
church, or, as some evangelicals hope, it has been remade in a world of pixels, as such 
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online churches have charted new paths through the digital unconscious of evangelical-
ism.  
The Start-up Church 
 Life.Church encompasses all of the three models of church discussed above, and 
as such it represents each of the progressive instantiations of evangelical church spaces. 
But Life.Church has also taken another step beyond these, and as it is a leader among 
technologically-focused evangelicals. In a video produced by the church entitled “Life-
Church.tv’s Vision and Values” they state, literally in red letters, “we are not a 
megachurch, we are micro. We are a startup church with a mega vision” (Life.Church, 
2012). Life.Church considers itself a “startup church” which indexes the history of 
“church planting” movements and micro churches that are often praised in evangelical-
ism, but of course, also connotes the colloquial understanding of the tech startup. In this 
way, Life.Church represents another iteration of the evangelical church’s zeal for shifting 
strategies in order to appeal to Americans on the spiritual marketplace. And though many 
people at Life.Church’s central offices told me that they were just stewarding a move-
ment whose spiritual power came wholy from God, Life.Church also employs strategies 
borrowed from the corporate world but also specifically from tech companies to help 
them succeed. In turn, the fact that Life.Church employs these methods appeals to the 
middle-class professionals who populate the pews at Life.Church’s many locations and 
who fund the church’s surprisingly sophisticated and complex operation. I had the chance 
to tour Life.Church’s central office in Edmond, Oklahoma, in December 2017 and I was 
!98
struck by how complex and diversified it is. It runs like a Silicon Valley tech startup, and 
this is not lost on the people who work there, and are proud of their startup church.  
 Fittingly, Life.Church began in a two-car garage in Edmond, Oklahoma. As with 
tech startups, churches often emphasize their humble beginnings and these origin stories 
are often taken as proof positive that God is on the side of the church or movement in 
question. Their congregation outgrew site after site before finally amassing the capital to 
build their flagship church in Edmond, Oklahoma. In the mythology of Life.Church, it 
became multi-site by accident. Craig Groeschel’s wife Amy went into labor on a Saturday 
and their child was born on Saturday night. Groeschel had to make a choice, spend the 
next day with his wife and new baby or head back to the church and preach Sunday ser-
vices. He decided to take his chances and play a video of him preaching on Saturday at 
the Sunday service. As he tells it, nothing changed. At the altar call people still raised 
their hand indicating that they wanted to come to Christ. And as congregants continued to 
flock to Life.Church, the church decided to set up satellite sites where worshippers could 
gather to watch a video of Groeschel’s service in other areas: first in Oklahoma, then in 
Texas, Florida, Tennessee and New York—in 2017 they have twenty six satellite loca-
tions across the country and Groeschel has announced that in 2018 they are slated to open 
four more locations in four more states. In their central offices they have a wall with pic-
tures of each locations in the order that they appeared and what is striking about these 
photographs is how similar each of the locations looks. This is not an accident. 
Life.Church has an interior designer on staff, and they employ a marketing team whose 
!99
whole purpose is to make sure that branding remains consistent in all of their multi-site 
locations, again, this strategy emulates the chain-restaurant business model and takes this 
idea of a “church brand” seriously.  
In touring Life.Church’s central offices on a bustling Monday I was struck by 
the complexity of the operation. A staff member told me that was due to the fact that a 
man named Jerry Hurley was on the directional leadership team which is abbreviated as 
“the DLT” of Life.Church. Hurley was a District Manager from the Target corporation 
and he brought his experience managing a chain of corporate stores to Life.Church. The 
corporate feel of the church is especially evident at the central offices. Individual offices 
have glass walls to indicate transparency and openness, I was told. At each staff mem-
ber’s desk is a placard with a printout of their Meyer’s Briggs personality score. You 
might run into an INTJ, a ENFP, and seeing that, I was told, you would know exactly 
how to approach that person and how to speak to their strengths. Speaking to strengths is 
important; at Life.Church, the staff is never meant to emphasize weakness. And when I 
asked someone about whether they had gotten criticism from another, related ministry, I 
was told that they have a policy of never speaking badly about any other ministries. Thus 
the atmosphere at Life.Church is overwhelmingly positive by design, but beyond that, 
people seem to genuinely want to be working for the church.  
At one point I asked a Life.Church employee if there was anyone working at 
Life.Church who was not a Christian. He seemed genuinely flummoxed by the question 
and he told me that their mission was to lead people to become fully devoted followers of 
!100
Christ so...no. Unlike a business, Life.Church does not have to abide by religious anti-
discrimination laws that bind, for example, faith-based business startups. And this influ-
ences the work environment at Life.Church. People have come from all over the country 
to work here. Several told me that they believed they were called by God to work for the 
church. And some saw their position at Life.Church as the answer to a prayer. I was told 
that people came from large tech companies like Amazon and Apple and took a pay cut to 
work at Life.Church because they believed that they could use their “gifts” in the service 
of a greater mission there. Life.Church’s parishioners know this as well and it enhances 
the enthusiasm they feel for their church’s mission. One parishioner proudly told me that 
Bobby Gruenewald, the church’s “Innovation Leader” and the central figure behind the 
YouVersion Bible App, had left a company worth 20 million dollars to work for free at 
Life.Church. Both the fact that Gruenewald had been a successful businessman and the 
fact that he had left it behind to work for Life.Church were admirable things in this man’s 
opinion and they proved to him that Life.Church was an important, successful, again 
“relevant” place. 
At Life.Church’s central offices, Bobby Gruenewald leads a team of developers 
that are called the “digerati” team, and this is what ultimately sets Life.Church apart from 
other megachurches and multi-site churches and makes it a “startup church.” Gruenewald 
and the digerati team create various “digital missions,” which are meant to be tools that 
evangelicals can use to evangelize in the digital environment. One of their digital mis-
sions is “Open.” “Open” offers sermon series for adults and children; various media that 
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smaller churches might pair with their sermons; financial worksheets tailored for church-
es to help them with payroll and tithing; free Christian music; and software and apps for 
church use including the platform on which Life.Church hosts church online. Basically, 
Life.Church offers all the resources one might need to start their own church from the 
simply logistical to the high tech. On the FAQ section of the “Open” site, they state their 
purpose clearly: “We give away free resources to churches because we believe that they 
belong to God and His entire Church. So no need to give us any credit, just give all that 
credit to God!” (LifeChurch.tv, 2014).  Life.Church sees its work as instrumental to an 
imagined global church community united under the authority of God. When I visited the 
office for “Open” at Life.Church I spoke with five of the staff members there who told 
me that they were experimenting with what they call “Open digerati” which will be an 
Open Source Software platform that anyone can tinker with, in effect it will truly “open” 
Life.Church’s digital resources.  
Life.Church also has an office for their church online team which fields thou-
sands of online prayer requests everyday. This part of the digerati team stewards church 
online and they try to grow their online audience by buying keywords for whatever peo-
ple are searching on the Internet in order to get them into church online. They mine the 
digital unconscious of the internet to find people who may be struggling and then they 
have the ability to track those people through the Google Ad Dollars system. I asked them 
about trolls and they said it was a big part of how they had to manage the church online 
platform. Because people might see an ad for Life.Church’s online church campus when 
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they search for, let’s say, “porn,” (this is a keyword that Life.Church buys) some are not 
too happy to be redirected to a church service. Yet they were optimistic about church on-
line’s success. They said that at a recent service 11 people had raised their hands (an op-
tion on the online platform) to become followers of Christ. “That’s eleven more people 
who know Christ!” I was told by an excited Life.Church employee. Though they use 
Google Ad Dollars to track online parishioners, as this reaction indicates, the stakes for 
the church are different than those of a business startup.  
Near the church online team is another office that houses people tasked with 
coming up with whatever is next in the technological realm. These people (I only saw 
two men working in that office on the day I was there) sit in a room all day anticipating 
what might happen with technology and how Life.Church might use new innovations to 
reach more people. They are trying to come up with the next YouVersion, in whatever 
form that might take and like many tech companies, they institutionalize future-casting as 
a means to stay on the cutting edge of technological innovation.  
The digerati teams’s most successful “digital mission” is the YouVersion Bible 
App, which is a free smartphone application with which users can access a digital Bible 
and connect with friends or churches to participate in Bible study. As of December, 2017, 
this app has been downloaded nearly 300 million times and has been translated into every 
major language. In fact, Life.Church created a version of the Bible app for the 1,140 peo-
ple who exclusively speak Samoan, and they have done the same for similarly under-used 
languages like Huilliche (Chile), Longto (Cameroon), Hupde (Brazil) and Ama (Papua 
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New Guinea). By doing this, they hope that their app, and of course the Good News that 
it contains, can reach every person on Earth. YouVersion has a large space in the central 
offices that houses programmers, engineers and designers and it is set up like the offices 
of a tech company. Coders sit at desks outfitted with multiple monitors. Engineers’ desks 
are outfitted with a light that is either green or red, indicating whether or not they can be 
interrupted. I spoke with one man wearing an Apple sweatshirt and he excitedly told me 
that he had gotten to go to an Apple event to test the YouVersion app.  
That Life.Church uses business strategies borrowed from the tech world in ser-
vice of their church makes them appear to parishioners and to their own employees as 
particularly “relevant.” And as a leader in the digital church movement, they have been 
able to attract church creatives and church geeks from around the country who see their 
work at Life.Church as purposeful, important, and in many cases directly guided by God. 
Through their focus on technology, then, Life.Church makes the case that evangelicalism 
is a modern religion with a role to play in the digital world.  
Conclusion 
Life.Church, the “startup church,” is the apotheosis of a movement in evangeli-
cal church culture that began in the late 1970s with the rise of suburban megachurches. 
This movement has borrowed strategies from the corporate world and has lately drawn 
inspiration from technological innovations in that world and from tech companies. De-
bate within evangelical church leadership continues as to how to incorporate technology 
and how to change the space of the church to adapt to an American populace inundated 
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and awed with consumer technologies but it has erred on the side of fostering constant 
innovation and growth and catering to the digital habitus that has become central to 
parishioners’ lives, especially to those in the target demographic of evangelical 
megachurches. Churches like Life.Church are hybrid spaces in which business-speak, 
tech-world jargon, and church culture commingle. And because of this they appeal to 
middle-class suburbanites who believe that this style is a particularly “relevant” form of 
religiosity in the contemporary era. 
Progressive spatial instantiations of evangelical worship spaces reveal the poly-
semic reality of the church as a cultural, and ontological object. Church may be experi-
enced in an auditorium where thousands of voices sing along to the words of a Christian 
rock song flashing on an overhead screen. Church may be experienced in a theater where 
the smiling, familiar face of a distant pastor beams, larger-than-life out of a movie screen. 
Or, church may be experienced in a living room, with a laptop or even an iPhone provid-
ing the interface. At every turn, evangelicals have created new spaces for worship and 
community engagement in evangelical culture and these spaces display new social logics 
and customs. Increasingly church spaces have been infused with digital habitus and the 
church world has been somewhat ported into the digital realm. This realm does not al-
ways resemble a church yet there are people there seeking spiritual fulfillment and human 
connection. That megachurches solidified the role of screens as sensational forms and 
that multi-site churches successfully disembedded church from the local context provides 
the impetus for churches that equate the online realm with the physical one. In these ways 
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evangelical churches have changed in response to the digital unconscious of evangelical-
ism and have become wholly new entities in the process.  
In my next chapter I look at those tech companies in the sub-industry of faith-
tech, many of which provide churches with technologies that can be used to make them 
more digital, and which see the digital habitus in evangelical culture as a business oppor-
tunity. The world of faith-tech, like the church world, looks to corporate, business ideals 
as a means to understand how they might fit into contemporary culture, but unlike the 
church world, the evangelical business people that traffic in the faith tech industry have to 
negotiate their place in a cultural milieu that emulates Silicon Valley. In the negotiations 
between what it means to be a Christian business and what it means to be a tech startup, 
these entrepreneurs give voice to the particular reified place that tech business has in the 
American imaginary and express their hope that their presence in this industry might help 
redeem it, and by extension might help to spiritualize the world.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE STARTUP 
The promise of redemptive entrepreneurship and the hybrid culture of faith-tech 
Vaynermedia’s New York office is on the 16th floor of a Park Avenue sky-
scraper. Exiting the elevator, a visitor is immediately bombarded with posters bearing 
quotes from one of Silicon Valley’s most successful gurus, author of Crush It! (2009), 
Gary Vaynerchuk or Garyvee : “We are a family first and an agency second.”  “We’re 12
rogue and we like it.” “Shhh. We love social media because it sells shit.” It’s a sprawling 
open office and the aggregation of quiet conversations and keyboard clicks give it a 
bustling atmosphere. In one corner sits Willie Morris and the FaithBox team. One Christ-
ian entrepreneur described FaithBox to me as “BarkBox but for Christian stuff,” meaning 
it follows the popular box-subscription model and sends a monthly box of products from 
businesses that promote ethical business practices, along with Christian-themed media 
products like devotionals, to digital subscribers. 
When I met Morris in the fall of 2015 he was wearing leather boots, an Apple 
Watch with a gold band, and a white t-shirt that revealed an elaborate tattoo on his fore-
arm––he looks like the kind of person that works in the tech industry. He told me that he 
had cut his teeth in tech at Amazon working in user experience design and had worked at 
 See Marwick (2013) p. 163-204 for a detailed analysis Vaynerchuk's persona and his role as both a mani12 -
festation and a promoter of the values of Silicon Valley. Marwick describes Vaynerchuk and another popu-
lar author Tim Ferriss as “self-improvement gurus in the tradition of Oprah, televangelists, and Landmark 
Forum facilitators, but they emphasize the techno libertarianism of Silicon Valley rather than the therapeu-
tic, Christian, or New Age principles” (Marwick, 2013, p. 170).
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startups before FaithBox. He describes FaithBox as arising out of a conversation with 
Garyvee in which the venture capitalist encouraged Morris to use his personal experi-
ences to create a new brand. Morris recalls that he thought, 
This could be really interesting using the subscription box model to build some-
thing that is meaningful and impactful. The cool thing about it is for me is 
we’re not just sending a box, we’re building a community which we can then 
do great stuff with. We can feed kids every month like we’re doing now or as 
the community grows and we listen to them we can figure out where are those 
other gaps how can we serve them better with technology and applying it to 
their faith which to me is the long term goal. Let’s figure out where those gaps 
exist and try to fill them in the best we can and see how that can impact indi-
viduals and hopefully impact other things as well. (Morris, 2015).  
Willie adroitly mixes Silicon Valley buzzwords like “impactful” and “meaningful,” with 
evangelical argot like “community,” “faith,” and “serve.” He characterizes FaithBox as 
another app that might help “save the world,” a particular preoccupation of tech startups, 
and he says that he wants to do that by appealing to faith communities. In many ways 
Willie and the story of FaithBox is an illustrative example of the world of faith tech. Faith 
tech is a space in which Silicon Valley ideologies blend with Christian visions of technol-
ogy, business, and the future. Here, the digital unconscious of evangelicalism is trans-
formed into digital products that both spring from and further enforce the digital habitus 
in evangelical culture.  
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There is a constant negotiation in faith tech between what it means to be a tech 
startup and what it means to be a Christian company. Christians fit into startup culture by 
using the style and jargon of of it but are nonetheless somewhat apart from it. Much like 
the Christian imperative to be “in but not of the world,” Christian tech startups are in, but 
not of Silicon Valley–– sometimes literally sitting in hubs apart from Silicon Valley as in 
those communities of tech entrepreneurs in Nashville, Dallas, and Atlanta–– which raises 
a set of questions about faith-tech business:  How do Christians imagine the tech sector 
and how do those working in it see their work? How does a company that targets a Chris-
tian audience and is run by Christians run differently than any other company? What are 
the big and small concessions these Christians have made to fit into Silicon Valley’s cul-
tural milieu and how have these values influenced and been influenced by evangelical 
culture? How do these startups manifest and shape both digital habitus and the discourses 
about technology circulating in evangelical culture?  
This chapter is based on four months of ethnographic fieldwork at a faith-based 
startup in Los Angeles as well as interviews with seventeen founders and CEOs of faith-
based companies and two venture capitalists who focus on Christian startups. Interviews 
were conducted in person in New York City, Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and Nashville 
and via Skype or phone with those startups located in other places in the country and in 
one case in Australia. I interviewed two of my informants more than once and kept in 
touch with many of them via Twitter and via the apps that they had created. Most of the 
startup founders I interviewed were running small businesses that had been in operation 
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on an average of two years, however, one founder had been in the faith tech sector for 
over 25 years. Most of the startups were in the app business, meaning they were working 
to create smartphone applications, four of the CEOs I spoke with had founded VR com-
panies, and were creating content for the burgeoning virtual reality scene. Most of the 
startups I looked at had very few employees, but one had three hundred. Faith-tech busi-
nesses sometimes sprung out of the church world, for example Tithe.ly a successful 
tithing app created by a former pastor, while others, like FaithBox, came from the tech 
world. My sample reflects the continuum of businesses in faith tech, yet what came to the 
fore in my conversations with these businessmen–– and they were with only one excep-
tion men––was a strong nearly reified belief in the power of business and entrepreneur-
ship in American culture similar to that found in places like Life.Church, the “startup 
church.” Yet though Christian entrepreneurs often spoke of the laws of markets as though 
they were natural laws, they also challenged many of the cultural norms of tech business. 
The discourses circulating in the faith tech sector, than, reveal an evangelical social imag-
inary of entrepreneurship and technology influenced by the techno-Utopianism of Silicon 
Valley. At the same time, the negotiations taking place within faith tech also lay bare 
some of the problematic foundations on which these ideologies are built.  
Silicon Valley culture and its place in the American imaginary 
To understand the hybridized faith tech space, we need to understand startup 
culture and its genesis. Specifically, how Silicon Valley's counterculturally-inspired aims 
of social revolution serve as an ideal harbor for the new arrival of sub-spaces like faith 
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tech, and how its historic shortcomings are also replicated by industries and institutions 
who emulate it. As Fred Turner documents in From Counterculture to Cyberculture the 
roots of Silicon Valley culture go back to the 1960s (2006). For Turner, Stewart Brand, 
the radical thinker behind the Whole Earth Catalog, inspired by Marshall McLuhan, 
Buckminster Fuller, and others created a counterpublic that believed in the world-chang-
ing potential of the internet (Tuner, 2006, p. 89). These “New Communalists” had what 
Thomas Streeter deems a romantic vision of the potentials of the new medium and inject-
ed a sense of play into computing, which had previously been dominated by an under-
standing of the managerial and business possibilities of the computer (Streeter, 2011, p. 
45). Their romantic vision of computing ultimately went mainstream when the personal 
computer entered the consumer marketplace in the 1980s.  
In Silicon Valley Fever (1984), a portrait of Silicon Valley written in the midst 
of this heady time, the authors paint a picture of the Valley as a place where capitalism in 
its purest form thrives. They note that, “Meritocracy reigns supreme in Silicon 
Valley” (Rogers & Larsen, 1984, p. 139), and in this business world there is a “sense of 
power of the future” (23). As this description shows, a mystique was beginning to sur-
round the industry in the 1980s. This mystique especially shrouded the new poster boys 
of the personal computer revolution. The American media characterized Steve Jobs and 
Bill Gates as young anti-establishment figures whose counter-cultural affectations set 
them apart from other businessmen of the time. Streeter (2011) notes that Jobs especially 
fit the bill of the 1980s entrepreneur and his iconoclasm only served to solidify his place 
!111
in “The mythic American narrative of the entrepreneur, who in popular fantasy came 
from nowhere and needed no outside support” (Streeter, 2011, p. 69). The dazzling finan-
cial success of these self-made men proved to many that the right-wing economic policies 
promoted by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s, were justified. As Streeter explains, “The 
microcomputer thus provided a sophisticated, high-tech glitter to the Reagan era enthusi-
asm for markets, deregulation, and free enterprise; it became an icon that stood for what’s 
good about the market, giving leaders the world over an extra incentive to pursue neolib-
eral policies” (2011, p. 87). And these tech businessmen continued to assert that their 
products could improve the world, or in Jobs’ iconic (and appropriately ambiguous) 
phrase, could “put a dent in the universe.” 
In the 90s, as the internet transformed into the World Wide Web, companies 
like Apple, Microsoft, and America Online proved the tech sector was no longer simply 
the domain of iconoclasts and hackers, rather it was crucial to American economic 
progress (see Schulte, 2013, p. 83-112). It was during this time that the countercultural 
beginnings of the web were married to libertarian ideology as both Fred Turner and 
Thomas Streeter have discussed in relation to Wired magazine an outlet that extolled ne-
oliberal ethics but remained cloaked in a hip aesthetic (see Streeter, 2005; Turner, 2006, 
p. 207-236). Relatedly, as tech businesses grew they began to adopt what Barbrook and 
Cameron call “the California Ideology,” which they assert “promiscuously combines the 
free-wheeling spirit of the hippies and the entrepreneurial zeal of the yuppies” (1996, p. 
1). The California Ideology is an inherently optimistic attitude that assumes that the 
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world’s problems may be ameliorated with technological, market-based solutions–– and 
without the unnecessary intervention of government entities. Those who ascribe to the 
California Ideology see a techno-Utopian future, and this vision is often so powerful that 
it allows for a denial of the structural inequalities that are necessary to produce techno-
logical products. This is why Barbrook and Cameron characterize it as “an optimistic and 
emancipatory form of technological determinism” (1996, p. 14).  
Also in the 1990s, investors flocked to companies with dubious value other 
than the dot com at the end of their domain name and the stock market briefly soared in 
what became known as the dot com bubble. Streeter characterizes this era of speculation 
as fueled by romanticism and a new imagination of the potentiality of computing and the 
internet’s role in society: “Change the world, overthrow hierarchy, express yourself, and 
get rich; it was precisely the heady mix of all of these hopes that had such a galvanizing 
effect” (Streeter, 2011, p. 133). Importantly this bubble was not only fueled by the prom-
ise of financial success, but also by an understanding of high-technology businesses as 
particularly unique and special, again, sublime, in the American imaginary.  
Though the dot com bubble eventually burst in 2003, the sense of sublimity 
was then transferred to the new technology companies cropping up and rebranding as 
“Web 2.0.” “Web 2.0” referred to all of those companies that were able to harness and 
monetize the content creation and sharing aspect of the web––ventures like Facebook and 
Twitter soared. Scholars began to write about the potential of a new participatory culture 
in which those who were once merely consumers of hierarchically-produced media con-
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tent could actively create or remix content (see Jenkins, 2006), and some even asserted 
that the ideals of deliberative democracy could be realized through networked political 
participation (see Benkler, 2006). That Silicon Valley’s understanding of itself as a world-
changing industry had taken hold in the American imagination was particularly evident 
during the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 which was initially dubbed in the Ameri-
can media as “the Facebook revolution,” a term that many scholars criticized as it seemed 
to simply repackage Silicon Valley technological determinism and sloganeering rather 
than interrogating the historical and cultural factors at play in the protests that swept the 
Middle East (see Schulte, 2013, p. 139-163).  
In 2008 Steve Jobs, the then-CEO of Apple created the App Store and allowed 
third parties to create applications for the iPhone, a move that inaugurated yet another 
tech boom. As Brian Merchant notes, this development led to the explosion of tech start-
ups and mini Silicon Valleys (Silicon Beach in Los Angeles, Silicon Savannah in Nairobi, 
etc.) all over the world (2017, p. 148-184). The app economy fueled investor excitement 
and led to top-dollar valuations for applications like Instagram and Uber. Apps in the ag-
gregate have “disrupted” many social and economic norms ––for example Uber and Lyft 
have crippled and contested the traditional taxicab industry and have been a driving force 
behind the rise of the “gig economy” that has spread to other sectors as well. App-based 
companies also tend to continue the long Silicon Valley tradition of framing their busi-
nesses as potential powerful agents of change.  
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The ideologies surrounding and bred in Silicon Valley have also been dissemi-
nated widely through the products that the tech industry has created. Related to what I 
have been calling “digital habitus,” Zizi Papacharissi, in conversation with Thomas 
Streeter has called the particular set of practices that develop around the ever-expanding 
assemblage of technological products all touted as the next big thing that will revolution-
ize modern life as “the habitus of the new” (Pappacharrisi, et al, 2013, p. 600). Thus, 
through the widespread use of digital technologies created in Silicon Valley, the ideolo-
gies of that culture find purchase in American culture broadly conceived. This in turn has 
led to the culturally held belief in the productively disruptive nature of “new” media—the 
sense that the media itself holds the key to revolutionary change (Pappacharrisi, et al, 
2013). Tech, in the American social imaginary, is thus seen as a particularly powerful 
type of business and one that is indeed expected by many to solve a number of the 
world’s problems.  
 Yet, the tech industry is rife with its own problems. Silicon Valley’s unwillingness 
or inability to hire people of color, especially black people, has been both well document-
ed in the media, and mostly ignored by the tech industry (see McCorvey, 2015). Alice 
Marwick (2013) provides another salient critique of the industry in her ethnographic ac-
count of Silicon Valley. She documents several instances of explicit and implicit sexism 
voiced by her subjects and argues that the widespread belief that the tech industry is a 
meritocracy serves to doubly exclude women and people of color by first being run by 
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men who do not notice their own bias and second by assuming that the lack of women 
and people of culture in the tech world signifies their lack of drive or intelligence.  
Silicon Valley and the many places that seek to replicate it, spring from a spe-
cific type of business culture defined both by techno-Utopianism and a reliance on ne-
oliberal economic principles. Since its inception, Silicon Valley startup culture has as-
pired to "world-changing" impacts, whether in hardware or software pursuits, though 
what was meant by these lofty goals was often ill-defined. Still, because Silicon Valley 
has proven to be a site of innovation and profit generation, and because it has developed 
products that have become central to the habitus of American culture, it has come to oc-
cupy a reified space in the American social imaginary. The entrepreneurs who populate 
the sub-industry of faith tech sometimes embrace and sometimes wrestle with tech cul-
ture, but, as my research shows, they believe in its potential and have internalized many 
of its ideologies.   
Making a faith-based startup 
Origins and motivations 
 The oft-repeated fact that Apple began in Steve Jobs’ garage in Los Altos, Cali-
fornia has become a parable demonstrating the possibilities of business greatness stem-
ming from humble, hobbyist beginnings that connects to the ideological predispositions 
of a Silicon Valley-based understanding of meritocracy. Garages have synecdochally in-
dexed this idea in commercials like the one produced by Xfinity in 2014 in which an 
Xfinity customer opens his garage and finds that his kids have created a tech startup––
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with the help of their powerful internet connection of course–– and are already experi-
menting with drone and hover-board technology (https://www.ispot.tv/ad/7RRN/xfinity-
internet-tech-startup). At one point in my fieldwork the CEO of the company at which I 
was an intern abandoned the office to work in his garage with his CTO, presumably to get 
back to the roots of what tech innovation is about–– the romantic feeling of the garage 
rebel.  
Many of the founders of startups that I interviewed similarly highlighted their 
humble beginnings. CEOs of faith-tech startups, just like founders of any startup, have a 
founding story that they repeat. The only difference is that some in the faith-tech world 
characterize their business ideas as having been guided by God or Providence. One 
founder, who asked to remain anonymous, told me that the idea for what would ultimate-
ly become his faith-based app came to him when he was deep in meditative prayer. He 
said that after some setbacks in his tech career he had asked God what his purpose was. 
As he describes those formative moments, “One thought kind of set in my mind and it 
was stillness around it, there was no other thought. It was no distractions but that thought, 
which was to enrich media lives by creating technology that empowers churches to pro-
vide greater impact to their communities. And I was sitting there and I felt like, ‘Oh this 
is it!’ I felt assured, ‘I felt no doubt that that’s what it is. That’s my life goal!’” For many 
this sense of being called to their app is a real and deeply-felt motivation for their busi-
ness that connects with the common discourse in Silicon Valley that says that startups 
should be agents of “disruption” or positive change.  
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 Most of the CEOs and founders that I spoke with did not put their founding story 
in such spiritual terms, but still retained the sense of calling implicit in the story above. 
Aaron Martin, one of the two designers behind Neu Bible, a popular Bible app, explains 
that he and his partner were tossing around ideas for collaboration while camping in 
Yosemite and the idea for the Bible app was the one that felt right. He said it did not 
strike him as too much different than a lot of startups whose goal is to create something 
that will be monetarily successful but that will also have a social impact. He noted that in 
Silicon Valley, where he had worked for many years, it was common to have a secondary 
reason for your business, namely, that it would provide a social good, “So I don’t think 
it's necessarily a Christian idea, but, it felt more deeply rooted for us than some of the 
other ideas that we had toyed around with” (Martin, 2017). The term “impactful” is one 
that gets used a lot in Silicon Valley and it connects to the ethic that the entrepreneurs I 
spoke to want to put out into the world. They want to make technology that can positively 
“impact” the world and, often, what is known in evangelical culture as “the Body of 
Christ,” ––referring to the global aggregate of all Christian believers. That their founding 
stories sometimes take on a spiritual dimension is not surprising, and in fact it is also in-
dicative of the nearly-spiritual understanding of the entrepreneur in tech culture. Often 
described as “visionaries,” tech founders are elevated to near-God-like figures in Silicon 
Valley. Alice Marwick in her ethnographic account of tech culture notes that “the highest 
position on the status hierarchy is reserved for entrepreneurs” (2013, p. 80). Perhaps it is 
easy to mythologize the origins of a startup given the cultural cache these businesses and 
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their founders have. Faith-tech entrepreneurs, than, do not flip the script when they de-
scribe their startups as driven by a spark of divine inspiration, they just add a Christian 
flair to it.  
 What these founding stories also point to is an understanding of the power of 
business and especially the technology business as an agent of change. The discourse of 
startups connects to the social imaginary of Silicon Valley’s role in society, the idea that 
these businesses are all doing their part to “save the world” and it is one that many Chris-
tians in tech believe and have internalized. Being able to characterize the creation of 
technology as a life purpose indicates the power that tech holds as an agent of change in 
the American imagination. For Christians, this possibility is tantalizing because for Chris-
tians working in tech, digital habitus, if guided in the right way, could make people better 
and more faithful. One venture capitalist, Shawn Cheng working in New York City put it 
clearly when he described the ways he could imagine technology transforming faith: 
You may not even have a mobile device, it will be your glasses or it will be 
contact lenses or it will be the shirt you are wearing and it will say, “Hey you 
haven’t stood up all day long you’ve been sitting in front of this computer,” 
“It’s been 36 hours since you’ve actually seen your wife,” or “You missed the 
10 day streak of having bath time with your kid. Bad dad point.” But technolo-
gy should empower and help change behavior and get out of your way. All that 
meta-data all that stuff is here but making it useful and available and changing 
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how you as an individual and as a collective group and as a society thinks. 
(Cheng, 2015)  
Cheng’s vision reads like science fiction, but the idea that technological products could 
improve the way that people live and even think is a common one in Silicon Valley dis-
course and it is particularly appealing to Christians who want to help “redeem” or spiritu-
alize the world. As Cheng does above, Christians interpret the world-changing promises 
coming out of Silicon Valley within a religious framework. If Silicon Valley entrepre-
neurs promise to “make the world a better place” than faith tech entrepreneurs hope to 
make the world more faithful, more Christian place through their technological products. 
  
 Yet, Cheng, as a Christian venture capitalist is in a unique and somewhat privi-
leged position to speak to the potential for faith tech and though businesses are often be-
gun with these goals in mind, many face the typical obstacles of tech startups. Startups 
tend to be small. Some employ only two or three people who might not ever work in the 
same room together. Businesses that employ some transnational workers are common. At 
the startup where I interned I never met the lead designer who worked remotely as he 
travelled around the world. Conferencing apps like Zoom and Uberconference facilitate 
this kind of collaborative work over distance. During the interview process I sometimes 
met the CEOs of faith-based startups in their home offices, sometimes I met them in rent-
ed co-working spaces, and sometimes I met them at the large tech companies that re-
mained their day jobs. One startup I visited was housed in a church–– their church had 
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offered to let them use the space. Typically, startups don’t advertise their smallness as 
they worry it may be indicative to others (potential founders, business rivals) of a strug-
gling operation. I once sent an email from a person that didn’t exist for the CEO because 
he did not want it to seem like his business was just a one-man show (though it mostly 
was).  
 The smallness of these business environments allows for a lot of play to take 
place. The office takes on an intimacy as ideal Spotify playlists for workflow are dis-
cussed. Many faith-tech startups also emulate the cultural spaces of the larger companies 
who inject a sense of playfulness into the work space. While I visited Yahoo, for exam-
ple, I was shown their donut wall–– a large vertical wall covered with differently flavored 
and colored donuts. Facebook and Google famously have game rooms in their offices and 
hope to keep employees entertained probably for the purpose of keeping them on the 
work campus (see Stewart, 2013). Small faith-tech startups often emulate this culture of 
playfulness as well. The startup where I was an intern had an old video game console in-
stalled in it and the CEO asked me what I thought about converting part of the office into 
a “chill space.”  
 There is, of course, also a precarity to this kind of business. The smallness of it 
means that it can easily fail. Many of the faith-based startups I interviewed had not re-
ceived venture capital funding. Some had received funding from personal and business 
networks–– sometimes even church networks, but most were self-funded. One CEO told 
me that money was often tight and even once “we had no money in the bank and this 
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friend was like ‘I’ll write you a 5,000 check’ so we just went up to midtown picked up 
the check put it in so we could clear our next payment.” Yet these problems are common 
to startups of all kinds, and also part of the romantic appeal startup culture.  
Fitting in 
 Though these startups emulate the aesthetics of tech businesses, use the same 
products and speak the same language even for those working in the central node of tech 
culture, there remains an outsiderness to their endeavors. For example, I met Aaron Mar-
tin at the cafeteria on Yahoo’s Sunnyvale campus in the spring of 2017. When we met 
Martin had worked at Yahoo for three years as a design director. Together with another 
friend who is employed at Facebook, he created Neu Bible in 2015. From the early days 
of beta testing his app he received insulting comments. He tells me “We’ve had people 
say that Christianity is stupid and there’s no way I would put this on my phone. I don’t 
care how well designed your stuff is I’m not helping you test this” (Martin, 2017). Others 
in the faith tech space told similar stories. One faith-tech CEO who focuses on video pro-
duction and works in Los Angeles told me that among his peers “if I told somebody that I 
was shooting porn they would probably think it's cooler than if I said I’m shooting reli-
gion or faith.” And the CEO of Faithlife, a large faith-based company in Washington, 
who started his career at Microsoft said that he was used to the condescension he re-
ceived from people. He told me “I have a thousand episodes of cocktail parties of getting 
the funny look when you tell people you build Bible software” (Pritchett, 2017).  
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For Aaron Martin at Neu Bible, though, the flak he received from beta testers 
and others was par for the course and he accepted it in stride. Ultimately his app was cov-
ered by the tech press and received good reviews from well-regarded Silicon Valley pub-
lications. Though there is a challenge to branding a company as a Christian organization, 
he thinks that Christians are much too sensitive to not fitting in, especially those who did 
not start their careers in the tech industry. He tells me that often Christians in other re-
gions do not really understand Silicon Valley and assume that because it is a “less 
churched area,” as a Christian he might face persecution for his faith. For Martin, that has 
not been the case. He tells me:  
I was at a startup that was in Dallas so I’ve been through the South that’s where 
my Mom’s family is from. There’s an idea that it should have been persecuted 
for doing this but I don’t think that was the case.It would have been for a great 
story like overcoming this persecution to make this great Bible app! But I think 
we knew it was going to be a hard business because we had multiple things we 
had to try and overcome the fact that it was a faith business that makes your 
market segment a little smaller so it's just another business challenge that we 
had to overcome. (Martin, 2017) 
Martin subtly rolls his eyes at what he sees as Christian oversensitivity and he thinks this 
is especially present in regions of the country where there are a lot of Christians. In these 
places the Christian echo chamber and the sense of the “establishment/ outsider paradox,” 
to use Marsden’s (2006) term, contributes to the evangelical belief that powerful media 
!123
industries like tech and Hollywood have values that are at odds with Christian culture and 
that all Christians working in these industries must have to adopt a crusade-like mentality.  
 Others I interviewed responded to this idea agreeing with Martin that it was an 
overstatement prevalent in evangelical culture. Silicon Valley is a religiously pluralistic 
place, but it is an ultimately agnostic culture. What matters most is what you produce not 
what you believe. Shawn Cheng explains that he openly discusses his faith with his co-
workers: 
We as Christians I think are called to be witnesses and you know say “Hey, 
what do you live for and what drives you?” And you know inevitably they’re 
going to say “My love for my God and my love for my family, and really bring-
ing renewal to all of the things that I touch and do” I think people respect that. I 
think people when they think about “Oh, you take time to meditate? That’s 
great! To not go insane? That’s great.” (Cheng, 2015) 
Tech culture can be brutal. As Shawn Cheng explains, it is full of “type A alpha males” 
who see the industry as a zero-sum game (Cheng, 2015). Cheng points to the other side of 
the problem of fitting in here. What does it mean for a Christian to fit into a cutthroat 
business culture? And what might be lost if one does? 
 For one CEO that I spoke with, the culture of Silicon Valley and the relentless fo-
cus on success is one that he felt like he had to escape. Before starting his app, geared 
toward churches, he worked for years and was successful in Silicon Valley. Now, though 
he still lives in the area, he does not attend the parties or social events as he once did and 
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he does not want to get sucked back into a culture he sees as toxic to his spiritual growth. 
He told me “I know a lot of people in Silicon Valley are obsessed with success building 
the next big thing. And closing the next big round by whatever means necessary. I think 
that’s what I see more and more is like you lie, you cheat, you do whatever you want but 
as long as you become successful that’s what people are doing to talk about.” At one 
point, he believes that he also became obsessed by the idea of making money and gaining 
prestige and he tells me that it affected his faith and his marriage. It was only after he let 
go of his place in the tech hierarchy that he felt like he could grow as a person. He put it 
to me bluntly: “I feel like more and more people in Silicon Valley need Jesus.” 
Prayer hands equals one hundred dollars 
 With two exceptions all of the CEOs I spoke with ran for-profit businesses and 
making money was a clear driver for their work–– even when they believed that their 
work was important for other reasons. Dean Sweetman tells me that he had no problem 
garnering investment and interest for his venture Tithe.ly, an application that helps 
churches collect digital donations, because the numbers supported it, “Anyone who in-
vests in a startup is going to really look at the basics of the numbers. The market that 
we’re involved in you’ve got about 300 billion dollars that are given to faith-based orga-
nizations in North America and 85 percent are still cash and check so the enormity of the 
market is kind of a no-brainer for investors to back a company like ours” (Sweetman, 
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2017). For Sweetman, the religiosity of the audience means little to investors. Like any 
audience, their value lies in their buying power.  
When we spoke Sweetman was pitching “emoji giving” to his church cus-
tomers. Parishioners would be able to text and emoji that was associated with a level of 
tithing, for example, “prayer hands equals 100 dollars.” He said he is also pioneering 
turning Facebook and Instagram likes into donations––so if a parishioner likes their 
church’s Instagram photos a certain number of times in a month that number would be 
multiplied by a dollar amount and determine their tithing for the period. Sweetman is us-
ing digital tools in an innovative way to appeal to the digital habitus of a young Christian 
audience and his success in the faith-tech business proves what purveyors of Christian 
media have know for a long time, Christians make up a big market in the United States. 
At the same time, Sweetman expresses a common sentiment among faith-tech entrepre-
neurs, namely the idea that their business, because it is run by Christians is different than 
other startups. “I think to say that we’re just a company that’s about trying to get to the 
biggest market share, to try and sell this company so we can all make money that’s really 
the furthest thing from our intention, Our business is to serve the body of Christ with 
great technology” (Sweetman, 2017). 
 Sweetman is influenced by his church background–– before he was a business-
man, he was a pastor–– and he notes clear differences between the culture of church and 
the culture of business:  
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In the church world things are very black and white and you’ve got a clear 
guide on how to live and if you’re in adherence to the Bible you have a guide 
on how to live life and treat people and so on. Business is almost the opposite, 
it’s anything goes. It’s all just about money. So if your motive is just money, 
you are going to cross lines all day long but if your motive is to do good and 
help people with good products than I think you can live within those bound-
aries and ultimately add value to not just your business but to the community 
that you serve (Sweetman, 2017).  
Sweetman tells me that money is not the evil, but the obsession around money in the tech 
business can be. His sentiment gets to the root of the problem that faith tech entrepre-
neurs face. They want to make money, many even expressed that they had started their 
business because they thought it was a good business opportunity. Maybe, some even 
thought, they would found the next “unicorn”–– a term for that rare startup that earns a 
billion-dollar valuation. Yet, these hopes for financial success had to be negotiated with 
Christian values. 
Sweetman’s understanding of business is illustrative of the bind that many 
Christian tech CEOs find themselves in. They are business people who run for-profit 
businesses, but they also understand that their faith makes them different. They have to 
actively construct their companies and their own images in such a way as to represent 
what they believe to be Christian values and these are not always compatible with the 
values that dominate Silicon Valley startups. Some faith tech CEOs shrugged off this 
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problem as just one of optics–– because they are explicitly running Christian companies 
and targeting Christians they have to be sure that their branding appeals to their demo-
graphic.  
 But many noted to me that this reliance on a religious audience was sometimes a 
burden. Bob Pritchett who has been in the faith-tech sector since he started his company 
in 1991 noted that, “People call us to a higher standard. I get a different set of creative 
insults from customers who are angry. Because people want to use the spiritual stick to 
beat you with or something. Something happens like the product crashes ‘well I expected 
higher quality from a Christian company!’” (Pritchett, 2017). Pritchett uses a comical ex-
ample here of a petty complaint, but he voices a common theme that came up in my in-
terviews: When a company brands itself as Christian it then has to make sure that its pub-
lic face is Christian enough or it risks facing backlash.  
For Pearry Teo of BibleVR, this has been an annoyance. He feels that people 
are constantly trying to judge how religious or spiritual he is. And though he is a commit-
ted Christian, he shows me his tattoos and says, “I’m not exactly poster boy Christian 
here” (Teo, 2017).  He does not want people to judge him, but instead to judge his com-
pany and he uses the metaphor of parenting to talk about how he ran his business (“The 
company is the baby I’m growing up”). It is important for him to imbue his Christian 
values into the business, but as this metaphor implies he wants there to be a separation 
between his persona and the character of the business. Teo believes this separation is a 
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particularly important one in the faith-tech sector, where there is a different set of expec-
tation from faithful customers and investors.  
There is always a negotiation, then, between running a business and being a 
faithful person. Though there is money to be made in the faith tech sector, money-making 
cannot be the only goal of faith-based startups and the ways in which faith tech entrepre-
neurs interpret this balance sets their sub-industry apart from that of Silicon Valley.  
Redemptive entrepreneurship  
 I spoke with two Christian founders of an app company that does not label itself 
as Christian. For them it was a business decision first–– why would you limit your market 
share? But it was also a reflection of their understanding of the role of Christians in cul-
ture. One of the founders, Phil Anema told me that when he sees companies brand them-
selves as Christian he thinks, 
 Just do what you’re doing. Do the thing you are doing and do it for everyone. I 
 think U2 does a good job of that, but Jesus does a good job of that. Be excellent in 
 what you do and offer really great service that meets people’s needs and do it   
 excellently but there’s this unneeded step of being like “...and we’re Christians!”   
 If you do that you do this subculture identification and you kind of win this group  
 of people but you also ostracize yourself from a lot of other people because you   
 are are doing this for the Christians and it's like why not just do it for the world   
 and do it really well.” (Anema, 2015). 
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Anema does not want to specifically focus on a Christian audience for his app not only 
because he does not think it is a good business decision but because he does not think it is 
a good Christian decision. A good product is more likely to have a positive impact on the 
world than a specifically Christian one, in Anema’s view. Christian businessmen like 
Anema see their businesses as a chance to connect to people, in the way that a song by 
U2 might connect to listeners, and they believe that the values that they imbue into their 
businesses might translate to those people and influence them in some way. He references 
Jesus, who did not “preach to the choir” but brought his message to everyone. This, he 
believes, should be the basis of a business, not “subculture identification.” 
A venture capital company called Praxis is illustrative here. The goal of Praxis 
is to fund and incubate companies with Christian missions. By actively promoting, train-
ing and supporting Christian entrepreneurs, Praxis hopes to inject business culture with 
Christian values–– though the businesses that they incubate do not have to only cater to 
Christians and they do not have to explicitly brand themselves as Christian businesses. 
Praxis takes a “missional” approach to thinking of business, which means they see work 
and particularly entrepreneurship as a place in which Christians might influence society. 
As with many of the startups I have discussed so far this vision comes from an under-
standing of the power of businesses in American culture.  
The founder of Praxis Dave Blanchard writes: “Only as we step back and ex-
plore what seems unthinkable can we truly begin to imagine creating ventures that might 
shift and shape culture. We might think of this as the cultural renewal analogy to Clay 
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Christensen’s ubiquitous disruption terminology. With our short lives and Western privi-
lege, what if entrepreneurs aimed to be cultural pioneers and explorers instead of 
moguls?” (Blanchard, 2014B). Business is the most powerful agent of change in culture, 
in Blanchard’s view, and thus this is where Christians need to be. Christians cannot be 
normal businessmen, though, like those who would aim to be moguls, but they must 
serve a higher calling. Though Blanchard privileges business, he also sees it as a sector of 
society that needs to be “redeemed” or imbued with Christian values. He writes, “It is 
hard work maintaining integrity and a right motive in the world of Mammon, which is 
consistently and ruthlessly recruiting us to the lesser, decadent pleasures of power, pres-
tige, and possessions, each of which can be instead used winsomely to benefit others to 
His glory” (Blanchard, 2014A). The goal for Blanchard is not to fund and incubate a crop 
of companies that are simply going to make money (though of course that is part of it) it 
is to incubate companies that they believe will spread Christian values by creating a 
Christian work culture that does not make profit the ultimate goal, but instead takes glori-
fying God as its mission.  Like the CEO who feels he needs to avoid Silicon Valley par-
ties because they are toxic to his faith, Blanchard criticizes a culture obsessed with “less-
er pleasures.” Yet, at the same time, because this culture is influential he implores spiritu-
al warriors to brave it.  
Praxis has funded various companies, most of which do not have an explicitly 
Christian mission. The Giving Keys is one. This business employs homeless people in 
downtown Los Angeles to make necklaces stamped with simple, positive messages that 
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say, for example, “love.” The Giving Keys’ business model is a benevolent one that hopes 
to empower homeless people. Praxis also funds Lasting, a marriage counselling app, and 
Cladwell a startup that uses artificial intelligence to help people curate their clothes and 
buy fewer products. Though none of these companies are explicitly Christian, in keeping 
with the philosophy of Praxis the businesses that they support hope to imbue their work 
and by extension American culture with Christian values. Praxis calls this strategy “re-
demptive entrepreneurship.”  
I spoke with Kurt Keilhacker, the board chair of Praxis about Praxis’ goals and 
he reiterated Dave Blanchard’s vision of cultural pioneerism: “Ultimately we want to in-
fluence culture. So that’s absolutely our goal and we are very intentional. If you were to 
ask yourself back in 1950 how does the parachurch or the church influence culture we 
would have one set of answers. If you were to ask that question today we think that en-
trepreneurship would be the key through which to influence culture” (Keilhacker, 2017). 
For Keilhacker there is a biblical precedent to this, he explains that the Apostle Paul 
evangelized through his tent-making and tells me “You know there was a reason why 
Paul was in the Agora in the marketplace because that’s where things happen” (Keilhack-
er, 2017). Entrepreneurship is where Praxis believes that culture happens, and so, theo-
logically, it is a place where Christians need to be and need to be thinking about their role 
in culture.  
Keilhacker has worked for many years in venture capital, and has focused on 
Silicon Valley. Perhaps because of this he is more gimlet-eyed than many about the role 
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of Silicon Valley as a great savior. “When you work in tech you are around a lot of posi-
tive — oh this is great stuff! This is exciting! And yet you say to yourself you know that’s 
true and we are very fortunate to be part of it but you know is humankind really different 
today? Is humankind really interested in more human flourishing than it was 20 years 
ago?” (Keilhacker, 2017) Keilhacker makes the point that though Silicon Valley has often 
promised to solve the world’s problems, they have done very little to deliver on those 
promises. For Keilhacker and Praxis, one way that business might begin to do some of 
the work of helping “human flourishing” is by starting with Christian values. For Keil-
hacker this happens on micro and macro levels. It happens when Christians are in the 
workplace, subtly evangelizing to their co-workers through their behavior. It happens on 
the macro level when business people make decisions based on Christian values rather 
than bottom-line values. The philosophy of “redemptive entrepreneurship” then, believes 
in the premise that business, and especially new startups, can save the world but only if 
Christians can first save business culture.  
Shortcomings 
Despite their sometimes lofty goals, the faith-tech industry displays many of 
the same problems endemic to the larger tech industry. There was nearly no diversity in 
the start-ups I researched. All of the people that I spoke with for this study were men and 
they were all white or of East or South Asian descent and though my study was not ex-
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haustive, it was nonetheless clear that the world of faith tech is primarily white and male 
dominated just as the larger tech industry is.  
Interestingly, Shawn Cheng told me that he believed that Christian values might 
be able to help the tech industry’s problem with diversity, “A Christian ethic is like you’re 
supposed to value everybody and diversity is really important not just demographically 
but both sexes and also socio-economically and even just psychologically like people that 
are of different thought. Like you should be valuing people coming from different walks” 
(Cheng, 2015). For Cheng, the discourse of diversity in technology is one in which a 
Christian ethic might benefit the industry. Yet, there was nearly no diversity in the star-
tups that I looked at. In this way faith tech looks a lot like the larger tech industry, but it 
also looks a lot like evangelical culture.  
Though gender politics in evangelical culture are complicated–– as Cheng’s 
comment points to and as I explore in Chapter Six of this project, men still occupy most 
leadership roles. Many of the men I spoke with talked about supporting their wives and 
families as part of the anxiety that surrounded the success or failure of their businesses. 
Many had wives who did not work outside of the home, and this is common in evangeli-
cal culture.  
In terms of racial diversity, faith tech reflects both the problematic messaging 
of Silicon Valley culture and of evangelical culture. On the one hand, the technology in-
dustry purports to be a meritocracy, yet on the other hand, it consistently fails to hire can-
didates of color. As in evangelical culture, racism is seen as a faraway problem. The un-
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derstanding is that individuals should not be racist. As influential evangelical Rick War-
ren explained in a Tweet, “racism is a sin problem.” Beyond that, however, there are very 
few structural understandings of racial exclusion put forth by white evangelicals, just as 
there are few attempts to meaningfully address diversity in the tech industry. The feeling 
is that the market will take care of the problem and that good people will rise to the top. 
This feeling is so strong and so widely held that it obscures the structural and cultural fac-
tors that make racial parity an impossibility. 
The strategy of “redemptive entrepreneurship” similarly relies on the idea that 
if Christians are in business, business will be better, but apart from imbuing values and 
potentially evangelizing to co-workers, there is no coherent strategy to change the tech 
industry for the better. And thus, though faith tech companies hope to both change the 
tech industry and change the world through tech by imbuing digital habitus with Christ-
ian values, the industry has in a sense remade the tech industry in their own image and 
have duplicated many of its shortcomings.  
Conclusion 
In the spring of 2017 Willie Morris Tweeted that FaithBox would be suspend-
ing operations. Like many startups it had reached the end of its run. Two months later 
Morris put up a vlog where he enthusiastically explained that FaithBox had been bought. 
I caught up with him and he said that ultimately he was really happy with the way things 
had gone with FaithBox. No, it had not been a unicorn and he was not going to get to re-
tire, but that was the business. You start something, see what happens, and then hopefully 
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get a chance to start something else and the fact that FaithBox had been bought by a 
Christian company with a lot of resources was a good fit. Willie had been CEO, CTO, 
CFO of FaithBox for two and a half years and he was ready to move on.  
The business of tech startups is a volatile one. It moves quickly and sometimes 
relentlessly. I met several entrepreneurs whose initial hopes had not panned out and some 
that seemed genuinely jaded by the tech industry. Despite the fact that all of the people I 
spoke to who had started faith-based companies believed that they were doing important 
work, there was certainly a realism and a general malaise in the air. Yet Christians remain 
in the industry and new faith-based companies pop up regularly because Christians in 
faith tech see business and particularly the tech sector as a way to gain influence in Amer-
ican culture more broadly conceived. Not unlike Christian political activists who have 
supported “values candidates” since the 1970s, these evangelical business people theorize 
their place in technology as a means to “influence culture,” in Praxis’ terms. What this 
reveals in the power that business, and especially the myth of the tech startup has in the 
evangelical imagination. The tech startup is seen as a place where real “disruption” might 
happen and where Christian values might break through into mainstream culture by be-
coming integrated into digital habitus. In this way the discourses and practices of these 
evangelical entrepreneurs follow the logic of neoliberalism, the idea that free market 
businesses pave the way to a better society. Government policies are not seen as effective 
means of influencing or changing society, instead entrepreneurship is. And the most pow-
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erful type of entrepreneurship and the most lauded in the American imagination in this 
moment is that of the tech startup.  
The products that this industry has created add the assemblage of digital tools 
and products in Christian culture and in their implicit embrace of technology and the 
technology industry, they influence the Christian social imaginary of tech. Each of these 
apps and websites is a piece of digital habitus and the fact that they continue to proliferate 
is further evidence of the emerging digital unconscious in American evangelicalism. By 
seeking to infuse the technology industry with Christian values and by creating products 
that they hope will aid spiritual development, faith tech business people see digital habi-
tus as a dual opportunity, to both make money and perhaps to “save the world.” As in the 
church world, they embrace the corporatist sloganeering and the strategies of Silicon Val-
ley and they see technology as a mean to remain relevant in contemporary American cul-
ture.  
But, as I will show in the next chapter, their attitudes also display problematic 
blind spots primarily by resting on the assumption that technology is culturally neutral. 
As evangelicals attempt to take technological innovations into the missions field, they run 
into problems with the corporatist leanings of the faith tech sector and are forced to re-
think how technology and the technology industry is culturally, and racially coded.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: MOBILE MINISTRY 
Proselytizing on the electronic frontier  
 
 On the second floor of a small stucco office building in Torrance, California, John 
Edmiston and his partner make raspberry pis–– tiny single board computers equipped 
with wifi and bluetooth [see fig. 1]–– to be shipped to remote areas of the globe. Edmis-
ton explains to me that the device has to be “ruggedized”so that “it can be dropped it can 
be in mud it can be out there. It can be in heat, it can be in dust it can be in the 
tropics” (Edmiston, 2017). This is the latest project of Cyber Missions, Edmiston’s non-
profit. Edmiston hopes these “Pastor Boxes” will offer seminary-level training for in-
digenous Christian leaders in various locations where mobile phones are plentiful but in-
ternet and cellular network connections are scarce. This project fits into the stated goal of 
Cybermissions which is “using computers and the internet to facilitate the Great Com-
mission.” (https://www.cybermissions.org/) Edmiston is part of a network of Christian 
Figure 5.1: A “Pastor Box” produced by Cyber Missions. Photo by author. 
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non-profits and individuals who believe that technological products when conceived in 
the framework of Christian missions work can be used to evangelize the world or fulfill 
what evangelicals call “The Great Commission.” 
 Evangelicals trace the missionary imperative to the Bible, specifically to the 
verses in the Book of Matthew that describe Jesus telling his followers: “Therefore, go 
and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 28:18-20). And another verse in the Book of Revela-
tion sets the stakes for missionary work when it describes a vision of the end of Christian 
history: “Then I saw another angel flying in midair, and he had the eternal gospel to pro-
claim to those who live on the earth—to every nation, tribe, language and people” (Reve-
lation 14:6). In my fieldwork and interviews, it was not uncommon to hear evangelicals 
explain that they believed that they might be part of the end of times and that spreading 
the gospel to every nation, tribe and tongue was an agentive force in fulfilling this 
prophecy. Many who I spoke with believe and expressed to me that fulfilling the Great 
Commission was the most important task set out for Christian believers. And this struc-
tures how evangelicals see media use, and especially new technologies in missionary 
work.  
In this chapter I document the ways Christian missionary organizations see 
digital tools. I begin with a focus on the most visible proponents of digital missionary 
work, those involved in what is known as “mobile ministry.” This is a world in which 
self-proclaimed tech geeks come up with workarounds to get Bibles into underground 
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churches in China by practicing what is known as “SD card evangelism.” It is a world in 
which programmers rejoice when their apps are opened in Saudi Arabia. It is a world 
where coders construct secret Bible apps that cloak their religious content. And I argue in 
this chapter that it is a world in which the problematic history of Christian missionary 
work is in some ways being challenged and in some ways being continued by a new set 
of digital Utopians who often echo the rhetoric of those in Silicon Valley who want to 
“save the world” by spreading technological products and digital habitus. Yet, unlike the 
other spaces this study explores–– faith-tech entrepreneurs, networked and online 
churches, and Christian social media users–– this is a space that challenges the norms of 
corporatist technology in favor of the early visionaries of the web and especially the dis-
courses of the Free and Open Source Movement (FOSS).  
The Missionary tradition in Christianity meets digital evangelism  
 The history of missionary work, or Missiology as it is known in seminaries and 
Divinity Schools, is vast and is comprised of myriad theological, historical, and ethno-
graphic monographs. Christian scholars see the paradigm for missionaries traced out in 
the Book of Acts. Christianity from this time, as Lamin Sanneh (2008) writes, was a reli-
gion that relied on an understanding of the centrality of individual believers, rather than 
on a homeland or a sacred, revealed language, as, for example, Islam does. Because of 
this it was conceived of as a mobile faith that could move throughout the world and ex-
press itself in any cultural context and these theological underpinnings opened Christiani-
ty to the possibility of linguistic and cultural translation.  
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As it moved throughout territory and history, Christianity became cemented as 
the religion of Europe and during the Age of Colonization, missionary work was folded 
into and informed the imperial project. Christian missionaries were cast as civilizing 
forces, or, in other words, as carriers of what Rudyard Kipling famously called “The 
White Man’s Burden.” Lamin Sanneh writes about how Christianity is still seen as a 
Western religion because of this history explaining the accepted view that, “Christianity 
was already so firmly anchored in the Enlightenment milieu of its origins in the modern 
West that in whatever forms it emerged in the rest of the world it was bound to sow the 
seeds of its formative Western character” (Sanneh, 2008, p. 217). This view holds that 
missionary work is a one-way process, inextricable from the history of Western imperial-
ism and inevitably a carrier of racist and ethnocentric worldview. Sanneh’s work compli-
cates this, however. And Jay Case Riley (2012) similarly pushes back on this historical 
narrative to make the argument that  
the missionary encounter did not simply encompass imposition and resistance, 
as many scholars have painted it, or simple proclamation and acceptance, as 
many evangelicals have described it. New movements of world Christianity 
emerged from a complex process of engagement in which local Christians se-
lectively took resources brought by missionaries and adapted them to their own 
contexts” (Riley, 2012, p. 7).  
Riley makes the point that missionaries were not particularly good at changing or “civi-
lizing” indigenous cultures and were just as likely to adapt their theological and religious 
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frameworks to fit indigenous cultures. He uses the Mukti Revival as an example. In 1905, 
a group of American Christian missionaries at a girls’ school in India heard about a young 
woman who had had visions of fire that she interpreted as visitations from the Holy Spir-
it. As Riley recounts, these missionaries, excited by the idea of these supernatural visita-
tions, actively encouraged them, sought out their own visions, and ultimately brought 
back a new form of Pentecostal Christianity to North America that later became a primary 
religious form in South America. As this dizzying story reveals, for Riley and others, 
missionary work was never a one-way movement, but was always hybridized. Further-
more, that hybridization circulated back to the West, challenging and changing the shape 
of Western Christianity in the process. Riley also notes that missionaries who returned 
from the field in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were among the only 
voices challenging accepted beliefs in white supremacy and civilization. He writes, “Ar-
guably world Christianity did more than academic theories of human difference to un-
dermine racism in nineteenth century America. More often than not, the academic trends 
of that era intensified racist thinking” (Riley, 2012, p. 10).  
 In the Twentieth century the growth of Christianity in Africa and South America 
particularly challenged the idea of Christianity as an Occidental religion (see Jenkins, 
2011) and Western Christians have been attempting to publicly reconcile their history of 
racial supremacy and cultural dominance since at least 1910. In that year the World Mis-
sions Conference met in Edinburgh. Though this conference set the stage for an under-
standing of Christianity as a unified world religion (this movement is known as Christian 
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ecumenism) rather than a Western one. But it has proven difficult or impossible to extri-
cate Christian missionary work from global politics, and all of this historical baggage has 
become a structuring force in the American evangelical missionary project in the twenti-
eth century. After the neo-evangelical revision of evangelicalism in the 1940s, Christian 
missionary became institutionalized in non-profits, large churches, and Bible Colleges 
and an accepted evangelical lens on the globe was developed.  
Contemporary missiology has identified what it calls “unreached people 
groups,” a term dating to a 1974 missiological conference (see Pratt, 2016 ). This idea 
shifted what missions work meant. Rather than identifying countries to send missionaries, 
Christian organizations now identify people groups by their ethno-linguistic identifiers. 
By dividing the globe into ethnolinguistic communities that sometimes transcended na-
tional borders, the Christian missions movement again reframed the globe. The emphasis 
was placed on translation of the Bible into thousands of dialects representing “unreached 
people groups” or “the unreached,” And this especially put what is called the “10/40 win-
dow” front and center. The 10/40 window, also known as the “resistant belt” refers to the 
area at 10 or 40 degrees North latitude and the areas that surround this point. This area 
comprises much of North Africa and the Middle East, places where Islam is typically the 
dominant religion. Frances Fitzgerald chronicles how evangelical missionary organiza-
tions in the 1990s and early 2000s began to focus on converting people of Muslim faith in 
majority-Muslim countries which followed from evangelical theories of the “resistant 
belt.” As she notes, this particularly became a problem when the Bush administration 
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agreed to allow missionaries into combat zones in Iraq, a move that many foreign policy 
experts saw as a dangerous conflation of military and religious goals that signaled to 
many in the Arab world that the United States was fighting a war against Islam (see 
Fitzgerald, 2017, p. 479-483). And thus, American missionary work, despite what many 
ecumenicists have hoped, has remained closely married to geopolitical power.  
 While the history of Christian missions is linked to a history of colonization, 
white supremacy, and American exceptionalism it also cannot be disentangled with the 
history of media use and innovation in American Christian culture. Evangelizing through 
printed tracts, through radio, through television, and then satellite and cable has always 
been framed in terms of reaching the unreached and spreading the gospel. And in the con-
temporary American consumer technology saturated landscape, this tradition has been 
continued and it has also been amplified by those promises coming out of Silicon Valley 
that claim that technology can be a way to positively impact the globe. For example, 
Nicholas Negroponte, head of the MIT Media Lab and techno-Utopian conceived of the 
One Laptop per Child project in which cheap computers would be given to children in 
underserved areas of the globe. The project’s assumption was that the technology itself 
could bring about positive societal change just by being present in people’s lives. And 
though the project did little to alleviate poverty or raise literacies levels (see Kenny & 
Sandefur, 2013, p. 75), projects that employ rhetoric like this are common in American 
technological and business circles. These ideas borne in the tech industry, then, when met 
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with the longstanding evangelical enthusiasm for using media tools in global missionary 
work inform each other rather naturally, as I will show below.  
 Furthermore, the digital habitus in American evangelicalism is influencing new 
ways of thinking about the mechanics and ethics of missionary work. It engenders new 
metaphors about the globe and new visions of global Christian community. When mis-
sionaries meet indigenous people who seem just as enthralled with their cell phones as 
Americans, they begin to imagine new possibilities for reaching them or introducing 
them to the Bible and these ideas have become products, businesses, and non-profits. As I 
sketch out below, an influential network of digitally-minded missionaries is contributing 
to the digital unconscious of evangelicalism and creating new social imaginaries in Amer-
ican and global Christianity. 
The new Roman roads 
 Given that technological innovation has been a part of missions work for hun-
dreds of years, it is not surprising that missions-focused Christians and organizations 
would see the new media revolution as an opportunity to find new ways to proselytize. 
The most visible and institutionalized form that this has taken is the movement known as 
“mobile ministry.” Mobile ministry refers to the idea that mobile phones, and the suite of 
technological products that come along with them such as e-readers, mobile apps, sim 
cards, SD cards, and video players, provide a new way for Christians to get their message 
out to a global audience that is increasingly adopting digital habitus. Some of the indige-
nous people that the mobile ministry movement hopes to connect to could be considered 
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“unreached people” in the Christian sense of the term, but they have nevertheless been 
reached by mobile technology. The Mobile Ministry Forum was started in 2010 and it 
represents a network of about thirty missionary organizations–– some large like the In-
ternational Missions Board, and some small like John Edmiston’s Cyber Missions–– that 
are all devoted to the idea that new media, and especially mobile tools, should be the fo-
cus of Christian innovation and experimentation. As they explain on their website, “The 
Mobile Ministry Forum is a network of missional innovators fostering a mobile ministry 
movement so that every unreached person will have a chance to encounter, experience 
and grow in Christ through their personal mobile device” (Mobile Ministry Forum, 
2017). Because of the growth and ubiquity of mobile technology, the people involved in 
the Mobile Ministry Forum believe that the Great Commission can be fulfilled in their 
lifetime. In 2010 they set a goal for fulfilling the Great Commission in ten years, by 
2020. When I ask Keith Williams, one of the leaders of the Mobile Ministry Forum, about 
this goal in late 2017 he told me, “That was ten years from that when we first got togeth-
er. And boy, I’m just watching something 100 million more people just got on the internet 
in India last year. The dream becomes more achievable even if we are not necessarily 
moving the ball forward as fast as we would like. God is moving that ball forward is what 
I would say” (Williams, 2017). As technology expands, Williams believes, so do the op-
portunities to spread the Gospel through mobile-connected devices. The vision of the 
mobile ministry forum and the movement known as mobile ministry shares a lot in com-
mon with those techno-enthusiasts who believe that closing the so-called “digital divide” 
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is the most important step in curing global inequity. Again, it is reminiscent of Nicholas 
Negroponte's ill-fated “One Laptop per Child Program.” Both assumptions rest on the 
idea that the technology itself is emancipatory and once every person has access to it, the 
world will fundamentally change. Of course for mobile ministry the message is just as 
crucial as the medium and getting the proper message transmitted through the proper 
medium is the central goal of the Mobile Ministry Forum.  
 Williams’ revelation about the power of mobile technology happened while he 
was a missionary in the field. He had gone to the Arab world (he declined to specify 
which country) armed with cassette tapes meant to transmit culturally relevant Biblical 
messages, because research had shown that many in the area drove old trucks with built-
in tape players. When he got to the region, however, he found that the cassette players 
were mostly not in operation. He told me, “we started seeing that they were putting up 
their tents where they could get cell phone reception instead of where they could get wa-
ter and that was kind of an Aha! moment” (Williams, 2017). This led Williams to think 
deeper about the role that mobile technologies have to play in the Christian mission to 
evangelize the globe. He used a metaphor that I head echoed by two other of my inter-
viewees, that of the Roman Roads. He told me that “We compare the Roman roads that 
Jesus and his disciplines walked down and we say, God knew the perfect time to create a 
place where Jesus would come in right at the time when these Roman roads were con-
necting the entire world and that would just be this avenue that could be used for the 
spread of his Kingdom and we look at in the same way right now with mobile telephony” 
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(Williams, 2017). Williams sees the world growing ever-more connected through mobile 
technology and it is through this technology that a Christian message can be spread, just 
as the Roman Roads facilitated the spread of Christian messages in Biblical times. 
Williams expresses a sentiment that I heard a lot in my fieldwork, the sense that technol-
ogy has been given by God and that Christians should use it, or as they put it, “steward” it 
in a way that expresses their message. And again, this idea syncs well with digital opti-
mist rhetoric endemic to Silicon Valley. Like those technologists these Christians believe 
in a determinist vision for the New Roman Roads of mobile technology that is not unlike 
what Marshall McLuhan described as the “global village” that he believed electronic 
technology would create (1964).  
Keith Williams described Antoine Wright to me as “the granddaddy of mobile 
ministry,” a moniker that seems silly when you see Antoine––a young-looking thirty-
eight year old––but appropriate given the speed in which technological change has hap-
pened in the last twenty years. People in the mobile ministry scene have dubbed him the 
granddaddy because he was the first to start publicly advocating for bringing mobile, 
digital devices into missionary and ministry work through his online outlet Mobile Min-
istry Magazine which ran from 2004 through 2016. When I spoke with Wright he was 
wearing airpods that connected to his iPhone, an Apple Watch, and a ring that doubled as 
a GPS-enabled fitness tracker. He told me he had his Spectacles ––Snapchat’s video-cap-
turing sunglasses–– inside. He has always been an early adopter of technology; he said he 
owned a Palm Pilot when it was commonly mistaken for a GameBoy. And it was at this 
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time around the year 2000 in a church, when he tells me he was looking at his Palm Pilot 
and he thought to himself,  
What’s going to happen when everything that this leader, this pastor or teacher 
is saying in front of me is accessible in this handheld device? Will that person 
matter? How does that change the threading of this community that I’ve come 
to love, appreciate or know and: Oh crap! Are we ready for that as a local 
community? Are we ready for that as a faith community and oh my God is 
Christianity Judaism, Buddhism, is anybody ready for that? (Wright, 2017).  
He tells me that it was these initial questions that led him to start writing the magazine 
and helping to assemble a network of church and tech professionals interested in how to 
use new media technologies for Christian evangelizing and community building. And 
with that Wright became the mouthpiece of a growing movement of evangelicals interest-
ing in using mobile devices, as they put it, “missionally.”  
 For most evangelicals using technology missionally means using digital tools to 
spread the Gospel or to connect individuals into digital networks that ideally become vir-
tual communities. Wright, however, has a more expansive view of mobile ministry. As he 
sees it, the world is becoming more and more connected––we are close the living in 
McLuhan’s “global village”–– and that requires a more mobile definition of faith itself 
because, “A decade ago it was disconnected first connected later but if the default is con-
nected and if the default means that we are connected we are probably more like plants 
and less like rocks— every plant in the world is connected at the root system” (Wright, 
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2017). In his view, faith has to be a lens through which believers can interpret an increas-
ingly connected culture. And in this way, he tells me that he sees a potential Christian fu-
ture looking more like the distant past, as in the past of Medieval Europe when “The 
thing that made Christianity valuable is that Christianity was able to spread because you 
could embed it into every area of someone’s life. It was in art if you were a noble it was 
you literally owned hymns or creeds while you were working in the field it was very 
much a part of who you are. I believe we get back into that.” (Wright, 2017). Wright be-
lieves faith has to infuse every aspect of life in order to succeed in a connected world, it 
has to be part of every connection, it has to create connections, it has to be immersive and 
ever-present in believers lives. In other words, it has to be on your iPhone. For Wright the 
challenge that the church faces is understanding how to embed Christian directives in 
ever-present mobile phones and he views this imperative in a global framework. He does 
not only fear losing a new generation of American millennials to agnosticism as others I 
spoke to for this study did, but he fears that globally Christianity could lose out to other 
religious voices. He predicts that “If the Christian church drops the ball and generally 
speaking another religion comes in and picks up the ball— that's just kind of the way his-
tory has happened––and it's like crap, now we are marginalized now we are back to being 
the little church in the corner trying to figure out what our beliefs are” (Wright, 2017). 
Wright hopes that Christians can avoid this future by taking to technology and under-
standing the world as a vast, connected, digital network of believers who increasingly are 
viewing their world through mobile phones. His vision is not too distant from the vision 
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of the man he calls his “intellectual mentor,” Howard Rheingold. In Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier (1993) Rheingold writes glowingly of the potential for communities 
to spring up on the internet. He uses his experience with the online community WELL as 
an example. And like Wright, he sees the importance of having knowledgeable stewards 
of this technology deeply understand it in order to use the technology to enhance democ-
ratic discourse. For Rheingold, in the context of democracy, a more connected world 
could be a Utopia or a dystopia because,  
technology offers a new capability of ‘many to many’ communication, but the 
way such a capability will or will not be used in the future might depend on the 
way we, the first people who are using it, succeed or fail in applying it to our 
lives. Those of us who are brought into contact with each other by means of 
CMC technology find ourselves challenged by this many-to-many capability––
challenged to consider whether it is possible for us to build some kind of com-
munity together.” (Rheingold, 1993, p. 12).  
Wright takes Rheingold’s simultaneously optimistic and precautionary stance when de-
scribing the connected world though his hopes are about the future of Christianity rather 
than the future of democracy. Wright hopes that the ubiquitous connection that the New 
Roman Roads facilitate will change Christianity for the better, but he also fears that if 
Christians are unwilling to change and adapt it could change them for the worse. In either 
vision, change is inevitable, the technology functions like Pandora’s box, it cannot be 
closed or willed away, it has to be dealt with, and ideally, “stewarded” correctly. 
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The Open Church 
 Though they are optimistic about digital technologies, and tend to adopt the lan-
guage of early tech visionaries, unlike evangelicals working in the faith-tech sector, 
Christians promoting technological tools in missionary organizations, many of which are 
non-profits, do not as fervently believe in the power of tech businesses. Whereas those in 
the church world and those in faith tech admired corporate tech businesses and often tried 
to emulate them, my interviewees in the mobile ministry field often pointedly critiqued 
what they saw as the increasing corporatization of the internet. For example, John Edmis-
ton prides himself on having been one of the first people to take to the internet, even be-
fore the introduction of the World Wide Web. He tells me that he had the first prayer 
website on the internet, the first Bible teaching website and the first Christian dating 
website. Yet, despite his enthusiasm for the early web, he is now cautious, because “it has 
been massively corporatized so that Facebook and Google and a few companies basically 
own the internet” (Edmiston, 2017). He goes on to tell explain his concerns about private 
surveillance, about the impossibility of being forgotten, and about problems with un-
masking of missionaries on social media. For Edmiston who had seen the early potential 
of the internet in the 1980s and 90s, the rise of Facebook was an example of problematic 
corporatization happening in the tech space. Others echoed these concerns. Though An-
toine Wright was typically optimistic about the trajectory of technology he told me, “I’m 
also as scared as everybody else because I read the terms of service for everything, so I 
understand the nature of surveillance culture” (2017).  
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While the culture of faith tech emulates startup culture and sees stylish entre-
preneurs extolling the potential of redemptive entrepreneurship, the mission field is more 
likely to attract self-proclaimed “geeks,” “techies,” and “hackers.” Because of this, evan-
gelicals in the missions field who emphasize technology often quoted people like Richard 
Stallman and Howard Rheingold rather than Sergey Brin or Steve Jobs. They prefer the 
early visionaries of the internet who believed that the connective power of the medium 
had Utopian potential and my interviewees especially expressed affinity with the Free 
and Open Source Software movement (FOSS). FOSS refers to a long-established com-
puting community that creates and contributes to software with an open source code. This 
type of software allows hackers and computer enthusiasts to freely copy and improve 
upon digital products. The ethic of sharing that is the basis of the FOSS movement was 
articulated by Richard Stallman in the 1980s who laid forth a set of moral rules for com-
puting, for example, “As a computer user today, you may find yourself using a propri-
etary program. If your friend asks to make a copy, it would be wrong to refuse. Coopera-
tion is more important than copyright” (Stallman, 2010, p. 52). In her ethnography of 
hacker culture, Gabriella Coleman explains that FOSS gave a generation of young men 
(and to a much lesser extent, women) who were fascinated by computing a rallying point. 
The software provided a chance for these proto-hackers to tinker, and in so doing, to take 
ownership of the process of computing. It also allowed for a community to develop that 
took FOSS as its lingua franca and that began to take the ideology of sharing as its central 
moral tenet (Coleman, 2013, p.  26). Both within and outside of the hacking community 
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FOSS has been taken as a touchstone for a variety of ideological positions. Richard 
Stallman conceived of it in a socialist framework, but others have read it as a libertarian 
ideal (like Raymond, 2001) or as a Marxist ideal (like MacKenzie Wark (2004). The 
Christians in the missions field that expressed enthusiasm for FOSS saw it in Biblical 
terms. Yet uniting these fractions is a social imaginary challenges the dominant neoliber-
alist capitalism that predominates in the tech world today. David Berry explains that the 
collective production that FOSS programmers perform challenges received cultural un-
derstanding of the necessity of Fordist and post-Fordist production models (2008, p.101). 
Because it is a challenge to dominant market modes, than, the logic of FOSS extends be-
yond just software. It allows for “a form of collective action that has crystallised in re-
sponse to capital's quest to commodify ideas, knowledge and information” (Berry, 2008, 
p. 101).  
Many of the people I spoke with had worked on Open Source platforms and 
they echoed the rhetoric of the FOSS Movement precisely because it challenged domi-
nant economic models. For example, Antoine Wright told me, “the open source commu-
nity and the Bible sharing community have seemed to almost work lockstep at least in the 
last decade they did in terms of making content available for least of these” (Wright, 
2017). For Wright it is the fact that the FOSS community produces content geared toward 
older devices that proves their idealistic goals, the same goals shared by missions organi-
zations who hope to proselytize to “the least of these.”  
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Life.Church has also taken on the ethics of the FOSS movement. On their ex-
pansive website they have a section called “Open” that offers church resources for free 
download. They explain: “We give away free resources to churches because we believe 
that they belong to God and His entire Church. So no need to give us any credit, just give 
all that credit to God!” (LifeChurch.tv, 2014). Life.Church sees its work as instrumental 
to an imagined global church community united under the authority of God. And the lead 
pastor of Life.Church, Craig Groeschel writes about the impetus behind “Open” 
recalling,“What if, we asked idealistically, we just gave away our creative content—for 
free?” Groeschel describes this as a breakthrough in LifeChurch.tv’s approach to min-
istry, and he says he immediately conceived of it as “open sourcing,” a concept that he 
traces to “a few computer companies who started sharing their in-house software with 
anyone who wanted it, trusting (hoping) that others would follow” (Groeschel, 2007). 
Groschel sees this as an ethic common in the tech world, but he also places it in a dis-
tinctly Christian framework when he explains that “open sourcing is giving away the 
rights to use what already exists. In the ministry world, we could define it as giving away 
what wasn't ours in the first place. (It all came from God, anyway)” (Groeschel, 2007). 
Groschel takes the concept of “open sourcing” and places it in a theological context in 
which God is the ultimate rights holder, not an individual or a church.   
 In the same vein, Jonathan Pulos runs a non-profit organization called Missional 
Digerati, another organization involved in the Mobile Ministry Forum. He tells me that 
the idea for  Missional Digerati was sparked by an eight-week ministry course called 
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“Perspectives on the World Christian Movement.” At the time he took this course he was 
working as a programmer in a large company. He says this course prompted him to imag-
ine that his role as a programmer could be creating an organization that was basically a 
full-time hackathon where programmers and engineers could get together to create tech-
nology to support missions work. As he explains, “I’ve always dreamed about the idea of 
Missional Digerati becoming a think tank where you get these techies together their heart 
and their mission is fulfilling the Great Commission and they’ve got all the resources 
they need on hand to just do stuff: build the right projects, test it out, see the results” (Pu-
los, 2017). He explains that this was not a business idea –– the goal was not to charge 
anything for these services. And in this way Pulos exemplifies the ethics of the mobile 
ministry community. In this world, making money is beside the point. The organizations 
that I looked at were all non-profits, but beyond that status, the people involved in them, 
like Pulos seemed to regard money and money-making as merely a hindrance to their ul-
timate goals––no one expected or even wanted their project to become a “unicorn.” In the 
five years since he has been running Missional Digerati that dream has not totally been 
realized; he says now he mostly works with missions organizations, consulting with them 
and building their technology. But it remains important for him to encourage his clients to 
Open Source everything that he produces for them. For him, Open Source Software is the 
key to his goal of having a frictionless innovative atmosphere of Christian technologists 
working to evangelize the globe.  
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 Tim Jore started his career working in Bible translation and in tandem with that he 
also participated in the Open Source movement. Because of this, he recalls, “I learned 
how the community works how very different it is from commercial products and really 
started to internalize some of those principles and more importantly started to recognize 
that much of it is I believe deeply rooted in biblical principles” (Jore, 2017). Like Pulos 
and Life.Church, he spins the ideology of FOSS in a Christian way, seeing the principles 
of sharing as biblical ones. Jore tells me he also read Lawrence Lessig, who applied the 
logic of FOSS to cultural production. Lessig created Creative Commons, a non-profit or-
ganization whose mission is to create and maintain open licenses specifically tailored to 
the concerns of the digital age, in 2001. Creative Commons translated the ethics of the 
FOSS movement to cultural production and instigated what is known as the Free Culture 
movement (see Boyle, 2008, p. 182). The ideas Jore gleaned from FOSS and the Free 
Culture movement eventually prompted him to write The Christian Commons (2013). In 
it, he describes being a missionary in the field in Papua New Guinea and trying to use 
software to help local Christians translate the Bible into their dialect, and he notes that 
“everything had been going fine until the software installer prompted us for a license key 
to translate the Word of God, but since we did not have a license key, we could not pro-
ceed with the installation of software” (Jore, 2013, p. 15). For Jore this experience was 
significant because, “In the legal context of ‘all rights reserved’ the global church is un-
able to work together without restriction or hindrance to leverage Internet and mobile 
technology to the fullest for the purposes of God’s Kingdom and the equipping of His 
!157
Church” (Jore, 2013, p 14). His book describes an alternate paradigm in which Christian 
technologists, translators, and publishers might work together to create a free and open 
Christian commons that might be accessed by anyone. And when I caught up with Jore in 
the fall of 2017 he excitedly related that, “What had been described mostly from a theo-
retical standpoint in Christian Commons in 2012 is just accelerating globally and it's 
thrilling to be a part of” (Jore, 2017). Jore works in innovation and strategy at an organi-
zation called Distant Shores, which has developed a model that allows indigenous Christ-
ian communities to get access to Biblical resources of all types in “gateway languages” 
that they can then use to translate into local dialects and spread throughout their region. 
All of the media he transmits is open through Creative Commons licensing, meaning that 
it can be shared, remixed, and rebranded in any way the user sees fit. 
 Jore tells me that the most pushback on his ideas he has received comes from pub-
lishers and established Christian organizations. For example, he expresses frustration that 
the Greek New Testament has been protected by publishers who have copyrighted their 
translations in effect making them inaccessible for people who cannot pay for them. 
Though evangelical outreach strategies have historically been based on giving away free 
things, especially Bibles, they have also always been involved in a balancing act between 
giving away the cultural products that they create and retaining ownership of the right to 
these products. Because of this there have been controversies about how churches should 
interpret copyright law in regard to sermons (see Smietana, 2014), Contemporary Christ-
ian Music (see Gormly, 2003), and other cultural forms (see Berg, 2003). The Christian 
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intellectual property regime established in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s has proven to be prof-
itable for Christian businesses; Bibles especially are a source of millions of dollars in 
revenue for a variety of Christian organizations every year (see Balmer, 1989 p. 
193-208). But Jore, inspired by what he believes are the biblical principles of the FOSS 
and Free Culture movements believes that to truly steward technology Christians have to 
get away from a paradigm that has valued business and money-making over sharing and 
free transmission of messages.  
For Jore, the Open Church movement is also a paradigm shift because it gives 
more power to those in indigenous populations in the Global South to control content. He 
explains, 
 Perhaps the most important aspect in all of this is getting away from the idea 
that we are going to come up with the best solution here and then we are going 
to ship it globally. That’s more of a commercial model and that’s fine. It’s a 
business model, that’s great. And sometimes it's extremely effective but where 
I’m going with this is very similar to our take on the content and the licensing. 
We are very interested in letting the church have the freedom to solve their own 
problems. Not in a disconnected way, not in a this is your problem you take 
care of it but in the sense of let's give everything that we’ve got with the free-
dom so that everyone can be creative to meet the needs together. (Jore, 2017). 
Through open technology, open resources, and a connected globe, Jore imagines new 
nodal points in global Christianity emerging. He believes he has seen the beginning of 
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this in parts of India where he has seen the sharing, remixing, and circulation of Christian 
content accelerate in the past few years, and he compares this to a flame hitting gasoline: 
it cannot be stopped.  
A global paradigm shift? 
 On the surface, Jore’s understanding of how to translate media messages through 
indigenous cultures by giving those cultures control and opening content to remixing and 
sharing without restriction is reminiscent of the anthropologist Faye Ginsburg’s view of 
indigenous media production in the “digital age” (2008). Ginsburg urges scholars to think 
beyond the common argument that points to the problematic existence of a vast digital 
divide, and instead introduces case studies that show that indigenous media producers 
often have different views on how technology might be used than those prescribed by 
Western observers. She shows that indigenous producers have especially critiqued what 
they see as the hegemonic insistence on Western intellectual property norms. For Gins-
burg this is important to keep in mind when we refer to the “digital age” as a unified ide-
ological moment because, “the language smuggles in a set of assumptions that paper over 
cultural difference in the way things digital may be taken up––if at all–– in radically dif-
ferent contexts and thus serve to further insulate thinking against recognition of alterity 
that different kinds of media worlds present” (Ginsburg, 2008, p. 129). In other words we 
have to get away from the technology industry’s understanding of “edge cases.” In her 
book, Sarah Wachter-Boettcher (2017) explains that the technology industry, especially 
given its demographic makeup as a male-controlled space, has blind spots that influence 
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how they imagine technology use. Everything outside of the frame that they set up is con-
sidered an “edge case.” This is problematic given that the technology industry is concen-
trated in a relatively few areas and there is very little input taken into consideration from 
people who inhabit “alternate media worlds.”  
 Because of this, some organizations in the mobile ministry movement are dedicat-
ed to using digital tools explicitly to empower indigenous communities to create their 
own products and content geared toward spreading Christian messages. Code for the 
Kingdom, for example, hosts weekend-long “hackathons” all over the world because they 
hope to be “igniting the Christian passion and purpose of technologists and entrepreneurs 
to innovate culture shaping technologies that would reclaim our times for the 
Gospel” (Code for the Kingdom, 2017). They have hosted events in places such as Jakar-
ta, Bogota, and Addis Ababa as a means to engage indigenous media producers. Another 
organization called Indigitous is also illustrative here. Indigitous is a portmanteau of “in-
digenous” and “digital.” They explain that both of these concepts are crucial to their mis-
sion. “Indigenous because it reflects our desire for locally-generated strategies that work 
in each generation, language and culture. Digital because we believe digital tools, re-
sources, platforms and strategies can accelerate God’s mission” (https://indigitous.org/
about-us/). To this end, like Code for the Kingdom, they sponsor hackathons around the 
world and they host a global network of volunteers, and offer social media training to 
Christians globally.  
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I spoke with two Indigitous volunteers Jeyanti Yorke and Janakan, a married 
couple living in Singapore. They have also created their own app, called Oikos which of-
fers church management services to churches around the world on a sliding pay scale. 
Janakan told me that the Western and especially American focus of Christian technology 
production is a problem because it excludes non-Westerners from the means of produc-
tion. Janakan believes that this deficit in the balance of technological production exists 
because of the structure of the global economy. He stresses that “there’s no lack of inno-
vation in the rest of the world, in the majority world. We have been to places in Ethiopia 
where they have internet for half an hour a day and they are able to code things at the 
same level as these American developers. The difference is they don’t necessarily have 
access to market” (Janakan, 2017). Because they do not have access to the market, and 
thus cannot easily sell their products, they do not have a voice in how technology is pro-
duced. Creative indigenous producers are in effect, silenced.  
In one sense, the way that Jore, Code for the Kingdom, Indigitous and others in 
this movement have reimagined how media might be used in indigenous contexts follows 
from Ginsburg’s understanding of alternate media worlds. Because indigenous producers 
can openly use content in any way that they see fit, they can for example put their own 
branding on a teaching video, or they can add their own Biblical exegesis to a openly 
shared cultural product these Christians believe they are ceding their power as theological 
and cultural gatekeepers to indigenous communities. Yet, as Janakan alludes to above, the 
problem goes beyond access to materials and tools. And this is a problem that comes into 
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many programs constructed in a Western context that hope to aid the majority world, and 
a focus on technological production and technology use may enhance that problem. In his 
book on the development of the iPhone and the app economy, Brian Merchant visited 
Nairobi’s “Silicon Savannah” and found that though Western technology companies and 
NGOs had enthusiastically pushed local producers to create technological products as a 
means to bring money into the region, these Western organizations had not understood 
how entrepreneurship worked in Africa. Merchant writes, “The idea of mobile revolution 
or an app-based revolution ported poorly from the U.S. or Europe, where it was a cultural 
phenomenon, to Kenya, where the reality was much different” (2017, p. 179). And Yuri 
Takhteyev’s (2012) study of coders in Rio reveals the complex relationship that those 
working at the periphery have with those in the center, i.e. in Silicon Valley. Takhteyev’s 
work also points out that technology production and especially Open Source Software 
presents a high barrier of entry for those programmers that do not speak English as the 
dominant coding languages all rely on English and FOSS particularly uses English as its 
lingua franca. He writes, “participation in open source projects involves a complex nego-
tiation of culture, language, and geography, and is often harder than engaging in other 
forms of software practice, since it requires more fluency in foreign culture and demands 
more of the resources that may be hard to find” (Takhteyev, 2012, p. 9, emphasis in the 
original). Thus, porting the idea of a “hackathon” to Bogota, may not be as empowering 
as the people who run these organizations hope it to be. Similarly cultural products ini-
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tially produced in the West may have a high barrier of entry for indigenous people, or 
may not be relevant in indigenous cultures.  
Though mobile technology has been heralded as the means by which the world 
might truly be united in a McLuhian “Global Village,” the way that it has been received 
and produced in local places belies this idea. Ultimately, then, the movement is still one-
way. Now not only are the messages designed in the West, but so are the technologies 
used to transmit them. Like the iPhone, they are “designed in California, assembled in 
China.” As Bill Wasik points out,  “the smartphone — for all its indispensability as a tool 
of business and practicality — is also a bearer of values; it is not a culturally neutral de-
vice” (2015). Mobile technology allows Christians to imagine themselves as part of a 
globally-connected network of believers and allows for predictions of new global nodes 
emerging to challenge the historic Western dominance of Christianity, but because these 
technological products are produced in a Western, capitalist context, they have in effect 
excluded the majority world from their production. As Langdon Winner (1980) reminds 
us, artifacts have politics and the mobile phones that have found their way into the hands 
of people all around the globe are no exception. The politics that these devices carry with 
them are not neutral and though evangelicals have tried to tinker with intellectual proper-
ty norms, with software, and though they have hacked and innovated, they remain reliant 
on an Orientalist vision of the world seeded throughout hundreds of years of problematic 
history. They also remain reliant on the system of global capital flows. By assuming that 
the increasingly ubiquity of technology and a global digital habitus will create a globe 
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connected by the new Roman roads, these Christians are falling into the same trap as their 
counterparts in the technology industry who see technological spread and the closing of a 
global digital divide as the central problems of the “digital era.” To return to Faye Gins-
burg’s critique, in the spread of these culturally, historically situated technologies is the 
spread of the ideologies that accompany them and while many Christians are trying to 
reimagine and rethink these hegemonic views of technology they have fallen into the 
same trap of digital Utopians throughout Silicon Valley’s short history.  
Conclusion 
 In reimagining the global and they ways they might approach it, the evangelicals 
involved in the mobile ministry world are also reimagining themselves and their role in a 
vast global network connected by the “new Roman roads.” Unlike those in the faith tech 
space, these Christians are not out to make money, but rather want to spread the Gospel, 
and they see technology  as a prime way to do that in an increasingly connected world 
defined by the ubiquity of digital technologies and digital habitus. At the same time, their 
technological influences are those like Richard Stallman who want to keep technological 
products free and open and as such these evangelicals explicitly and implicitly critique 
the neoliberal economic principles that govern the technology industry. While some hope 
that a connected planet will shift power dynamics and unite the global church, the 
rhetoric espoused by many in the mobile ministry movement continues the problematic 
rhetoric that has infused missionary work for hundreds of years. And it also reveals the 
problems of a technologically deterministic discourse inherited from techno-Utopianism.  
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Perhaps more importantly, the Christian missions field has historical baggage 
that it carries with it into the digital age. Though the missionaries that I spoke with tend 
to see themselves as John Edmiston does, as “ a servant to the majority world” (Edmis-
ton, 2017) and though many spoke about the problematic assumptions that have been 
built into missionary work there is still ample evidence that the norms of mobile ministry 
are Western, especially American. Furthermore, by emphasizing the importance of tech-
nology and borrowing the ideologies of techno-Utopianists like Howard Rheingold and 
others, I argue that evangelicals may in fact be intensifying the Orientalist leanings of 
Christian missionary work that Christian ecumenicism has been trying to fight against 
since 1910.  
Digital habitus has changed American evangelical culture and it has changed 
the way that many American Christians imagine global outreach, however, this habitus is 
culturally and socially situated and may not translate as readily as many evangelicals 
hope. Evangelicals have been successful attracting people to their suburban, American, 
churches by incorporating technology and strategies from corporate and technological 
businesses. Similarly, those creating digital products for Christians have been able to cap-
italize on the digital habitus in American evangelical culture and in so doing, have pro-
moted it. But in both of these contexts Christian technology enthusiasts have failed to 
grapple with the exclusionary basis of the technology industry and of the church world. 
Because of this, in the mobile ministry world, when missionaries try to use some of the 
same tactics to attract believers in other contexts who they perceive as similarly engaged 
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in digital habitus, they run up against the Western, and indeed, white biases of digital cul-
ture and of American evangelicalism.  
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CHAPTER SIX: #AMPLIFYWOMEN 
Evangelicalism and “the crisis” of authority on social media 
 On April 27, 2017,writer Rachel Held Evans Tweeted in all caps: “LITERALLY 
THREW MY PHONE ACROSS THE BEDROOM OVER THIS PIECE” (rachelhelde-
vans, 2017a). Evans was referring to a Christianity Today article entitled “Who is in 
charge of the Christian blogosphere?” written by a female Anglican priest, Tish Harrison 
Warren (2017). According to Warren’s article, popular Christian bloggers were causing “a 
crisis” in Christian culture. Warren used the example of Jen Hatmaker, a social media 
celebrity or “micro-celebrity” with over 750,000 followers on Facebook. In 2016, Hat-
maker publicly came out for gay marriage and the inclusion of LGBT people in evangeli-
cal culture, breaking with the larger church’s stance on homosexuality. In response, 
LifeWay Christian stores, a for-profit business affiliated with the Southern Baptist Con-
vention (SBC), the largest Protestant organization in the United States, stopped selling 
Hatmaker’s books and prominent evangelicals were forced to take sides–– for or against 
Hatmaker’s stance and Hatmaker as a figure. For Warren, Hatmaker was a symptom of a 
larger problem, namely the fact that many popular Christian female bloggers have mas-
sive followings on social media and thus, outsized influence. As a corrective, Warren’s 
article called for increased accountability in the Christian blogosphere, she wrote “If we 
are to help build not just a personal brand but a beautiful, faithful church for generations 
of women (and men) to come, we must work to strengthen and shape institutions larger 
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than ourselves and submit ourselves to the authority and oversight of Christ’s church, 
even as we are honest about its frailty and faults” (Warren, 2017). 
 Rachel Held Evans’ was not the only impassioned response to this article. In fact 
the social media response, which centered around Twitter in the days after the article’s 
release, but also saw responses cropping up on Medium, personal blogs, and Facebook, 
tended to be emotionally driven and connected to the personal stories of hundreds of 
women. In many Protestant denominations women cannot be ordained, while in others 
they may be allowed to preach but often face cultural barriers to doing so. For many of 
these women the Christian blogosphere has been a means to get around the patriarchal 
structure of church culture. Because of this, on and around the hashtag created by Chris-
tianity Today, #AmplifyWomen, Twitter users passionately debated the role of women 
bloggers in evangelical culture.  
This chapter examines the #AmplifyWomen hashtag  using the method of 13
“hashtag ethnography” proposed by Bonila and Rosa (2015) and analyzes this discourse 
in order to illuminate how social media is giving rise to a new type of evangelical femi-
nism. The conversations generated through the #AmplifyWomen hashtag cast in sharp 
relief the uneasy balance between popular postfeminist empowerment discourses, acade-
mic feminism, and traditional evangelical gender roles. This discourse reveals a new 
  Interestingly, the same hashtag was used before the Christianity Today article by organizers of the 13
Women’s March, and then five months later in September of 2017 in an attempt by some Twitter users to 
focus on women’s voices on the platform. It is unclear whether or not Christianity Today, in promoting the 
use of this hashtag for respondents to their article series on women in evangelicalism was trying to connect 
the conversation to the Women’s March, and it is also unclear whether the use of it later was connected to 
their earlier use of it by the Christian Tweetosphere. My analysis focuses, then, on the time period in which 
this hashtag hailed a specific group of Christians responding to the issues raised by the first Christianity 
Today article in the series posted in late April 2017. 
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evangelical feminism that has come into being through social media and has created a 
crisis of authority in evangelical culture. As such it provides another example of the ways 
in which digital habitus is transforming evangelical culture and creating a digital uncon-
scious that has real stakes for the American evangelical social imaginary. But, while the 
previous chapters in this study have focused on evangelicals producing technological 
products for Christian ends who were by a large margin men, this chapter looks at users, 
and more specifically female users, and analyzes how digital habitus fits into their lives, 
how it forces specific types of performances, and how because of this, it shifts and com-
plicates the established norms of evangelical culture.  
Investigating an affective public on Twitter 
Twitter has become a robust site for academic study because it has been seen by 
scholars as a particularly salient space for counterpublics to cohere. Through the hashtag 
function, topics can be debated by the platform’s whole user base, not just by those peo-
ple who identify as “friends” or “followers” as on Facebook (see Papacharrissi, 2015, p. 
27) and because of this, Marwick and boyd (2011) argue that we should conceptualize 
audience on Twitter not as we have thought of mass media audiences in the past, but 
rather as networked audiences (p. 129). Twitter’s functionality also allows for amplifica-
tion of otherwise marginalized voices via networked connections, as has been the case in 
the United States with the debate over racism following the police shooting of an un-
armed black teenager in Ferguson, Missouri (see Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015; 
Bonilla and Rosa, 2015), and debates around feminism and sexism (see Latina & Docher-
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ty, 2014; Clark, 2014; Williams, 2015). Scholars have also studied how Twitter has 
helped to connect networks of activists around the world around issues such as the con-
flict in Gaza (see Siapera et al. 2015), and the protests after the 2009 Iranian election (see 
Mottahedeh, 2015). Perhaps the best exemplar of how networked counterpublics thrive 
on Twitter is what has come to be dubbed “Black Twitter.” Black Twitter has proven so 
influential to contemporary political culture that The Los Angeles Times hired beat re-
porter Dexter Thomas to cover it (Greenberg, 2015). This Twitter-based counterpublic 
has piqued the interest of journalists and academics alike because it demonstrates how the 
platform can be used by a network of loosely affiliated people to change public conversa-
tion and effect the real world (see Chatman, 2015; Florini, 2014; Clark, 2014; Brock, 
2012; Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015). Black Twitter may also be thought of as an 
affective public (see Papacharissi, 2015) in which personal, emotional engagement with 
issues translates into political engagement, such as with the hashtag #IfTheyGunnedMe-
Down (Jackson, 2016) and other “blacktags” (Sharma, 2013) that hail those users that 
make up Black Twitter and allow for a space for affective connection to take place 
through the medium.   
The theory of affective publics outlined by Papacharissi (2015) is especially 
useful to consider in this context. One scholar of affect theory, Lauren Berlant, has writ-
ten that “Affect’s saturation of form can communicate the condition under which a histor-
ical moment appeals as a visceral moment” (Berlant, 2011, p. 16). The affective, physical, 
or visceral reaction a person may have to any given situation, for Berlant is not only per-
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sonal, but collective. It is a reaction to a historical, collective present. Papacharissi brings 
affect theory into the digital realm and she concludes that what is created from network 
publics on Twitter are “soft structures of feeling” following Williams, or “affect worlds” 
following Berlin and these theorizations provide the basis for her term “affective publics” 
(2015, p. 116-117). For Papacharissi Twitter discourses see people engaging on a person-
al level with large-scale political ideas, and they open a space in which storytelling can 
take place. By employing hashtags, users can connect their personal stories, ideas, opin-
ions to others, and be hailed by “connective networks.” Users begin to feel part of some-
thing larger, even when that thing is amorphous and mediated and in turn they perform a 
version of themselves within these connective networks and “these personal declarations 
of the self also contain collectivist or civic aspirations” (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 105). Af-
fective publics, then, in Papacharissi’s sense of the term, with their rhythm and move-
ment, with their emotionality, urgency, and senses of play and irony are complex spaces 
of engagement that require attuned attention. Thus affective publics on Twitter are partic-
ularly suited to ethnographic study.  
In this chapter, I employ the method of hashtag ethnography that follows from 
the understanding laid out by Bonilla and Rosa in their study of the hashtag #Ferguson 
(2015). The authors note that the functionality of the hashtag proves useful for anthropo-
logical study as it resembles the note taking and indexing that ethnographic researchers 
engage in. Beyond that, a hashtag can be a “mediatized place” where people gather to 
discuss and participate in protest movements and other forms of activism. Bonilla and 
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Rosa acknowledge that when approaching Twitter ethnographically, a researcher should 
not stop at the hashtag, but should “stay with those who tweet and follow them after 
hashtags have fallen out of ‘trend.’ Only then can we better understand what brings them 
to this virtual place and what they take away from their engagement” (2015). Thus a 
hashtag ethnography goes beyond a close reading of Twitter search results. It is a long-
term participant-observation project that requires daily engagement. By following several 
networked accounts for an extended period of time a researcher may begin to glean the 
affective valences and frames of the hashtag and this is especially significant when it 
comes to how counterpublics imagine themselves and their collective identities on social 
media because as Bonilla and Rosa write, “Whereas in most mainstream media contexts 
the experiences of racialized populations are overdetermined, stereotyped, or tokenized, 
social media platforms such as Twitter offer sites for collectively constructing counternar-
ratives and reimagining group identities” (2015). It is through social media discourse that 
the complex boundaries of identity and belonging can be negotiated.  
This method fits well with my understanding of the digital unconscious in 
evangelical culture. It is through participation and observation from within the paths of 
this unconscious that a researcher may begin to understand the tropes, and the stakes of 
the digital realm. Furthermore, the #AmplifyWomen controversy is particularly suited to 
hashtag ethnography because unlike the many protest movements that have had a social 
media presence, this discourse is endemic to social media; it was a mediated event from 
the moment that Christianity Today posted the article online and thus has only existed in 
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the digital unconscious. It has never had a real-world, conscious presence. On Twitter, 
prolific Tweeters “signal boosted” other writers using the retweet function and producing 
Tweets telling others who else they should be following, thereby strengthening the net-
work. Similarly many Twitter users responded with long manifesto-like threads on the 
platform, and again, these threads sparked related debates. The Twitter conversation also 
burst out into the blogosphere with people taking to Medium and other platforms to ex-
press their opinions on the original article.  In turn those articles were sometimes Tweeted 
out and entered back into the conversation on social media and they often enjoyed large 
numbers of commenters.  
Many of the women who Tweeted mentioned how emotionally taxing it was for 
them to participate. One person wrote about the debate: “I’m tired. I laugh at the hilarious 
comebacks to the subjugation of women because my own wounds are so far from heal-
ing” (EB_FindingMercy, 2017). Overwhelmingly, the women who participated in the 
hashtag conversation did not see themselves as impartial observers commenting academi-
cally about evangelical gender roles, but rather saw themselves and their life choices as 
implicated by the discourse. Because of this they shared words of encouragement with 
each other just as much as they engaged in heated debate with those that disagreed with 
them and many shared their personal stories through Twitter threads. Jory Micah, for ex-
ample, wrote of experiencing gender discrimination in Bible School and being told that 
she could not be a pastor because she was a woman. She writes, “I was devastated. I 
thought I wasted my life. I questioned my calling/my faith, until God told me to start a 
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blog/ministry” (jorymicah, 2017). For Micah and others, when Warren spoke of ordaining 
female bloggers, it connoted a history of silencing female voices. And this points to why 
the discourse maintained an emotional tenor and became a space for collective story-
telling, and mutual encouragement.  
Responding to the robust and diffuse discussion that followed the article’s re-
lease, editors at Christianity Today added a note to the original article that stated in part, 
“the conversation continues to spread and split into what scientists call a dendritic—a se-
ries of branching pathways that resemble a tree or a nervous system.” (Warren, 2017). In 
my analysis, I take the hashtag #AmplifyWomen as an entry point into this nervous sys-
tem. I became aware of the controversy because I have followed prominent Christians on 
Twitter, including many female bloggers, since I began using the platform in 2014. As the 
discourse unfolded I followed as many of the active accounts as I could, checking in daily 
and sometimes participating by liking or commenting on the Tweets of prolific posters. I 
collected notes and screenshots as a means to keep track of the discursive shifts, com-
monly used memes, and recurring characters. And I continued to follow these account for 
six months after the hashtag fell out of use. As such, my analysis is based not only on the 
hashtag #AmplifyWomen, but also on the mediated social world from which its public 
springs. 
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Evangelicalism and feminism 
 From the beginnings of evangelicalism in America, as it took on the populist, re-
vivalist themes that would come to define it, the role of women as public figures has been 
uneasily debated. As Marilyn Westerkamp explains, Puritan women who publicly ex-
pressed their views created a paradoxical situation Puritan culture, especially in the sev-
enteenth century when its traditionally hierarchical social structure began to be swept up 
in revivalism. During this time, Puritan “celebrity” Anne Hutchinson became a problem-
atic figure for church leaders because “her spiritual gifts were recognized and admired, 
leading people, women and men, to grant her speech authority” (Westerkamp, 2007 p. 
54). Like the female bloggers causing today’s “crisis,” women like Hutchinson, because 
of their popularity, troubled religious leaders especially when they espoused views at 
odds with Puritan orthodoxy–– in the case of Hutchinson Puritan leaders decided the only 
recourse was to exile her from their community.  
 Much has changed in evangelical culture and theology since the seventeenth cen-
tury, but evangelicals today are still split on the how women should occupy spaces of 
power and authority in evangelical ecclesiastical structures and in culture. Though the 
landscape is complicated, the evangelical position on gender relations has typically been 
characterized by scholars with regard to the schism between egalitarians and complemen-
tarians. Egalitarians believe that women and men are equal, and though they are gifted 
with different abilities, they should have equal access to power and authority within 
churches and families. Complementarians, by contrast, believe women and men are 
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meant to fulfill distinct roles in culture and in families; that men are meant to lead and 
women to support, for example. Further muddying the waters, this split does not fall neat-
ly along denominational lines, can vary from church to church, and can even shift 
throughout a single church’s history. Nonetheless, complementarianism tends to be the 
accepted position in most traditional American evangelical churches.  
Complementarianism in some ways rigidly fixes gender roles, but in her ethno-
graphic account of two fundamentalist Christian congregations Brenda Brasher (1998) 
theorizes that the complementarian church is a “sacred canopy with a sacred partition,” 
meaning that women occupy enclaved spaces and exercise their authority from within 
these strictures. According to Brasher this has the effect of “Establishing parallel religious 
worlds: a general symbolic world led by men that encompasses overall congregational 
life and a second, female symbolic world composed of and led solely by women” (Brash-
er, 1998, p. 5). Thus, though men are in positions of nominal authority, women find ways 
to manipulate the structure in which they find themselves in order to create space for their 
own voices. Ethnographic and qualitative studies focusing on evangelical women like 
Brashers’ then, paint a more complex picture than the simple split between complemen-
tarian and egalitarian theology allows. 
And though complementarians tend to reject feminism qua feminism, it would 
be a mistake to assume that they are cut off from the vagaries of popular and academic 
feminist discourse. Manning (1999) found in her qualitative research with conservative 
women from Catholic, evangelical and Orthodox Jewish faiths that although they claim 
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to be against feminism, most conservative religious women agree with many, if not all, of 
the values of feminism; they tend to enjoy working outside of the home, expect fairness 
in their workplace, and hold positions of authority in their families. And as Griffith’s 
(1997) ethnographic account of Aglow, a prayer organization for charismatic Christian 
women reveals, evangelical women have developed various tactics and narratives of em-
powerment that borrow from discourses found in popular culture and in feminism. For 
Griffith, it is a mistake for feminists to write off conservative Christian women and their 
experiences as the complexity of their engagement with authority in their churches and in 
society is in fact much more complex than the Culture War paradigm allows.  
 The variegated landscape of evangelical gender relations has become even more 
complex in the postfeminist moment. “Postfeminism” is a contested term with sometimes 
conflicting referents (see Gill, 2007, p. 249-272). Here, I am using it as Rosalind Gill has 
theorized–– as a sensibility marked by certain predilections present in media and popular 
culture that is “organized around notions of choice, empowerment, self-surveillance, and 
sexual difference and articulated in an ironic and knowing register in which feminism is 
simultaneously taken for granted and repudiated” (Gill, 2007, p. 271). This sensibility 
relies on an understanding that many of the struggles of second-wave feminism have 
been overcome and thus feminism is no longer needed. This sensibility takes as proof 
positive the many individual women who have succeeded in their careers and in govern-
ments. As Sarah Banet-Weiser puts it “The individual entrepreneur becomes the signature 
of a postfeminist women” (2012, p. 61). Thus it is a sensibility that relies on a neoliberal 
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understanding of the economic and political world and regards with irony any attempt to 
critique the culture of late capitalism. For another theorist of postfeminism, Angela 
McRobbie (2009), this is the result of an insidious process that has in effect neutered po-
tentially radical female critique. She writes of the expectations for women in a postfemi-
nist culture: “The new female subject is, despite her freedom, called upon to be silent, to 
withhold critique in order to count as a modern, sophisticated girl. Indeed this withhold-
ing of critique is a condition of her freedom” (McRobbie, 2009, p. 18). McRobbie looks 
to popular culture and explores the ubiquitous idea that women can now “have it all”–– a 
well-paying job and a successful family life--without relying on female solidarity or call-
ing for social change.  
For McRobbie and others, media is central to the construction of a postfeminist 
sensibility. Susan J. Douglas (2010) explored the media landscape in the 1990s and 
aughts in order to chart the rise of “enlightened sexism,” the ironic register in which pop-
ular culture recognizes and repudiates feminism. Douglas is particularly concerned with 
the simultaneous girlification and sexualization of women in media which she believes 
has had the effect of setting up overly sexualized bodies and girlish, submissive personal-
ities as normative femininity. With the rise of social media and social media celebrity this 
has become increasingly the case. And those women with popular blogs, or “Instafame” 
on social media (see Marwick, 2015) are central in shaping what the ideal woman looks 
like at any given moment. As Anita Harris writes about the figure of the “future girl” who 
creates a mediatized persona for herself, it is in and through media that the promises of 
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postfeminist rhetoric can be both displayed and policed (2004). In other words, social 
media shapes a certain female habitus that has implications for how women perform 
themselves on and through these platforms.  
In some ways then, it makes sense that traditional, conservative women would 
fit well in a media milieu that prizes traditional femininity. But this is just half of the pic-
ture. Though in the 1970s and 80s evangelical women became vanguards of a traditional 
femininity constructed in opposition to the burgeoning feminist movement and are often 
seen as the reason for many of feminism’s failures in the public sphere (see Stacey, 
1983), as Susan Faludi’s research illuminates, the picture within evangelical culture was 
always more complex. Faludi writes that the “backlash politics” of the New Right in the 
1980s was largely predicated on the fact that Christian men had lost authority in their 
own churches and families. These men, Jerry Fallwell and Paul Weyrich, chief among 
them, advocated a return to a fabled 1950s vision of womanhood that would have kept 
evangelical women in what they believed was their rightful, Biblical place. In order to 
roll back the clock on women’s rights, they developed a rhetorical strategy that relied on 
a positive sounding message.They were “pro-family” and thus, nominally pro-women, 
and they strategically deployed evangelical female spokespeople to help spread their anti-
feminist vision. Connaught Marshner and Beverly LaHaye epitomized the women of the 
New Right who as Faludi writes, “were voicing antifeminist views––while internalizing 
the message of the women’s movement and quietly incorporating its tenets of self-deter-
mination, equality, and freedom of choice into their private behavior” (256). In many 
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ways, the backlash politics fueled by the reactionary fervor of evangelical men won out 
and neutralized feminist critique, but feminism within evangelical culture was never 
completely squashed.  
 Since the 1980s, the debate about feminism and women’s proper role in the 
church and in culture has raged. Evangelical parachurch organizations have arisen pro-
moting egalitarianism and an evangelical version of feminism that borrows from second-
wave and academic feminist discourses. Thus, perhaps as a backlash to the New Right’s 
vitriol towards feminism, a reawakening of feminism within evangelical circles has oc-
curred, especially among those who consider themselves egalitarians. The organization 
CBE International (Christians for Biblical Equality) established in 1988 is one example 
of this trend. Though CBE does not claim to be feminist per se, it advances an agenda 
through conferences and media products defined by feminist understandings of female 
authority, power, and choice. Their third value in their “Core Principles,” for example, 
states: “Patriarchy is an abuse of power, taking from females what God has given them: 
their dignity, and freedom, their leadership, and often their very lives” (CBE In-
ternational, 2017). That a Christian organization rails against “patriarchy” in their mission 
statement is an indication that the evangelical rejection of feminism is an overdetermined 
narrative. Sarah Bessey’s book Jesus Feminist (2013) is another example of this trend 
toward evangelical versions of feminism. In it, Bessey recalls her own familial and per-
sonal history in both complementarian and egalitarian churches, refutes many of the 
commonly used Biblical justifications for the submission of women to male authority, 
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and calls for a new “redemptive movement––for both men and women––toward equality 
and freedom” (2013, p. 14). Bessey emphasizes the importance of collective storytelling 
and of solidarity among women from all over the world and these themes echo in the 
public that engaged with Warren’s article on the hashtag #AmpilfyWomen.  
The discourse that followed the Christianity Today article is another indication 
that feminism is not dead in evangelical culture, and in fact may be facing a renaissance 
due to the affordances of social media. The (mostly) women and (some) men with that 
engaged with the debate that flurried around the Christianity Today article and that cen-
tered around the #AmplifyWomen hashtag deployed various cultural touchstones, often 
displayed a fluency with the argot of academic feminism, and contemporary pop-culture 
postfeminism as well as with theological justifications for their understanding of their 
own role and the role of women in evangelical culture and society. What erupted through 
the #AmplifyWomen hashtag was an affective public that has been many years in the 
making, one uneasily defined by feminism, postfeminism, neoliberalism, and evangelical 
theology. Importantly, what was expressed shared little in common with the “Pitbull fem-
inism” embodied most famously by Sarah Palin and that saw evangelical anti-feminist 
women hope to attain positions of power in order to dismantle any feminist gains (see 
Butler, 2012; Douglas, 2010, pp. 267-297; McCarver, 2012; Rodino-Colocino, 2012). It 
is rather a real feminist movement, inspired and fueled by female Christian writers, to 
promote a diverse array women’s voices in a patriarchal subculture.  
!182
The Crisis 
New Charismatic Authorities: Social media habitus and postfeminist performance in the 
Christian blogosphere 
 “The crisis” identified by Tish Harrison Warren was predicated on the popularity 
that female Christian celebrities have gained on social media, because of this popularity, 
Warren warned that bloggers were gaining outsized influence in evangelical culture–– in 
other words they were becoming authorities. Because of this, Warren suggested that 
bloggers should be held accountable by formal bureaucratic authorities such as pastors. 
Max Weber (1968) divided authority into three types: Rational or legal authority, tradi-
tional authority, and charismatic authority. Defining charismatic authority he writes that it 
relies on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an in-
dividual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by 
him” (Weber, 1968, p. 215). The female bloggers at the center of “the crisis” and of the 
affective public it called into being share many things in common, but most importantly, 
they have all created self-brands on social media and in so doing they employ an under-
standing of what it means to be an “authentic” Christian woman, thereby displaying and 
policing the boundaries of modern Christian womanhood in and through social media, 
and, in so doing, bolstering their charismatic authority. Their feminine performance is in 
some ways a result of the normative vision of femininity endemic to the evangelical so-
cial imaginary, but it is also a product of the habitus that social media engenders.  
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On social media people are encouraged to develop a “self-brand,” a notion that 
follows from a ubiquitous understanding of the power of the brand. And Sarah Banet-
Weiser connects this to postfeminism noting “Postfeminism and interactivity create what 
I would call a neoliberal moral framework, where each of us has a duty to ourselves to 
cultivate a self-brand” (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p. 56). Yet, self-branding to be successful, 
must be somewhat invisible. That is, if it is clear that a social media celebrity is trying to 
promote themselves, they lose that crucial air of authenticity–– and “authenticity” is cur-
rency on social media. As Alice Marwick has written, authenticity, though a slippery 
term, is one of the guiding principles of social media presentation. In her study of the cul-
ture of Silicon Valley entrepreneurship, Marwick discusses how the cultivation of “au-
thenticity” in social media is a type of emotional labor and is central for the maintenance 
of a self-brand, the most powerful commodity in the social media world-- a commodity 
that she notes also has real economic value (see Marwick, 2013, p. 167). Self-branding is 
central to the working of social media and it encourages a specific type of performance 
that is ongoing, and indeed fits into daily life by design. Successful social media celebri-
ties post photographs and selfies daily, and thus constantly reinforce their brand through a 
performative habitus demanded by the medium.  
Though I will argue that these women at the center of a new evangelical femi-
nist movement, they all brand themselves within a narrow understanding of the meaning 
of femininity that relies on reified notions of the role of women as homemakers, and as 
caregivers and in this way they perform their identities within the norms of a social media 
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landscape dominated by postfeminist sensibilities. Jen Hatmaker, for example, on the 
“about me” section of her website first emphasizes her role as a mother and a wife and 
then says, “I love Jesus. I am absolutely that girl. I feel so tender toward Him that some-
times I think I'll die” (Hatmaker, 2017). Hatmaker’s emotional, indeed girly characteriza-
tion of her spirituality is part and parcel of her authenticity. She does not portray herself 
as a theologian or even as a woman, but rather as a down-home girl, whose love of Jesus 
and her family guides everything she does. Beth Moore provides another example of how 
self-branding functions along a narrow path for evangelical women bloggers. Like Hat-
maker she presents herself as a mother and wife first and her role as a Christian is charac-
terized as an abiding passion, “At the age of 18, Beth sensed God calling her to work for 
Him. Although she couldn’t imagine what that would mean, she made it her goal to say 
yes to whatever He asked” (Moore, 2017). Again, her theological understandings is char-
acterized as coming from a place of girlish passion and her pursuits, though deeply-felt, 
as generally submissive. These women also style themselves and their photos in a similar 
way. They wear conservative but fashionable clothing, they often photograph themselves 
lit in golden-hour light, they have fun, goofy pictures of themselves on social media and 
their personalities seem to match their style. They come across as approachable mom 
types. This type of self-branding is common in the postfeminist media landscape where 
girliness, beauty, and traditional femininity are prized. These Christian women are “hav-
ing it all” in their own way––they are mothers and wives, but they also hope to “spread 
the gospel,” preach, teach, and speak out in evangelical culture.   
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 And because of this, despite their folky femininity, these women pose a threat to 
evangelical authority and are at the root of what Tish Harrison Warren calls “the crisis.” 
 Postfeminist tropes of femininity have helped some evangelical bloggers become 
celebrities and thus, they are seen as dangerous figures. Their digital habitus on display 
also adds to their authority. Banet-Weiser notes that “Self-branding, in the postfeminist 
context, becomes the selective hallmark of how to insert oneself into the future, as savvy, 
technologically astute, and invested in visibility” (Banet-Weiser, 2012, p. 86). Evangeli-
cal women writers and bloggers want to stake a claim on being modern, and to achieve 
this they turn to digital habitus and the mores of the social media milieu.  
 Yet, though savvy self-branding techniques have helped these women gain the 
followers that they have, they have expressed uneasiness with the practice. In a Tweet 
that has since been deleted Moore said she was “sick to death” of personal branding, and 
noted that “It'll be a grievous mistake to cater to culture with a selfie gospel. All we'll lose 
are numbers that weren't real anyway. Preach the cross.” She was a strange figure to be 
voicing this critique as she has made her name in evangelical culture through her video 
ministries, all plastered with her name and face, and marketed to Christian women’s 
groups. Later clarifying her position on her blog Moore wrote:  
Selling our souls doesn’t always involve money. I could sell my soul just for 
the power of having a blog that attracts hundreds of thousands of readers. It’s 
about notoriety, an understandable and legitimate goal out in the world market. 
But we are Jesus followers. We’re attempting to sell ourselves in the name of 
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Jesus. We’re being tutored in the post-Christian modern art of self-glory for 
God’s glory. (2017). 
Moore struggles with social media’s seeming insistence on this specific perfomative habi-
tus, the maintenance of a self-brand. And though she states succinctly, “There is no godly 
way to self-promote” (Moore, 2017), she also notes that she falls victim to this imperative 
of social media. Here, Moore voices the bind in which evangelical female bloggers find 
themselves. To self-promote self-consciously would be inauthentic, and further, would be 
a type of selling out that Moore characterizes as “post-Christian,” however, it is through 
self-promotion that her platform has thrived. Moore herself, despite her protestations 
against it, is a master of the self-brand and because of this she has nearly 800 thousand 
followers on Twitter. But as Moore’s polemic against self-branding reveals some self-
awareness of the fact that self-branding is ultimately a neoliberal exercise. Nonetheless, 
Moore has continued to post selfies on Twitter, she has continued to cultivate her brand in 
the months that followed this article. And it is because the bloggers at the center of the 
#AmplifyWomen controversy have mastered the postfeminist art of the self-brand that 
they have the audience that they have. These women have become authorities in Christian 
culture by creating a self-brand that relies on an understanding of what it means to be an 
authentic Christian woman. Interestingly, that charismatic authority achieved by deploy-
ing their authentic, normative, Christian femininity has been leveraged against the tradi-
tional authoritative structures of evangelical gender relations––again, this is why it was 
dubbed a “crisis” by Christianity Today. And that the perceived attack on these new au-
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thority figures that the Christianity Today article seemed to levy, opened up a space for 
individual women to come forward, form connective bonds with others, and create a new 
feminist affective public.  
A populist religion meets a democratic medium 
 Women drew upon two social imaginaries in their response to the article, that of 
evangelicalism as a particularly democratic religious tradition and that of the internet as a 
democratic space for expression. Arguing against Warren’s thesis, the idea that the Christ-
ian blogosphere should be accountable to a more formal authority, Twitter users deployed 
both of these ideas on the hashtag #AmplifyWomen as a way to defend the practice of 
blogging, which they characterized as e a space for female expression in evangelical cul-
ture. 
Responding on her own blog, Christian writer, Keri Wyatt Kent explained why 
she disagreed with Warren and echoed a sentiment that was often repeated in the #Ampli-
fyWomen conversation. She wrote: “To ask why women don’t serve within the authority 
and structure of the church is a bit tone deaf. The people ‘in charge’ of many Christian 
women have told them to sit down, be quiet, or go change some diapers in the 
nursery” (Kent, 2017). For Kent and others the blogosphere has become a place of refuge 
for Christian women, much like the ministries from which women have traditionally ex-
ercised their authority. But unlike those ministries, the internet has provided women with 
platforms from which they can preach to large audiences, albeit unofficially. Digital habi-
!188
tus has liberated many female voices, and because of this, to corral blogging under the 
authority of church culture, as Warren seems to suggest is the purpose of her article, 
would be akin to telling women to go back, sit down, or to change diapers in the nursery.  
 The blogosphere provides a corrective to the entrenched patriarchal authority of 
the church world and as such, many argued, it should not answer to any authoritative 
structures. A Twitter user calling herself “April Persisting” wrote, “If I thought the broad-
er church was completely right about everything (especially women in ministry), I 
WOULDN'T HAVE A BLOG,” (Revolfaith, 2017; Emphasis in the original), and “Hey, 
institution that could be leading ppl astray. Would you ensure I don't say anything you 
think would lead ppl astray?" (Revolfaith, 2017). Here, the blogosphere is cast as a work-
around, a way for women to speak without having to submit themselves to the authority 
of a church that, as another user pointed out, “has almost exclusively been shaped by 
straight white men” (Carly_Hanney, 2017). As a corrective to a culture seemingly con-
trolled by white men, then, women have taken to the internet, to their own blogs. Not un-
like the women Brenda Brasher studied who occupied their side of a “sacred partition,” 
women flocked to blogging as a means of expressing themselves. But unlike those 
women who have always taught and preached to their communities in their own way, 
they found on the new medium a way to connect to thousands, even millions of people. 
They were truly amplified, and not only that they were also able to create connections 
with people who thought like them given the affordances of digital media. As Jory Micah 
Tweeted, “The blogosphere gave me the female leaders I was looking for, but couldn't 
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find in the Church - women standing up for justice” (Jorymicah, 2017b). The internet al-
lowed women like Micah access to a community they might not have otherwise found–– 
a community of like-minded women thinkers. Thus, Warren’s piece threatened a space 
that seemed tailored to women and the women on the hashtag fought to keep social media 
as a protected space for women’s voices.  
 People commonly Tweeted about the Biblical justifications for lay authority and 
used irony as a means of pointing out the hypocrisy implicit in the idea that female blog-
gers should be subject to institutional authority. They focused on the person of Jesus, who 
as many people noted, was not an ordained minister or part of a church establishment. 
One user wrote, “The funniest thing about last week's #AmplifyWomen convo & needing 
to be ordained to have a platform is that I serve the son of a carpenter” and included in 
her Tweet a Gif of pop star Rihanna winking (LysandraJanee, 2017). And another, again 
deploying irony: “Would a carpenter/stonemason from a tiny town have the correct au-
thority to write a blog? Asking for a friend” (Kimincrete, 2017). 
Many women also brought up the figure of Mary Magdalene, the woman who 
was said to have travelled with Jesus and who, in two of the gospels revealed his resur-
rection.  Megan Westra joked about Mary’s role as an authority saying: “Mary: ‘Jesus is 
risen!’Disciples: ‘Who gave you permission to say such a thing?’”(Mwestramke, 2017). 
A popular female writer, Ann Voskamp wrote a response on her blog in a litany style that 
emphasized her humility as an unordained woman and worked to connect that humility to 
other Biblical figures, “Yeah, I don’t know much of anything, except that we all need 
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each other, that we all belong to each other, but seems like maybe God has always chosen 
women who felt less than, women that no one thought were enough: Tamar was harlot, 
Ruth was an outsider, the wife of Uriah , who became the wife of David, was an adulter-
ess, and Rahab was a woman of the night” (Voskamp, 2017). This defense and the style in 
which it is voiced speaks to evangelicalism as a populist, democratic, folk religion where 
humility and humble beginnings are often prized over institutional authority. Evangelical-
ism is littered with figures, who, just as these women did, used their own Biblical exege-
ses as a means to establish their authority. The lay preachers that spread Christianity 
throughout America during the Second Great Awakening were similarly unordained. And 
like the female bloggers at the center of this “crisis” their charismatic reach threatened 
established religious order (see Fitzgerald, 2017, pp. 13-48).  
 Evangelicalism, even when it is not the religion of the lower classes, tends to be-
lieve itself to be a folk religion. Since the Second Great Awakening anti-authoritarian and 
anti-clerical sentiments have been prevalent and charisma and popularity have been pre-
requisites for leadership (see Fitzgerald, 2017). Mark A. Noll in exploring the anti-intel-
lectual “desires” of evangelicalism notes that “the evangelical ethos is activistic, populist, 
pragmatic, and utilitarian” (Noll, 1994, p. 4). Because of this, the idea of evangelicalism 
as a populist religion marries well with the idea of the internet as a democratic space. 
Blogging is an inherently democratic medium–– a common understanding that many 
users pointed out. For example, one wrote, “‘Some of these bloggers aren't accountable to 
formal church authority!’ That's not a bug, it's a feature” (Violet_Sakinacy, 2017). And 
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another: “The fact that churches can't police... diverse voices on the internet is... what 
makes the internet great” (JacksonDame, 2017). These Tweets portray Warren and evan-
gelical authorities who might police the internet as behind the times, clinging to a struc-
ture that the internet has blown up. They seem to suggest that evangelicals are struggling 
with the democratization of information itself. Austin Channing addressed this with re-
course to the history of media use in evangelical culture and the moral panics that have 
accompanied technological change, “We survived the printing press, radio, 
televangelists... I think we will survive the blogosphere, and whatever is next. I'm not 
worried” (AustinChanning, 2017). 
 The women who called upon the social imaginary of the internet as a place where 
anyone might be able to participate and the social imaginary of evangelicalism as a hori-
zontal culture, then, presented an alternate view of the evangelical church in the twenty-
first century. Their vision was a church in which all people might have the authority to 
preach or teach through the medium of the internet and in this way, many argued, they 
might break the patriarchal hold on evangelical culture that they have found to be a si-
lencing force in their individual lives. In other words, these women fought for a new ver-
sion of evangelicalism in which women can finally have an equal voice. 
Voicing a new intersectionality 
The conversation on the #AmplifyWomen hashtag had an antecedent, the dis-
course surrounding the two hashtags #ThingsOnlyChristianWomenHear and #Things-
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OnlyBlackChristianWomenHear. The former hashtag was started by a Christian female 
writer Sarah Bessey who wrote Jesus Feminist, and saw women sharing stories of being 
shamed and in some cases abused in and around church culture. A typical Tweet that used 
this hashtag referenced the subtle sexism implicit in Christian culture as women recalled 
being told things like “‘You better cover up or you'll make boys sin’” (LydLikeJar, 2017). 
Other users shared stories of abuse and oppression, like the woman who wrote “My pas-
tor told me to be a good wife and my husband wouldn't beat, rape and try to kill 
me” (RadicallySaved7, 2017). This hashtag also became a discursive space in which 
women shared stories and pushed back against people who tried to discredit their experi-
ences.  
The latter hashtag #ThingsOnlyBlackChristiansHear was started in response to 
the first by Ekemini Uwan (@sista_theology) as a way to indicate that the initial hashtag 
hailed a public that was defined by an a priori whiteness. This hashtag dealt not only with 
gender discrimination but also with racism in evangelical culture and with the intersec-
tional subjectivity of black Christian women. For example, one user recalled hearing in 
church: “‘It wasn't wrong for Christians to have slaves. They had slaves in the 
Bible.’” (Pinklady404, 2017). As the online magazine Faithfully, a publication that fo-
cuses on the concerns of Christian women of color explained, however, the hashtag 
#ThingsOnlyBlackChristianWomenHear did not garner the same amount of public atten-
tion outside of the Twitter discussion as the initial hashtag which was covered by several 
Christian media outlets (see Menzie, 2017). These dueling hashtags reveal another parti-
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tion in evangelical culture between white Christians and black Christians. Though many 
churches have explicitly attempted to create multicultural faith spaces as the research on 
Los Angeles church Mosaic by Gerardo Marti explores (2005), American churches re-
main largely segregated spaces. One ethnographic study argues that white evangelical 
churches systematically exclude people of color by applying “race tests” in white spaces 
as a form of boundary maintenance (Bracey & Moore, 2017).  
On the hashtag #AmplifyWomen, many brought up the question of intersec-
tionality and asked where women of color stood in this debate. Austin Channing, a black 
Christian writer who focuses on racial reconciliation in the evangelical church, noted of 
the article that “The Problem goes beyond we need more woc writers. The Problem is 
how often whiteness shapes, defines, is the beginning of the conversation”(Austinchan-
ning, 2017b). And Nish Weiseth, herself a white Christian writer agreed with Channing. 
Weiseth posted a thread that began “1. CT made a huge mistake by not leading & center-
ing the conversation from the perspective of women of color. Full stop” (NishWeiseth, 
2017a). In the conversation that followed, the women that participated referenced femi-
nism and intersectionality explicitly and discussed ways in which they felt that church 
culture was complicit in excluding people of color. Weiseth also referenced the fact that 
women of color are not represented on editorial boards at magazines or as writers. Self-
consciously, she noted what she felt was her place in this conversation as a white women 
standing up for the concerns of women of color: “That's why I'll keep swinging. It's not 
your responsibility. It's ours” (NishWeiseth, 2017b) and another account chimed in saying 
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“I'll keep swinging too. What the point of privilege if we don't use it to go to 
bat?” (ShannonDingle, 2017). This conversation was a striking moment that saw white 
evangelical women using anti-racism discourse along with anti-sexism discourse in an 
attempt to build a coalition.  
This is particularly significant given that many theorists have argued that post-
feminism is an ethos that prizes individualism and individual achievement above all. It is 
a neoliberal understanding of the world that does not allow for collective engagement to 
take place. Angela McRobbie has called theorized this with regard to the cultural politics 
of disarticulation (2009, p. 24-53). McRobbie draws on Stuart Hall’s understanding of 
“articulation” in politics--the idea that in a deliberative democracy political power comes 
from the ability to draw connections among multiple subjectivities–– in order to make the 
case that feminism has been disarticulated. She writes, “In social and cultural life there is 
instead a process of unpicking the seams of connection, forcing apart and dispersing sub-
ordinate social groups who might have possibly found some common cause (2009, p. 26). 
For McRobbie, feminism has been disarticulated from anti-racism and thus it is signifi-
cant to see evangelical feminists attempting to reclaim these connections.   
That anti-racism discourse did not stand out and was not criticized or silenced 
in this public is also interesting given the fact that most evangelical Christians identify as 
Republicans and 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 
election. The public that sprang forth around the #AmplifyWomen hashtag countered 
these statistics rhetorically borrowing from liberal politics and criticizing Trump. Rachel 
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Held Evans, for example, pointed out the irony of evangelicals calling for accountability 
in the blogosphere after the election of Trump: “Evangelicals: We put a racist, lying, sex-
ual predator in the oval office. Let's do a series on why Jen Hatmaker's shouldn't 
blog” (Rachelheldevans, 2017b). In many ways this public, then, runs counter to the larg-
er evangelical voting public. Yet the fact that it is comprised of popular figures perhaps 
indicates why, again, these voices may be precipitating a crisis in evangelical culture. 
Through social media a new coalition of evangelical feminists is being called into being. 
Like Hatmaker, these women do not always accept evangelical cultural or political ortho-
doxy, but both the popularity of female Christian bloggers and the affective nature of the 
public that defends them indicate that people are listening to these new shepherds of the 
flock. 
Conclusion 
Social media has provided a new means for evangelical women to gain a voice 
in evangelical culture and it is a space that women have shown they will passionately 
protect. The article in Christianity Today written by Tish Harrison Warren sparked a de-
bate that revealed the ways in which this affective public has come into being and been 
defined in and through social media. As such it wrestles with typical social media buga-
boos, the anxiety that surrounds the performative habitus of social media; the democrati-
zation of information and speech; questions of authority and celebrity––but it filters this 
through the lens of evangelical culture and theology.  
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The discourse presented here can also been seen, I argue, as establishing the 
boundaries of a new evangelical feminism. This version of feminism promotes the idea 
that women should have equal authority to men, they should be able to voice their opin-
ions in public in any way that they see fit, and that their theological and cultural opinions 
should be taken seriously. Their version of feminism does not include sexual liberation 
and only scratches the surface of gender as a construct, and in these ways, they do not 
resemble second-wave, third-wave, or postfeminist feminists. And yet, their understand-
ing of female liberation should be taken seriously as it indicates that there is a grassroots 
movement of women from a conservative subculture who identify or are beginning to 
identify as feminists. This is no small thing given the historical opposition that evangeli-
cals have put up to feminism for the last forty years and if, following McRobbie, the only 
course forward for feminism is to re-articulate the bonds that women from diverse back-
grounds share, then dismantling the narrative that claims evangelicals are anti-feminist 
this public may indicate that a stepping stone toward that goal exists. 
 The crisis is also about the encroachment of progressive politics into the arena of 
authority. Women are speaking using the language of progressive feminism. These unor-
dained, unsanctioned voices are all the more dangerous because the platforms available to 
them offer them a stage on which to create their personal brand and cultivate their 
charismatic authority. These women, many of whom have been left out of the ecclesiasti-
cal structures of their denominations, or having been siloed into traditional female roles, 
approach the medium of the internet with the intent to disrupt structures that have bound 
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their voices in the past. Because of this, the Christianity Today article struck a nerve. 
Women writers responded emotionally to the perceived threat of oppression. The democ-
ratization of information has in some ways liberated female voices in evangelicalism. Yet 
many, like Tish Harrison Warren, fear that this liberation has gone too far and that these 
women have too much authority, just as they did in the days of Anne Hutchinson. 
 In contrast to the previous case studies, which all focused on men whose goal was 
to harness the digital habitus in evangelicalism as a means to bring people closer to the 
church or to the gospel, this chapter has shown that digital habitus may also have unin-
tended consequences for evangelical culture. It is through digital habitus, through reading 
blogs, posting on Twitter, uploading selfies that a large network of women are question-
ing the roles that they have historically played in evangelical culture. And it is through 
the performative habitus of social media that new authorities are springing up. While 
many evangelicals hope that by modernizing their strategies and using technology as a 
means of outreach and community building they may remain a relevant force in contem-
porary American culture, they also run the risk of modernizing evangelical culture. In 
other words of being “in and of the world.”  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
The anti-technological option 
 Against all odds, Rod Dreher’s The Benedict Option (2017), an appeal to trans-
form American Christianity so that it might more closely resemble the ascetic practices of 
Benedictine monks, made the New York Times Bestseller list in 2017. Dreher writes that 
Christians need to retreat from politics and the public sphere and to create their own 
counter-cultural communities and he explains that these communities should build 
schools, follow strict guidelines, rules, and rituals and in many cases might require Chris-
tians to sacrifice their careers and middle-class comforts. In this way Christians in Ameri-
ca would become a network of orthodox communities of believers not unlike the many 
orthodox Jewish communities who live in the modern world, but also strictly set their 
cultural practices and daily habitus apart from it. Ultimately, Dreher urges American 
Christians to “build a Christian way of life that stands as an island of sanctity and stabili-
ty amid the high tide of liquid modernity” (2017, p. 54).  
Central to his understanding and critique of modernity is his antipathy for con-
sumer technologies and for digital habitus. Dreher writes, “Our barbarians have ex-
changed the animal pelts and spears of the past for designer suits and 
smartphones” (2017, p. 17) and he refutes the discourse that technology is a morally neu-
tral tool, as many, including Bobby Gruenewald of Life.Church, have argued.  Instead 14
  See Grenewald’s TEDx talk from 2012, available on YouTube, in which he explains how technology is a 14
neutral tool that can be used for good or evil ends. 
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Dreher implores Christians to see how the technological worldview that their interactions 
with ubiquitous media is harming their faith. He believes that the impulse in Christian 
culture to use technological tools is wrong-headed. In his view, “Technology itself is a 
kind of liturgy that teaches us to frame our experiences in the world in certain ways and 
that, if we aren’t careful, profoundly distorts our relationship to God, to other people, and 
to the material world–– and even our own self-understanding” (Dreher, 2017, p. 220). He 
prescribes strict media diets for Christians and Christian families and unequivocally con-
demns tech-saturated worship spaces. For Dreher, technology has encroached on culture 
and though many claim that it can be used for positive, even Godly ends, Dreher dissents. 
It follows from Dreher’s argument, in other words, then, not only that the medium is the 
message but that the message of smartphones and other consumer technologies is ulti-
mately an un-Christian one.  
Interestingly, Dreher seems to read the trajectory of modernity in the same way 
as many technologically-minded evangelicals in that he believes that Christians are losing 
their place in the public sphere, however, he draws radically different conclusions and 
indeed refutes many of the discourses about technology that have come to the fore in 
Christian culture in the last decade. Dreher represents the backlash to the American evan-
gelical embrace of new media technologies and his popularity proves that there is an au-
dience who is receptive to hearing these ideas. Yet less than a year after the release of 
Dreher’s book, Wired magazine reported on a megachurch pastor in Pennsylvania who 
had left his church in order to start a virtual reality (VR) church (French, 2018), smart-
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phone apps geared toward evangelical audiences have continued to proliferate, and net-
works of Christians on social media have only grown, in fact Dreher himself has become 
a popular figure on what might be considered “Christian Twitter.” Despite Dreher’s warn-
ings, then, it seems that digital habitus is continuing to shape evangelical culture and the 
digital unconscious of evangelicalism is continuing to grow.   
As I have shown with the case studies in this project, the prevailing winds in 
evangelical culture have been blowing against Dreher’s understanding of technology in 
the last ten years. Relative to other religious traditions, evangelicals have embraced new 
media technologies and have integrated them into nearly every aspect of evangelical cul-
ture–– which, as I argue is consistent with their historical attitudes toward new media 
technologies such as radio and television. Just as evangelicals have historically used me-
dia technologies to spread their message, evangelicals today take to digital media enthu-
siastically. And in their use of the internet, evangelicals have begun to conceptualize their 
place in the world in a different way. From the digital church leaders that hope to reach a 
global population, to those entrepreneurs coding for a deeper purpose, to those missionar-
ies who imagine the globe as a connected network of mobile phones, to those bloggers 
and Tweeters seeking new forms of community engagement, evangelicalism has changed 
as it has eagerly adopted the norms of the digital age. I have argued that this is the result 
of American evangelicalism, as a populist religion, a continuation of their history of using 
and remixing popular media technologies in order to remain relevant in the modern 
world. A continuation, then, of the tradition of pouring old wine in new wineskins. But, 
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my case studies also assert that their shift to the digital is different in qualitative and fun-
damental ways from other shifts throughout their history as it has shifted and shaped the 
social imaginary of evangelicalism, and changed and upended the norms, discourses, and 
practices of it.  
Central to my understanding of how evangelicalism is being shaped by digital 
habitus is my assertion that that the people who comprise this study share a digital uncon-
scious, which functions in a similar manner to Walter Benjamin’s “optical unconscious,” 
that is, as a display of collective beliefs and practices. To mine this digio-cultural assem-
blage for data, I have used various real-world and virtual methods. In attending churches 
all over the country, interviewing Christians working in tech, as missionaries, and as 
church leaders, and engaging in a “hashtag ethnography” of Christian Twitter users, I 
have found that American evangelicals have adopted the argot, idioms and habitus of 
digital culture and in so doing have created new meanings and narratives, new networks, 
spaces, and hybrid forms, and new questions within evangelicalism about who counts as 
a proper authority. 
My study has shown that American Christians have transformed their churches 
in order to appeal to a suburban culture that increasingly expects and is impressed by in-
novative technological tools and tech businesses and I take Life.Church, the “startup 
church” in Edmond, Oklahoma is the prime example of this trend and a leader in this 
movement toward a teched-up church culture. Though Life.Church is innovative in its 
approach, this “startup church” can also be seen as the culmination of evangelical church 
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growth strategies which have relied on demographic data to tailor the experience and 
style of church to the preferences of American suburbanites. Because Americans today 
engage in digital habitus, churches are now redefining themselves based on these tech-
nologies and practices, hence the startup church.  
In Silicon Valley and beyond, Christians have entered the tech industry and 
have created new apps. For some this is a way to tap a seemingly lucrative and ignored 
niche market, but for others, tech business is a place in which evangelicals might imagine 
how to redeem the business world, the tech industry, and even American culture more 
broadly conceived. Though Christian business people believe in the redemptive potential 
of technology and business, they also struggle to define their place in a corporate culture 
whose ultimate and sometimes only goal is money-making. I argue that these entrepre-
neurs also fail to reckon with the biases of the technology industry and instead often re-
produce them in their own businesses.  
In contrast to the corporate worlds of church and startup culture, Christian mis-
sionaries have employed the rhetoric of the FOSS movement in the creation of new low-
er-tech technologies that they hope will be a new key to evangelizing to unreached people 
groups. Those in the “mobile ministry” movement, inspired by free culture advocates 
have tried to imagine ways to spark indigenous media production, much as the tech in-
dustry often purports to do––though their efforts have not proven fruitful and have often 
laid bare the biases endemic to Western-based technologies and the ideologies they carry 
with them.  
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And lastly, women, whose voices have historically been pushed to the margins 
of evangelical culture, have begun to make connections and find new authorities through 
social media, even, I argue to the point of strengthening the bonds of a new connective 
evangelical feminism. Interestingly, this movement has centered around a few female 
bloggers who deploy a performative habitus on and through social media that follows the 
logic of the medium and especially its reliance on self-branding as a central practice. Yet, 
though these bloggers perform their feminine evangelical identity within the strictures of 
evangelical understandings of womanhood, they have become charismatic authorities and 
have carved out new spaces for women form networks and communities on social media 
platforms like Twitter and these women have begun to question some of the central shib-
boleths of evangelical culture including its racially exclusionary past.  
At stake in the transforming social imaginary this study charts, then, are the 
recurring tropes of evangelicalism: modernity, authority, gender, and race. At stake too 
are the myths exported from Silicon Valley culture: the myth of the meritocracy, and the 
myth of “disruption.” Each of the case studies sketched out here illustrates a way that 
Christian culture in the United States has fundamentally changed in response to what is 
seen as “the digital age” and ways in which evangelicals have attempted to exert their 
own influence on digital culture. And, if history is any teacher, evangelicals will not re-
treat, as Dreher hopes but will continue to change and adapt in response to the next inno-
vations that capture the popular imagination.  
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In offices, church basements, and homes across the country I have spoken with 
evangelicals who see their role as technological vanguards as central to the future of 
Christianity. Many believe that technological tools can and will hasten the return of 
Christ, and because of this, to ignore these tools would be wrong, even sinful. I have spo-
ken to others who see a clear market for their products and do not imagine their role in 
Christian culture going far beyond that. But in all cases I have found an evangelical cul-
ture that is interpenetrated with the habitus of digital culture. Yet as Dreher indicates, 
these changes, for some may have gone too far. Like Tish Harrison Warren, the priest 
who challenges the role of female bloggers and their charismatic authority, Dreher sees 
the technological world encroaching on traditional Christian values. 
It may be that technology is a type of spiritual kryptonite as Rod Dreher wants 
to assert, or it may be that it is the path that leads to a more robust Christian presence in 
the public sphere as most of the subjects of this study would hope. In either case it seems 
impossible to imagine an American evangelicalism that completely divorces itself from 
the technological tools that have been thoroughly embedded into the ecosystem of this 
culture. Unlike other faith traditions, evangelicals have proven themselves ready to jump 
in and try out new media. And as my case studies have shown, these experiments have 
changed what it means to worship, to proselytize, and to form communities in evangelical 
culture today. Digital culture has changed how evangelicals think and operate, and how 
they see themselves as inhabitants in the modern world and as passengers in Christian 
history.  
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Perhaps not coincidentally, along with Dreher’s critique of the technological 
trajectory of American evangelicalism, there has been a concurrent backlash in American 
culture against the sloganeering of the tech industry. Platforms like Facebook, which once 
promised a more connected world, are now coming under scrutiny for empowering hate 
groups and enabling the mass dissemination of false and misleading information.  The 15
academic discourse that had seen the future of technology as empowering to activism and 
democratic norms,  has been challenged by prominent scholars who show that the reali16 -
ty on the ground is vastly more complicated (see Tufekci, 2017). The popularity of 
Dreher’s book and his vision for the future of Christians as a counterculture in the United 
States seems to point to the continued interest that evangelicals have of keeping up with 
non only the flows, but the ebbs of the popular cultural tide.  
If it is difficult to imagine an American evangelicalism that is not infused with 
techiness, it also may be because it is increasingly difficult to imagine being an American 
without access to consumer technologies. Americans are increasingly living lives in some 
digital realm or another, whether or not they are conscious of it. It is getting harder and 
harder to opt out of digital databases that store identity-defining metadata. We have been 
conditioned to understand that our photos, files, and stored “in a cloud” somewhere. My 
study has shown that a subset of American evangelicalism is preoccupied by the possibil-
ities that digital media technologies might hold for their movement. But I also hope to 
 Myriad news articles have been published exploring how social media, and especially Facebook has en15 -
abled the spread of dangerous and misleading stories. See for example, Carey, 2017 in The New York Times. 
 See for example Benkler, 2006. 16
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have made the case that the ideals and visions of the technology industry have come to 
occupy a particular place in the American social imaginary. Ultimately, if American 
evangelicals are changing as they respond to an increasingly ubiquitous digital culture, it 
may be because we all are.  
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APPENDIX A 
A glossary of evangelical terms 
Altar call 
 Typically occurring at the end of a sermon or other Christian event, this is the  
 time when the pastor or orator urges anyone in the crowd to come to the front and  
 “be saved.” 
The Body of Christ sometimes abbreviated to The Body 
 The conceptualization of the global aggregate of all Christian believers in the   
 world.  
Capital C Church 
 As in “The Body of Christ” this refers to all Christian believers in an ecumenical  
 sense.  
The Early Church 
 The Christian church described in the Book of Acts.  
Fruit 
 This term comes from The Book of Matthew (7:15-20) that quotes Jesus as saying  
 of false prophets “You will know them by their fruits” and it refers to the idea that  
 Christians should prove themselves based on their actions rather than their words.  
 It is often used in reference to people’s behavior.  
  
Fundamentalism 
 This is a term that was inaugurated by a series of pamphlets called The  
 Fundamentals in the early twentieth century. Fundamentalists advocated for a  
 strict, literal understanding of the Bible and for Christians to retreat from worldly  
 affairs. After the Scopes trial of 1925, fundamentalism fell out of favor. Most  
 American evangelicals do not consider themselves fundamentalists today.  
Gifts  
 This refers to an individual’s spiritual strengths conceived of as springing from  
 the Holy Spirit. Though it is meant to connote spiritual gifts this term is also used  
 more broadly as when a person is said to have “the gift of organization” for  
 example.  
The Gospel 
 Specifically denotes the first four books of the New Testament, but connotes what  
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 Christians see as the “good news” of the story of Jesus Christ and his significance  
 as a savior of all people. 
The Great Commission 
 This term refers to the goal set by Jesus in the Book of Matthew (Matthew  
 28:16-20) that his followers go forth and make disciples of all people. 
Harvest 
 In the missionary context, this refers to the idea that there are souls in the world  
 that need to be spiritually harvested, or saved, as in a successful mission would  
 reap a bountiful harvest.   
Kingdom 
 Refers to the Biblical idea of the Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Heaven and  
 is used to connote a spiritual world that is under the authority of God and Jesus.  
 -work 
  Work done in service to the Kingdom. Typically missions work and church  
  work fall into this category.  
 -tools 
  Any technology that can be conceived of as helping with or doing  
  “Kingdom work.” 
Least of these 
 From the Book of Matthew (25:40), this refers to those who are poor,  
 downtrodden or in any way seen as lesser than.  
Missional 
 A way of being, or doing things that is meant to attract people to Christianity.   
Parachurch 
 A Christian organization that is not a church, usually a non-profit organization.  
Pentecost 
 A Biblical event that was said to have occurred after Jesus’ ascension from death.  
 At this moment the Holy Spirit was said to have descended on 120 of Jesus’  
 disciples. This is seen as the spiritual beginning of the Christian church. It is often  
 referenced as a theological shorthand meant to signify that all Christian believers  
 have the authority of the Holy Spirit.  
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Revival 
 Usually meant to refer to a period in a church’s history with a heightened spiritual  
 significance. Revivals have been important events in American Christianity and  
 their emotional, affective dimensions have been been shaping forces in  
 evangelicalism.  
Saved 
 The moment when a person commits to being a Christian by “accepting Jesus as a  
 personal savior.” 
Spiritual formation 
 A person’s spiritual growth path, or how a person grows in spirituality as a  
 Christian, as in how a child in the church may grow up to become a faithful adult. 
Testimony 
 The way that a Christian may “witness” their faith usually told as a personal  
 conversion story. 
The Unchurched  
 Refers to all of those people who chose not to attend church. Usually does not  
 refer to people in places where Christianity is not prevalent but rather references  
 secular people in the United States.   
Unreached people groups  
Coming from the missionary tradition this refers to the theory that there are  
ethnolinguistic groups of people that cannot neatly be divided by nation that  
have not been reached by Christianity.  
Walk, Walks, Walk with God 
 Often shortened to simply “walk,” this refers to the proverbial “walk with God,”  
 that is every individual person’s life path as a Christian. The idea of “different  
 walks” signifies diverse life experiences.  
Witness, Witnessing  
 To bear witness as a Christian is to share one’s faith with others.  
Word of God 
 Typically used to refer to the Bible.  
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APPENDIX B 
A list of books written by evangelicals that provide data for Chapter Three:  
Barna, G. (1998). The Second Coming of the Church. Nashville, TN: Word Publishing.  
Barna, G. (2005). Revolution: Finding vibrant faith beyond the walls of the sanctuary.  
 Carol Stream, IL.: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc.  
Challies, T. (2011). The Next Story: Life and faith after the digital explosion. Grand  
 Rapids, MI: Zondervan. 
Cominsky, J. (2005). The Church that Multiplies: Growing a healthy cell church in North  
America. Moreno Valley, CA: CCS Publishing.  
Dixon, P. (1997). Cyber Church: Christianity and the internet. Eastbourne, Great Britain:  
Kingsway Publications.  
Drescher, E. and Anderson, K. (2012). Click 2 Save: The digital ministry Bible. New  
 York: Morehouse Publishing.  
Friesen, D. (2009). Thy Kingdom Connected: What the church can learn from Facebook,  
 the internet, and other networks. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books.  
Hammonds, M. (2015). God, Technology and Us: How our digital life affects our faith.  
 Amherst, MA: Small Batch Books.  
Hipps, S. (2005). The Hidden Power of Electronic Culture: How media shapes faith, the  
 gospel, and church. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.  
Hipps, S. (2009). Flickering Pixels: How technology shapes your faith. Grand Rapids,  
 MI: Zondervan.  
Hunter, J. C. (2007). Church Distributed: How the church can thrive in the coming era of  
connection.  Longwood, FL: Distributed Church Press. 
Jewell, J. (2002). New Tools for a New Century: First steps in equipping your church for  
 the digital revolution. Nashville, TN.: Abingdon Press.  
Jewell, J. (2004). Wired for Ministry: how the internet, visual media, and other new  
 technologies can serve your church. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.  
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McConnell, S. (2009). Multi-site Churches: Guidance for the movement’s next  
 generation.  Nashville, TN: B&H Publishing Group. 
Murrell, S. (2011). Wiki Church: Making discipleship engaging, empowering and viral.  
  Lake Mary, FL: Charisma House.  
Rice, J. (2009). The Church of Facebook: How the hyperconnected are redefining  
 community. Colorado Springs, CO: David C. Cook. 
Schraeder, T. & Hendricks, K.D. (eds.). (2011). Outspoken: Conversations on church  
communication. Los Angeles, CA: The Center for Church Communication.  
Stephenson, M. (2006). Web-Empower Your Church: Unleashing the power of internet  
 ministry. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.  
Stephenson, M. (2011). Web-Empowered Ministry: Connecting with people through  
 websites, social media, and more. Nashville, TN.: Abingdon Press.  
Surratt, G, Ligon, G & Bird, W. (2006).  The Multi-site Church Revolution:  Being one  
 church in many locations. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan. 
Sweet, L. (2012). Viral: How social networking is poised to ignite revival. Colorado  
 Springs, CO: Waterbrook Press.  
Warren, R. (1995). The Purpose Driven Church: Growth without comprimising your  
 message and mission. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.  
Wilson, L. (2008). The Wired Church 2.0. Nashville, TN.: Abingdon Press. 
Wilson, L. & Moore, J. (2002). Digital Storytellers: The art of communicating the gospel  
 in worship. Nashville, TN.: Abingdon Press. 
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